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1 Introduction 
 
The English striker Gary Lineker once famously summarized the game of soccer with a simple 
formula: 
 
"Football is a simple game; 22 men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end,  
the Germans always win." 
 
Unfortunately (for Germany), it is not that easy. Starting in the mid-twentieth century with "The 
Baseball Players' Labor Market" by Simon Rottenberg (1956) and "The Peculiar Economics of 
Professional Sports: A Contribution to the Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market 
Competition" by Walter Neale (1964), sports economics developed as a research field for scientists. 
The research on soccer started a couple of years later with "The Labour Market in Professional 
Football" and "The Economics of Professional Football: the Football Club as a Utility Maximizer" by 
Peter Sloane (1969; 1971). With this dissertation, I contribute to the sports economics literature by 
helping to better understand the determinants of athletic, and indirectly economic, success, as 
measured by promotion and relegation. 
 
Apart from its obvious appeal from the standpoint of a passionate viewer and player, there are 
reasons that soccer inspires scientific fervor as well. Distinct characteristics of the soccer industry 
make it specifically apt for scientific research: data is very comprehensive when it comes to athletic 
success and some key statistics, such as league position at the end of a season, are readily available 
dating back over a hundred years, which enables a multitude of statistical methods. Moreover, 
success of individual teams in soccer is measurable, discrete and ordinal, which again assures a 
special fitness for valid statistical results. In addition, performance data on individual players as well 
as their salaries are readily available (at least for recent years). For these reasons research in the field 
of soccer generates not only statistically significant results for the industry, but also yields benefits 
for the advance of organizational theory and for statistical methodology beyond the boundaries of 
sports.  In no other industry is it possible to analyze, e.g., the impact of labor market liberalization 
(see, e.g., Simmons 1997; Antonioni and Cubbin 2000; Frick 2009a; Binder and Findlay 2012), the 
performance of employees (see, e.g., Scully 1974; Dawson et al. 2000b; Eschweiler and Vieth 2004) 
or the impact of management on athletic success (see, e.g., Kahn 1993; Dawson et al. 2000a; Frick 
2008) in such detail. In this dissertation, I use organizational ecology, a widely used theoretical and 
empirical approach to study the emergence, growth, change and disappearance of (the population 
of) organizations. One of its key characteristics is that it analyzes an industry from its very beginning. 
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In soccer, the data for all companies (clubs) is available, even if they only played for one season in the 
nineteenth century. In most other industries it is difficult to find data on all companies. Many 
industries date back to the nineteenth or even eighteenth century (e.g., railways). Many small 
companies that went bankrupt early on cannot be found and therefore cannot be included in the 
analyses. A complete analysis of all companies is almost impossible in most industries. 
 
From an economic standpoint, European soccer, as an industry, has developed over the last one and 
a half centuries from an amateur sport into a multi-billion-Euro industry. Revenues in European 
soccer were approximately €16 billion in 2010/11. Real Madrid alone earned almost €500 million 
(Deloitte 2012). Christiano Ronaldo transferred from Manchester United to Real Madrid in 2009 for 
over €90 million. He earns around $38 million (Badenhausen 2011) from salary and endorsement 
contracts. However, soccer as an industry is—compared to other sectors—still very small. In 
Germany, Bayern Munich was the club with the highest revenues of all 'Bundesliga' clubs: €312 
million in 2009 (Bayern München AG 2010). As a comparison, the biggest German companies in other 
sectors earn a multiple of that (Volkswagen AG (2010):  €105,187 million, Bayer AG (2010): €31,168 
million). 
 
In my research I combine a statistical method, survival analysis, which is still relatively new to the 
field of organizational theory, with matters relating to the determinants of promotion and relegation 
as measures of athletic success. My results answer the following questions: 
 
— Beyond pure financial power, what factors determine a club's probability of relegation in 
professional soccer? 
— Do the determinants of promotion and relegation differ between various countries in 
Europe?  
— Looking at leagues with relegation and promotion, do the same factors have an impact on 
promotion and relegation? 
 
Being promoted or relegated has huge implications for the affected sports clubs. External 
stakeholders such as media stations, sponsors as well as fans are less likely to pay the same price as 
in higher tier leagues. Therefore, relegated teams face a decrease in revenues. In addition, the best 
players normally leave relegated clubs to continue playing in the higher tier league. Due to the 
reduced revenues and the lower quality of the roster, raising money from banks or private investors 
to, e.g., build new stadiums, perform stadium maintenance, invest in new players, and so forth 
becomes much more difficult and the cost of capital will be higher. The revenue gap between large 
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and small clubs as well as higher and lower leagues increasingly widens. The top 20 clubs account for 
over 25% of total revenues of the European football market, leaving the smaller clubs behind 
(Deloitte 2012). Nevertheless, there are measures in place to help relegated clubs. In England, for 
example, relegated clubs receive a larger proportion of the TV revenues compared to the other 
second tier clubs. In Germany, TV revenues are distributed not only by the current position in the 
league but also the final rankings in the last seasons, leaving relegated clubs with higher revenues 
than other second tier clubs. Nevertheless, being relegated from a first division is usually associated 
with a dramatic decline in revenues for the affected teams. Consequently, athletic success measured 
by promotion and relegation is within reasonable boundaries tantamount to financial and economic 
success. Thus, from a managerial standpoint, understanding the determinants of promotion and 
relegation is highly relevant. 
 
Despite this fact, promotion and relegation have not been the focus of much research so far 
(Matheson 2006; Szymanski 2006b). The reasons may be a) that there is no promotion and relegation 
in the United States major leagues where much of the sports economics research is done and b) that 
most research focuses on championship titles and the top rather than the end of the league table. 
There are two strands of literature cover promotion and relegation as a research topic. First, 
promotion and relegation is part of the broader research topic covering the differences between 
open and closed leagues – promotion and relegation being one of the main differences between the 
two systems. In closed leagues, the same clubs compete each season. Changes in the composition of 
the league are only possible by allowing new members to the league by vote of all existing members. 
In open leagues, the weakest teams are relegated at the end of each season to a lower tier, while the 
best teams from that lower tier are promoted. This model of competition is widely used in European 
sports leagues as well as in most soccer leagues all over the world.1 The European Commission even 
characterized the promotion and relegation system as "one of the key features of the European 
model of sports" (1998). In this manner, promotion and relegation produce a key measure of athletic 
success for academic research. The second string of literature covers studies on the factors that have 
an effect on the promotion and relegation probabilities of individual clubs.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, Noll (2002), Ross and Szymanski (2002), Szymanski and Zimbalist 
(2005), Szymanski and Valletti (2005) and Szymanski (2006) have analyzed the differences between 
the promotion-relegation-system and the closed-league-system. While Ross and Szymanski (2002) 
use a theoretical approach, Noll (2002) as well as Szymanski and Valletti (2005) use data from the 
English Football Leagues to support their model empirically. Szymanski (2006) discusses the 
                                                          
1
  Major League Soccer (MLS) in the U.S. is the best known example of a soccer league without promotion and relegation.  
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differences as well as the cost and benefits of a league system with promotion and relegation. Ross 
and Szymanski (2002, p. 625) argue that "the institution of promotion and relegation tends to raise 
consumer welfare by increasing effective competition among the teams in a league." Noll (2002) 
states that players' wages as well as attendance are generally higher in open leagues. Szymanski and 
Valletti (2005) show that teams at the bottom of the league are more eager to win in an open league. 
In closed leagues, teams that cannot qualify for the playoffs anymore have no incentive to win. In 
some closed leagues with a draft system, where the worst team of the season gets to pick their new 
players first, teams may even have an incentive to lose (Taylor and Trogdon 2002). In open leagues, 
even teams at the bottom of the league have an incentive to win each game until the end of the 
season, as they could be facing relegation otherwise. In addition, the willingness to share revenues 
(e.g., from media or fans) between the teams is less in open leagues.  
 
The following paragraph outlines previous research specifically on determinants of promotion and 
relegation. To the best of my knowledge, only Frick and Prinz (2004), Dherbecourt and Drut (2009) 
and Oberhofer et al. (2010) have contributed to this topic. Frick and Prinz (2004) analyze twelve 
major European soccer leagues over a period of twenty-five years (1976-2000). Using a fixed-effects 
regression model and a limited amount of variables,2 they find the 'Bosman-ruling' to have different 
effects on promoted teams in stronger rather than in weaker leagues.3 Survival probabilities of 
newcomers in strong leagues such as England, Italy or Spain have decreased since the 'Bosman-
ruling' has become effective. Established teams in these strong leagues4 started signing many 
foreign-born top players that weaker teams cannot afford. In countries with weaker leagues such as 
Yugoslavia, Russia or Belgium, the dominant teams have lost their star players to foreign clubs. 
Therefore, survival chances of promoted teams have increased. Dherbecourt and Drut (2009) 
estimated the impact of socio-economic variables such as GDP, population or unemployment, as well 
as club internal factors such as average age of the team, coach seniority, percentage of foreign 
players or championship history on promotion and relegation. Their sample included the five biggest 
soccer leagues in Europe from 2004 to 2009. They found that regional factors play a significant role: 
Teams from regions with a larger service industry and more highly educated inhabitants have a lower 
probability of being relegated. From the nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century, soccer was a 
way for people to socialize in industrial towns (see Kuper and Szymanski 2009). Therefore, teams 
from industrial regions (e.g., Birmingham) used to be top clubs. With globalization and the decrease 
of production industry in developed countries, clubs from other regions now have increased chances 
                                                          
2
  The variables are: the number of points scored, a promotion dummy, the duration of the current spell in the league, a 
dummy for the seasons after the introduction of the three-point-rule, a dummy for the seasons after the Bosman ruling, 
a linear time trend and a variable as measurement of the competitive balance. 
3
  Strength of a league is defined by its Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) coefficient. 
4
  In European soccer leagues, players are signed and paid by the teams and not by the league (as is the case in MLS). 
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to perform well in the championship. Dherbecourt and Drut (2009) do not state the correlation 
between the industrial sector and population or the GDP. It could be that the GDP and population 
rather than the industrial sector are the drivers of promotion and relegation probabilities. In 
addition, experience in the top division, qualification for a European cup competition and stadium 
attendance reduce the probability of relegation. Moreover, the promotion probability is negatively 
impacted by GDP growth and positively by unemployment, as well as by the fact that another club 
from the same city is playing in the top division. Dherbecourt and Drut also include the shareholder 
structure of the clubs in their analyses. The fact that a billionaire owns the majority of shares of a 
club—such as Roman Abramowitsch at Chelsea London or Silvio Berlusconi at AC Milan—also 
decreases (increases) its relegation (promotion) probability. Oberhofer et al. (2010) examine the 
determinants of relegation from an organizational ecology perspective. They use a dataset from the 
'Bundesliga' starting in the 1981/1982 season and ending in the 2009/2010 season. They find that 
new teams with less experience in the first league are more likely to be relegated. Apart from that, 
they observe that the duration in the league is positively affected by a team's budget and the 
number of competitors in the local market. All other things being equal, the number of foreign 
players also increases the duration in the first division.  
 
Overall, only a limited amount of research has been dedicated to analyzing promotion and relegation 
systems in general, and specifically to factors that are responsible for teams being promoted or 
relegated. The existing research, both theoretical and empirical, is limited by geographical, temporal 
and methodological restrictions. The authors focus either on one specific country (Oberhofer et al. 
use only the German Bundesliga), a very limited time period (Dherbecourt and Drut use only a period 
of five years) or a limited number of variables to discuss their findings. A broader analysis across 
different countries, a wide range of explanatory variables and a long-term period of study on the 
determinants that influence the promotion and relegation probabilities of teams, however, is missing 
so far. 
 
My dissertation aims at filling this gap by analyzing the underlying factors using a comprehensive 
dataset for the empirical analyses in this work. In the following four chapters I discuss determinants 
of promotion and relegation in professional soccer leagues in Europe. In comparison to earlier 
research, I focus on longer time periods, a broader geographical coverage, and a broader range of 
variables. All of my estimations in the following chapters are based on at least forty-four seasons per 
league, with a maximum of 110 seasons for the English Football League in chapter 4. My method of 
research in the following chapters is survival analysis (also known as event history or duration 
analysis) to identify the factors that determine the length of time until the occurrence of an event; in 
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this case, the event is promotion or relegation of a club. This statistical method is so far 
predominantly applied in the field of organizational ecology. 
 
Additionally, I introduce an approach to increase competitive balance within a league by using 
schedule design. Giving weaker teams an easier schedule could decrease their chances of relegation 
from the first league. 
 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Each of the chapters is written as an individual 
scientific paper that is either already published or in the publishing process. While individual papers, 
they all contribute to the research questions outlined above. The following paragraphs give a short 
summary of each paper's contribution. The titles of these papers/chapters are: 
 
— Chapter 2: Infant Mortality of Professional Sports Clubs: An Organizational Ecology 
Perspective 
— Chapter 3: Location and Success in German Soccer: The Impact of Location on the 
Performance of 'Bundesliga' Soccer Clubs 
— Chapter 4: Up and Down: Competing Risks in Second Tier Soccer in the Top European 
Leagues 
— Chapter 5: Increasing Competitive Balance Differently: How Schedule Design Can Help 
Promoted Teams 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of organizational ecology and the methodology of event history 
analysis. A broad dataset is used, covering seven different professional first tier sports leagues in four 
different European countries over a period of 44 to 71 seasons, depending on the respective league. 
Organizational ecology is a widely used theoretical concept to study the impact of characteristics of 
individual organizations, the total population, and the environment on the emergence, growth, 
change, and disappearance of (populations of) organizations. It was first applied in biology to predict 
the survival of animal populations and later introduced to organization theory by Hannan and 
Freeman's (1977) seminal paper "The Population Ecology of Organizations." Organizational ecology 
has four key properties. First, it analyzes the complete history of a population of organizations (e.g., 
an industry). Second, it includes all organizations, no matter how large or small they are. Third, it 
collects detailed information on the type of entry (e.g., foundation, spin-off) or exit (e.g., dissolution, 
merger) of organizations. Fourth, it estimates the effects of different variables on the pattern of 
entry and exit. This chapter is based on joint research with Bernd Frick which has already been 
published in the Journal of Economics and Statistics (232/3 (2012)). We use different semi-
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parametric (e.g., Cox) and parametric (e.g., Gompertz or Weibull) survival models to estimate our 
models. We discuss different theory fragments within organizational ecology theory for seven sports 
leagues. Specifically, we test the liability of newness and the liability of smallness hypotheses for the 
professional sports team industry. Both features describe the fact that a club that is new to a first 
division, or small in size, respectively, has difficulties 'surviving.' In addition, we control for conditions 
that were prevailing at the time of the first entry of a club in the first division. This theory fragment is 
known as the 'founding conditions' in organizational ecology. We use team specific information such 
as number of championship titles won or average attendance as well as external information (e.g., 
number of clubs in the league, number of relegations in a league). Due to the long time period of our 
study, we exclude financial data of the clubs since it is not available for the complete period. 
 
The following, chapter 3, applies the methodology introduced in chapter 2 to a wider variety of 
variables. At the same time, I focus my analyses on a single league, the German soccer league, the 
'Bundesliga,' since its inaugural season in 1963/64. In order to fill a gap in the search for determining 
factors of relegation, I specifically consider socio-economic, club external factors that characterize 
the location of a club such as population, GDP per capita, number of companies with more than 150 
full-time employees as well as the number of other sports clubs in the region. These factors will 
probably have less influence on success in sports than factors such as the amount of money a club 
can invest in players. Therefore, they have not been widely discussed in previous research. In 
addition, club management can hardly influence external factors that are specific to the location of a 
club. They cannot increase the population or the number of companies in the area and they can only 
increase the GDP of a region marginally.5 In addition, German soccer clubs have never been relocated 
to another city, as is more common in the U.S. (see, e.g., Lewis 2001). Nevertheless, the results can 
still be interesting for investors. They can invest in a minor league club in a region that promises the 
most success if the club is promoted to the first division. 
 
Chapter 4 extends the findings from chapter 2 by adding another dimension to the methodology, 
focusing on second instead of first division clubs. They face the risk of relegation (as in first tier 
leagues) but also the chance of promotion. Again, I want to answer the question: what factors 
determine whether a club is promoted or relegated. Since clubs play for promotion and against 
relegation at the same time, I use a competing risks model as suggested by Lunn and McNeil (1995), 
a special case of the survival analysis methodology presented in chapters 2 and 3, to estimate my 
model. Competing risk models estimate the coefficients for promotion and relegation 
                                                          
5
  The club with the highest revenues in 2009 was Bayern Munich with €312 million (Bayern München AG 2010). The 
county in which Bayern Munich is located had a GDP of €70.2 billion (City of Munich Statistical Institute 2011).  
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simultaneously, using only one regression. Via competing risk analysis, estimated regression 
coefficients can be compared, in order to find different levels of impact of the variables on relegation 
and promotion. The dataset used contains information on six different second tier soccer leagues in 
Europe from as early as 1892, adding two more countries as well as several seasons in comparison to 
the data analyzed in chapter 2. Due to the long time frame, I am able to focus on variables that are 
related to the league's final tables such as number of championship titles in the first and second tier 
league, experience in the first and second division, size of the city the club is located in, the fact that 
other teams from the same city play in the first league at the same time, and so forth. Findings may 
generate information on the differences between clubs playing at the top of the league, compared to 
clubs at the bottom of the league, showing whether the same or different factors determine the 
probability of promotion and relegation. In addition, using the estimation results, I suggest a forecast 
model to generate information for club management. With the proposed early warning system, 
managers can adequately prepare their teams in seasons with high probability of promotion or high 
risk of relegation. A strategic implication could be to save money in a season with low chances (for 
promotion) or risks (for relegation) and invest that money in seasons with increased chances or risks. 
 
In chapter 5 I discuss a simple possibility to increase competitive balance in sports leagues. 
Competitive balance, another major research topic in sports economics, is a measure to describe the 
fans' expectations about who will be the winner (Buzzacchi et al. 2003). If the competition is 
perfectly balanced, then all outcomes are equally possible. This would be a situation of complete 
outcome uncertainty. If the contest is perfectly unbalanced, on the other hand, the winner is known 
in advance. Leagues and team owners have used the concept of competitive balance to impose and 
justify restrictions such as revenue sharing, transfer fees, salary caps or the draft system. In Europe, 
different measures are in place to increase competitive balance. Most leagues sell their broadcasting 
rights collectively and distribute the revenues between the member clubs (see, e.g., Parlasca 2006). 
In addition, the "UEFA6 Financial Fair Play Regulations" were introduced to prevent professional 
soccer clubs from spending more money than they earn (UEFA 2010). The implementation of these 
rules was recently postponed from 2012 to 2015. The promotion and relegation system can also be 
seen as a measure to increase competitive balance. The weakest teams of the season are replaced by 
the best teams from the minor league. Provided that these new teams are stronger than the 
relegated teams, competitive balance should increase in the next season. Empirical evidence on the 
comparison of competitive balance between open European soccer leagues and closed U.S. sports 
leagues is ambivalent. Comparing the English soccer league and Major League Baseball, Szymanski 
and Valletti (2005) show that both leagues can have a higher competitive balance dependent on the 
                                                          
6
  The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) is the administrative body for association football in Europe. 
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used measure. Analyzing a game by game dataset of the league since 1965/66, I uncover the impact 
of the schedule of a team on its win percentage. Using the estimation results, I derive easy and 
difficult schedules, i.e., schedules that help clubs increase or decrease their win percentage. The 
analysis lays the foundation to give league governing bodies two major options. First, they can use 
easy and difficult schedules to raise competitive balance in a league by giving the weakest teams the 
easiest schedule. Second, schedules can be used to generate money by, e.g., auctioning schedules, 
beginning with the easiest one, to the clubs. This money could, e.g., be distributed to weaker clubs. 
That way, these clubs could invest in better players and competitive balance would also increase. 
Overall, the survival chances of promoted teams could be increased using schedule design. 
 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the results and giving a short outlook on 
future research opportunities. 
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2 Infant Mortality of Professional Sports Clubs: An Organizational Ecology Perspective 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Apart from the most prominent and successful clubs, such as Bayern Munich, Real Madrid, 
Manchester United and Inter Milan, that have dominated their respective country's first division in 
professional football for decades already, many clubs in the European top leagues have managed to 
survive for only one season. Examples are Blau-Weiss 90 Berlin in Germany, CD Condal in Spain, 
Northampton Town in England, and A.C. Pistoiese in Italy. Moreover, each of these leagues has its 
'yoyo teams' such as 1. FC Nuremberg, Real Murcia, AFC Sunderland, or Atalanta Bergamo that have 
been relegated from and promoted to the respective country's first division several times.  
 
Half life—the age at which half of the clubs have failed—is, e.g., three years in German soccer 
(Wallbrecht 2010). This is not a bright perspective for teams that have just been promoted to the 
first division. However, this is neither a soccer nor a team sports specific problem. Half life in other 
industries is quite similar: more than 50% of all American newspapers have failed after five years (see 
Freeman et al. 1983) and for American automobile producers, half life is only one year (see Hannan 
et al. 1998). Thus, successful organizations surviving for decades are equally rare in sports as they are 
in other industries. 
 
In this paper we discuss a number of important factors influencing club survival in seven different 
professional team sports leagues in Europe using organizational ecology as our starting point. This 
approach was first applied in biology to predict the survival of animal populations and later 
introduced to organization theory by Hannan and Freeman (1977). It looks at populations of 
organizations and tries to explain the impact of characteristics of individual organizations, the total 
population, and the environment on the observable patterns of survival. The approach has been used 
before in a number of different industries such as newspapers, wineries, breweries, restaurants, 
railway companies, credit and labor unions (see, e.g., Singh and Lumsden 1990; Hannan 2005), but 
never before in sports. In line with that literature, we use event history analysis (also known as 
'survival analysis') to estimate our models. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we briefly review the available literature on 'births' 
and 'deaths' (i.e., promotions and relegations in professional team sports leagues), while section 3 
outlines the basic propositions of organizational ecology. In section 4 we present the data and some 
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descriptive evidence, in section 5, our model and the econometric results. Section 6 discusses our 
findings and section 7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
While the European Commission (1998) describes the promotion and relegation system as "one of 
the key features of the European model of sport" it is virtually unknown in North America, where the 
professional leagues are 'closed shops.' Until recently, the sports economics literature has, therefore, 
only occasionally addressed the issue of promotion and relegation. To the best of our knowledge, 
only Noll (2002); Ross and Szymanski (2002); Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) and Szymanski (2006b) 
have analyzed the differences between the (European) promotion-relegation-system and the (North 
American) closed-shop-system. While the former system is usually associated with a more balanced 
competition, more excitement for the fans and lower barriers of entry, advantages of the latter are a 
better protection of specific investments and a higher level of financial stability.7  
 
Many more papers have analyzed the relationship between team wage bills and team performance 
(for a summary of the most recent studies see, e.g., Frick (2011b) and Szymanski (2003)). While these 
studies agree that higher player salaries are usually associated with a better performance on the 
court/field, the relationship seems to be much closer in the European team sports leagues with their 
de-regulated labor market. However, due to their limited financial resources, finishing at the top of 
the league or even winning the national championship and qualifying for an international cup 
competition is not a viable option for most small market clubs in any of the European team sports 
leagues, such as soccer, hockey, basketball or handball. Since a particularly poor performance is 
usually punished by relegation and since being relegated to the respective second division is on 
average associated with a dramatic decline in revenues, avoiding relegation is a target in itself. 
 
Apart from two exceptions (Wallbrecht (2010) and Frick and Prinz (2004)) few papers in the sports 
economics literature have used survival analysis.8 Wallbrecht (2010) looked at the impact of club 
external factors, such as per capita income and the presence of competing clubs, on the sporting 
success of teams in the German 'Bundesliga,' while Frick and Prinz (2004) analyzed the impact of 
                                                          
7
  There are two other papers with a somewhat similar approach to the one we develop below: first, Oberhofer et al. 
(2010) investigated survival in professional football, but restricted their econometric analysis to the German 
"Bundesliga” and covered a relatively short period of time (1981/82-2009/10). Second, Dherbecourt and Drut (2009) 
used a larger dataset including the first and second divisions in England, Germany, Italy and Spain but covered an even 
shorter period of time (i.e., they restricted their analysis to the seasons 2005/06-2008/09) and used simple logit 
regressions to predict the individual teams’ probability of promotion (from 2nd to 1st division) or relegation (from 1st to 
2nd division). 
8
  Most of these papers studied the factors influencing career duration of either players (see, e.g., Frick et al. 2007; Frick 
et al. 2009), head coaches (Barros et al. 2009; Barros et al. 2010) or referees (Frick 2011a). 
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revenue sharing systems on the survival probabilities of recently promoted teams in twelve different 
European soccer leagues.  
 
Since 'survival' in the sense of avoiding relegation is—apart from the number of wins and ties during 
the season—for many teams an obvious measure of success in 'open leagues,' we use data from 
seven different sports leagues in four different countries to estimate various parametric and semi-
parametric regression models to identify the determinants of the clubs' length of stay in their 
respective first division. 
 
2.3 Organizational Ecology 
 
Organizational ecology is a widely used theoretical and empirical approach to study the emergence 
('birth'), growth, change, and disappearance ('death') of (populations of) organizations. In their now 
seminal paper "The Population Ecology of Organizations," sociologists Hannan and Freeman (1977) 
first outlined the characteristics of this approach that has since then become one of the cornerstones 
of organization theory. Due to its quantitative focus and its emphasis on (market driven) selection 
processes, it has, over the years, also received increasing recognition and acceptance by many 
economists. Nevertheless, a full integration of organizational ecology and industrial organization is 
yet to come (for a promising approach, see van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006). Organizational 
ecology has four key characteristics (see, e.g., Carroll and Hannan 2000): 
 
— It looks at populations of organizations and analyzes their complete history. A population is 
often an industry, but can also be just a part of that industry or some other group of 
organizations, sharing common characteristics. 
— It collects 'life history data' of all organizations, no matter how large or small these 
organizations are. 
— It records detailed information on the type of entry and exit. An entry can be the founding of 
a new organization, but also the arrival from another industry, a merger, or a spin-off from 
an already existing organization. An exit can be the closure of an organization, a merger with 
another organization or the move to another industry. 
— It estimates the effects of characteristics of individual organizations, populations of 
organizations, and the environment on the patterns of entry and exit. 
 
Chapter 2. Infant Mortality of Professional Sports Clubs: An Organizational Ecology Perspective 
13 
 
Organizational ecology contains a number of 'theory fragments,' of which 'age dependence' is of 
particular importance in the context of our paper (see, e.g., Singh and Lumsden 1990).9 The term 
'liability of newness' refers to the fact that—all other things being equal—younger firms have a 
higher failure rate (see, e.g., Stinchcombe 1965). This is primarily due to the fact that new 
organizations have to learn their role and, in addition, to compete with existing organizations that 
already have well-established relations with clients, suppliers, politicians, and the public 
administration (see, e.g., Carroll and Delacroix 1982; Freeman et al. 1983). Consequently, Hannan 
and Freeman (1984) argue that older and, therefore, 'established' organizations have higher levels of 
reliability and accountability and that these two factors work in favor of incumbent organizations in 
selection processes. Moreover, organizational ecologists have identified two other forms of age 
dependence: the term 'liability of adolescence' implies that mortality rates rise during the early years 
and decline later (see, e.g., Brüderl and Schüssler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal 1991). A plausible 
explanation is that new organizations are started with enthusiasm and a stock of capital that both 
ensure survival for a while. On the other hand, there also exists a 'liability of senescence' which refers 
to the internal inefficiencies arising from the aging of an organization (i.e., the 'power of inertia'):10 
Older organizations, on average, experience more problems when confronted with changes in the 
environment and are, therefore, much more likely to disappear from their respective market than 
are younger organizations (see, e.g., Barron et al. 1994; Ranger-Moore 1997). Since the available 
theoretical explanations are conflicting, Le Mens et al. (2011) have recently developed a model in 
which the hazard of failure depends on the stock of organizational capital, and the rate of its 
accumulation depends on fitness. Organizational fitness, in turn, is particularly high in (rather) young 
and in (rather) old organizations. However, although past success (indicating a high degree of 
organizational fitness) is likely to lead to a better performance in the future (see, e.g., Levinthal 
1991), the selection process is not completely free of error (see, e.g., Levinthal and Posen 2007). It is, 
for example, possible that the long-term-strategy of developing young players is punished by failure 
(i.e., relegation to the second division) while the short-term strategy of signing experienced (and, 
therefore, expensive) players is rewarded by avoiding failure (relegation). In the industry that we are 
interested in—the professional team sports industry in Europe—newcomers are likely to be at a 
disadvantage compared to established clubs, since the latter have accumulated knowledge, have 
built routines and have established structures that foster survival in a highly competitive 
environment, where failure to adapt is punished very quickly (within a single season). 
                                                          
9
  The other concepts are 'inertia' (the ability of surviving organizations to adapt to changes in the environment), 'niche 
width' (the distinction between 'generalists' and 'specialists'), 'resource partitioning' (predictions about the founding 
and mortality rates of generalists and specialists as a function of market structure, (see, e.g., Carroll 1985) and 'density 
dependence' (the founding and mortality rates of organizations as a function of the number of organizations in a 
particular market, (see, e.g., Freeman and Hannan 1983; or Hannan 1986)). 
10
  The term 'liability of obsolescence' refers to an increasing mismatch of an organization’s structure and capabilities with 
its environment. 
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Of equal importance is the concept of 'liability of smallness' (see, e.g., Freeman et al. 1983) 
emphasizing a close positive relationship between the size of an organization and its survival 
probability, suggesting that larger organizations (or those serving larger markets) have lower 
mortality rates. According to Aldrich and Auster (1986) selection processes favor organizations with 
structural inertia and inertia increases with the size of an organization for a number of reasons. First, 
small organizations have more difficulties raising new capital. Second, tax laws create an incentive for 
small firms to be sold to larger ones. Third, government regulation has a less favorable impact on 
small organizations. Finally, small firms have fewer possibilities to offer an internal labor market with 
a high degree of job security and experience, and therefore, have more difficulties attracting talented 
employees from the external market. 
 
Moreover, environmental conditions at the time a particular organization is founded are likely to 
affect that organization's survival probability, too (see, e.g., Stinchcombe 1965). Some of the 
founding conditions—in particular, population density, niche width and macroeconomic situation—
affect an organization and its performance throughout its complete life cycle (see, e.g., Carroll and 
Delacroix 1982; as well as Carroll and Huo 1986). We will not address the important issue of 
organizational legitimacy (see, e.g., Singh et al. 1986) because we assume that there is hardly any 
variation in the industry that we are looking at (i.e., the different teams are likely to enjoy the same 
level of legitimacy). This, in turn, implies that the reasons for failure are differences in capabilities 
and the quality of internal coordination processes. We will return to this issue in the final section of 
our paper. 
 
We use the concept of 'organizational ecology' to explain the patterns of 'birth' (i.e., arrival in the 
respective first division) and 'death' (i.e., relegation from that division) to explain changes in the 
composition of professional team sports leagues. We admit that relegation is different from real exit, 
but nevertheless think that the logic of organizational ecology is applicable here. Relegation is 
nothing but a (usually involuntary) move to another (usually less lucrative) market, where the 
available resources may be used in a way that either allows returning to the more attractive market 
or exploiting the potential of the initially less lucrative market. Many second division clubs seem not 
to be interested in getting promoted, as this would require the mobilization of resources that are—
whether falsely or correctly—considered far too expensive. 
 
Moreover, organizational ecology has, in the past, not only been used to explain failures (in the sense 
of the 'deaths' of organizations), but also mergers, i.e., the 'absorption' of particularly successful 
newcomers by already established firms (see, e.g., Bröcheler et al. 2004). It has also already been 
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used to research the performance of start-up as well as established companies (see, e.g., Brüderl et 
al. 2007, Hinz 1994, Woywode 1998). It has also been used to analyze the duration of albums on 
ranking charts (Bhattacharjee et al. 2007), the survival of movies in cinemas (Mezias and Boyle 2005), 
the duration of Broadway shows (Simonoff and Ma 2003) and the duration of books on bestseller 
lists (Clement et al. 2007). 
 
Using populations of professional sports teams has five major advantages over most other industries. 
First, the necessary data is available from the very first year of all leagues under consideration. 
Second, the 'birth' as well as 'death' of a club can easily be identified as the year of promotion and 
the year of relegation (a club is either playing or not playing in the first division; an intermediary state 
is not possible). Third, there are no mergers or acquisitions where it is difficult to identify the 
organization that survives and the one that disappears.11 Fourth, we can identify all the clubs playing 
in the first division in a particular sport and a particular year. Fifth, since nearly all clubs have been 
relegated at least once during our period of investigation, we do not encounter the problem of most 
organizational ecology studies, which is that the especially large organizations do not 'die,' but seem 
to live forever. 
 
2.4 Survival in Professional Team Sports Leagues: Descriptive Evidence 
 
In the empirical sections of our paper we use detailed information from four different sports and four 
different countries, yielding seven unique 'league histories.' This allows us to compare, first, the 
survival probabilities of new (i.e., recently promoted) and established teams and, second, the impact 
of changes in the environment on the different types of clubs. Our dataset includes the four 
economically most relevant football leagues in Europe (i.e., in England, Germany, Italy and Spain, see 
Deloitte 2011) and the four economically most relevant professional team sports leagues in Germany 
(i.e., football, ice hockey, handball and basketball, see Deloitte 2010). Our observation period starts 
with either the inaugural season of a particular league (ice hockey, handball, basketball and soccer in 
Germany) or with the first season following a historical break (i.e., the end of the Spanish Civil War or 
the end of World War II) in the remaining three soccer leagues.12 
 
Thus, depending on the particular league, we use information covering a period of 44 (handball and 
basketball in Germany) to 71 (soccer in Spain) seasons. Since the German ice hockey league has been 
                                                          
11
  Perhaps surprisingly, we observe not a single merger of two (previously) competing clubs while both were playing in 
their country’s respective first division. Mergers do occur, however, among second division clubs. 
12
  When practicing their sport at a competitive level, male athletes are usually at an age where they will be drafted for 
military service. 
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a closed shop for a number of years, most figures (such as the number of clubs and relegations) are 
particularly low for this league. 
 
In the period under investigation we observe between 62 (German ice hockey) and 198 (soccer in 
Italy) relegations. The number of 'forced relegations' (i.e., cases in which the license has been 
withdrawn by the league) is highest in German ice hockey with 14 despite the fact that there are only 
62 relegations in total. In the four soccer leagues, only Germany (n=1)13 and Italy (n=9)14 have so far 
experienced forced relegations. The number of clubs that have ever played in the respective first 
division is quite different and ranges from 38 (German ice hockey) to 88 (German handball). Spanish 
soccer, with only 56 different clubs in 71 seasons, has the highest number of multiple relegations 
(the relegations per club ratio is 3.5). On average, the seven leagues have between 1.2 and 3.2 
relegations per season. Excluding German ice hockey, which has been a closed league for many 
years, the results in average number of relegations are quite similar, ranging between 2.4 and 3.2 per 
year. 
 
Most leagues include a number of 'yoyo teams' that have experienced multiple relegations, followed 
by another promotion: the maximum number of relegations by one club is eleven for Real Murcia in 
Spanish soccer. It is followed by Betis Sevilla, CD Malaga, and Celta Vigo from Spain as well and by 
Atalanta Bergamo from Italy, with ten relegations each. Moreover, there also exist a number of clubs 
in each league that have never been relegated, with some of them having been members of that 
particular league since its inaugural season or its re-start. Examples are VfL Gummersbach in German 
handball, MTV 1846 Gießen in German basketball, Hamburger SV in German soccer, FC Arsenal in 
English soccer and Inter Milan in Italian soccer. In Spanish soccer, three clubs have managed to 
survive all 71 seasons under consideration (FC Barcelona, Real Madrid, and Athletic Bilbao). 
 
Descriptive evidence on the survival rates of clubs in the different leagues is displayed in Figure 2-1 
below. It is based on the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier survival method that allows for the calculation 
of the probability of survival past a certain point in time (Kaplan and Meier 1958). It appears from 
Figure 2-1 that the survival rates are indeed quite similar (Appendix 2-1 reveals that according to the 
Wilcoxon-Test, equality of pairs of survivor functions cannot be rejected for most cases).  
 
 
 
                                                          
13
  Hertha BSC Berlin following the 1964/65 season due to illegal signing bonuses. 
14
  Most notably, AC Milan and Lazio Rome in 1980 due to match fixing ("Totonero scandal”) and Juventus Torino also for 
match fixing in 2006. 
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Looking at Figure 2-1, it appears that after only one year, between 17% (English soccer) and 43% 
(German handball) of all recently promoted clubs have been relegated again (i.e., these clubs 
managed to survive for just one season). After five years, between 56% (English soccer) and 77% 
(Spanish soccer) have disappeared and after 20 years, only between 1% (Italian soccer) and 8% 
(German ice hockey) of the clubs have survived. Moreover, 50% of all clubs are relegated within the 
first two (German handball and ice hockey as well as Spanish soccer) to four years (English soccer). 
Survival of clubs in %
100
75
50
25
0
Time in years
4038363432302826242220181614121086420
Italian soccer
English soccer
Spanish soccer
German soccer
German basketball
German handball
German ice hockey
 
Figure 2-1 Survivor curves for different leagues 
 
2.5 Model, Estimation Method, and Findings 
 
We focus in our estimations on a subset of the 'theory fragments' discussed in organizational 
ecology: liability of newness, liability of smallness, and founding conditions.15 
 
— Our measure of 'liability of newness' is straightforward. Since we know the exact date of 
birth of a particular club—in our case, the year of promotion to the first division—and the 
exact date of death—the year of relegation to the respective second division—we can easily 
calculate the number of seasons that a club played in its first division. Thus, we measure a 
club's experience as the number of seasons played in the first league. This variable takes a 
                                                          
15
  We do not consider density dependence (the number of clubs is more or less constant over time, i.e., there is little if 
any change in the number of competing organizations). We also exclude the distinction between generalists and 
specialists (all clubs are identical in the sense that they produce a homogeneous service—sports entertainment). 
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value of zero for the first season and increases by one for every additional year a club played 
in the first league. 
— Contrary to the available literature, where revenues, profits and/or number of employees 
are used as proxies for 'liability of smallness,' we have to use a less obvious measure, 
because neither revenues nor profits are available for most of the clubs in our sample. 
However, since ticket sales accounted for almost 100% of the club's revenues until the mid- 
to late 1980s, we use average attendance as our preferred measure of club size. 
Unfortunately, even that information is available only for the English and German soccer 
leagues. In addition, we therefore use the number of national championship titles as a 
second, admittedly rather indirect measure of club size or—perhaps better—'club resources.' 
Since 'rich' clubs can afford to sign better players and since these better players increase the 
chance of winning championships, we consider this measure of club size acceptable. 
— To account for differences in 'founding conditions,' we use a number of different variables: 
The year a club was promoted to the first division for the first time; the number of previous 
relegations of a particular club; a dummy variable to distinguish the Pre-Bosman from the 
Post-Bosman era (induced by the respective verdict of the European Court of Justice in 
December 1995 and enacted at the beginning of the 1996/97 season);16 and a linear time 
trend to account for the increasing 'commercialization' of professional team sports as well as 
the skyrocketing TV revenues in some of them. Controlling for particularly 'turbulent times' is 
standard in the organizational ecology literature. Since the 'Bosman-ruling' of the European 
Court of Justice in December 1995 was a landmark event in the history of the professional 
team sports industry, we introduce in our estimations a dummy variable that separates the 
period before that verdict from the period thereafter. Moreover, since TV revenues have 
replaced the revenues from ticket sales as the clubs' most important revenue, we control for 
these developments in our estimations indirectly by including a linear time trend. This is 
necessary, because TV revenues are not available for German handball, basketball, and ice 
hockey.17 
 
                                                          
16
  Prior to the 1995/96 season, all European leagues operated their transfer market on two basic principles: first, a 
transfer fee had to be paid even if a player’s contract had expired and the player wanted to change clubs. Second, 
football leagues operated strict protectionist controls on the number of foreign-born players who could appear in a 
team in a particular match. Following that decision, average contract length increased significantly, and transfer fees 
became a function of a player´s remaining contract duration. Moreover, the influx of players from abroad increased 
significantly in all of the 'Big 5' leagues in Europe (England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain), making it easier for 
recently promoted teams to sign "quality players” from all over the world. For a review of the evidence see, e.g., Frick 
(2007). 
17
  However, less than 10% of the clubs’ revenues in ice hockey, handball and basketball come from TV revenues (see 
Deloitte 2010). 
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Apart from the variables measuring 'liability of newness and smallness' as well as changes in 
'founding conditions,' we include a number of control variables in our estimations: 
 
— Since the number of teams in a league as well as the number of promotions and relegations 
is not constant over time in the different leagues, we control for these changes that are—on 
average—of minor quantitative importance (i.e., an increase in league size from 16 to 18 
clubs or a reduction in the number of promoted and relegated teams from three to two per 
year). 
— In a number of exceptional cases (bribery scandals, match fixing, insolvency) clubs were 
relegated although they had been successful enough on the pitch to avoid relegation. We 
control for these events by including a dummy variable, taking the value of one if a club was 
denied the license for the next season. 
— One of the major differences between professional sports clubs and other organizations—be 
they for-profit or not-for-profit—is that the former can be 're-born', i.e., they can be 
promoted to the first division again either after just one season or a few years later. Thus, 
many clubs oscillate between the first and second division in their respective sports, causing 
a particular problem that has to be addressed adequately. Clubs that cannot be observed 
temporarily are removed from the risk pool for the duration of their absence. In order to 
account for these temporary exits, two different approaches are available: re-entries (clubs 
returning to the first division) can either be treated as new clubs or as incumbents. However, 
since repeated relegations are not independent from the number of previous relegations, we 
use an event history model with repeated events where a club can be relegated several 
times. This is clearly the most appropriate option. Thus, we use the number of previous 
relegations as an additional control variable instead of stratifying our regression model by 
number of relegations. 
— To account for unobservable differences between the leagues in our sample, we also include 
a series of dummy variables to control for these seven leagues: German handball, German 
basketball, German ice hockey, German soccer, English soccer, Italian soccer and Spanish 
soccer. 
 
Table 2-2 displays the descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in our estimations. 
Table 2-3 provides the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
 
We analyze the 'survival time' of each club in each of the seven leagues, using duration analysis (also 
called survival or event history analysis), a technique that seeks to identify (the effects of) factors 
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that determine the length of time until the occurrence of an event. Since this method was initially 
used by medical statisticians, the event studied has often been (the time until) the death of a patient 
or, more recently, the dismissal of an employee (Allison 1984; Cox and Oakes 1984; Yamaguchi 
1991). Given the specific character of our data—sports clubs can by relegated from the first division 
due to poor performance league, but can be promoted again—we use event history analysis with 
repeated events. That means that a club can experience several relegations that are treated as 
distinct events with the first events influencing the probability of the latter ones. A number of 
different models for repeated events have been proposed in the literature. On the one hand, there 
are 'semi-parametric' models (Prentice et al. 1981; Andersen and Gill 1982; Wei et al. 1989) that use 
a Cox regression (Cox 1972). On the other hand, there are various 'parametric' models, most notably 
the exponential, the Gompertz, and the Weibull model. Generally, the hazard of being relegated can 
be written as 
 
  (    )    ( )    (   ) 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard, Xi is a vector of i covariates that can be time dependent and β is a 
vector of parameters. 
 
The difference between the semi-parametric and the parametric models is the estimation of h0(t). In 
the semi-parametric Cox model, h0(t) is not estimated. The model makes no assumption about the 
shape of the hazard over time. The main assumption is that however the baseline hazard is shaped, it 
is the same for every individual or organization. In parametric models h0(t) has always a particular 
underlying functional form. If we assume 
 
  ( )     (  ) 
 
for a constant β0, we have the exponential model. Here, the baseline hazard is assumed to be 
constant over time. One additional parameter (β0) has to be estimated by the model. A constant β0 
means that the failure rate is independent of time. In the Gompertz (1825) model 
 
  ( )     (  )    (  ) 
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we have two ancillary parameters (β0, γ) to estimate. The Gompertz model is suitable for data with 
monotone hazard rates that either increase or decrease exponentially over time. The parameter γ 
defines the shape of the hazard as follows: γ=0 for a constant hazard, γ<0 for a decreasing and γ>0 
for an increasing hazard. The baseline hazard in the Weibull model can be written as 
 
  ( )    
       (  ) 
 
Depending on the parameter p, the hazard function can be monotonically increasing or decreasing. 
Both the Gompertz (for γ=0) and the Weibull (for p=1) model have a special case each in which they 
are identical to the exponential model. 
 
Many papers in the tradition of organizational ecology use the Gompertz model because survival is 
assumed to be monotonically decreasing over time (Carroll and Delacroix 1982; Delacroix et al. 1989; 
Carroll et al. 1993). Some authors extend the Gompertz model with Makeham's law (Makeham 1859) 
which adds a constant parameter α to the hazard. With this extension, the hazard does not decrease 
towards 0 but towards α. While this extension makes sense for many industries—where many 
companies survive in the long run—we see that in our data only eight (out of 425 different clubs) 
have survived the whole period under investigation. Thus, we do not need the Makeham extension in 
our analysis (see Appendix 2-2 for a detailed comparison of the fit of the different parametric 
models). 
 
In survival analyses the parameters are estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood that, in turn, 
can be specified as 
 
 ( )  ∏∏(
     
∑ ∑     
(    )  
   
 
   
)
     
   
 
   
 
  
where δ is a censoring indicator which is equal to one if an event is observed and zero if the 
observation is censored (i.e., no failure has occurred yet). Y is a risk indicator. If the individual is at 
risk for the current event, then Y is one and zero otherwise.  
 
Two problems—one of which is characteristic of survival analyses and one that occurs only in data 
such as ours—require a brief discussion: first, we have a number of cases that are right-censored 
(i.e., we do not know how long into the future the clubs that we observe today will manage to 
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survive in their respective first division).18 Second, there is a considerable age difference between the 
leagues in our sample (i.e., the inaugural season ranges from 1939 to 1966). 
 
We deal with these problems in two different ways: first, to check the robustness of our results we 
estimate our models with a different end date as suggested by Ruef (2004) and censor our data set 
one year earlier (in 2009 instead of 2010; the result are displayed in Appendix 2-3). It appears that 
the parameters are virtually identical, suggesting that our results are very robust. Second, we also 
present in Appendix 2-3 estimations that are based on an equal number of seasons for each league 
(either the first 44 seasons, irrespective of the year of the inaugural season, or the last 44 seasons 
until 2010, irrespective of the year of the inaugural season). Again, the results turned out to be very 
robust, increasing, once more, our confidence in the findings presented below. 
 
Table 2-4 displays the results of our preferred Gompertz model for the seven leagues. The first 
column includes the full model with a dummy variable for each team sports league. The remaining 
columns include the model for each of the leagues separately. 
 
Table 2-5 also includes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1974) that allows us to 
distinguish the fit of the different models (see Appendix 2-2 for a more detailed discussion of the AIC) 
where a lower AIC indicates a better fit. 
 
In the estimations displayed in Table 2-5 we include information that was available for only some of 
the leagues in our data set. The first model (a) for each league is identical with the one in Table 2-4. 
The second model (b) includes a measure characterizing the 'founding conditions' in terms of TV 
revenues. For the English and the German soccer leagues, we estimate two additional models 
including average attendance as a measure of club size and club resources. While model (c) for 
German and English soccer includes average attendance as well as the number of previous 
championships as measures of market size and resources, model (d) excludes the latter variable 
again. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
It appears from Table 2-4 that the coefficient of a club's length of stay (measured as 'years of 
experience') is negatively signed and statistically significant in virtually all of our models. In the case 
                                                          
18
  Moreover, our data set includes a number of left-censored cases (i.e., clubs that played in their country’s highest 
division before the league that we investigate started in its first season). Due to a lack of data, we are unable to control 
for that duration. 
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of the 'full model' (column 1), this means that each additional year of membership in the first division 
reduces the hazard of being relegated by 4.4%.19 Apart from one exception, this effect is nearly 
identical in all models (in German ice hockey the coefficient is still negative, but statistically 
insignificant). 
 
This result is in line with prior research on the 'liability of newness:' organizations that have just 
entered a particular market (segment) have yet to learn their role and are, therefore, particularly 
threatened by the forces of competition. With regard to professional team sports leagues, this 
implies that clubs that have just been promoted have to adapt to the higher standards in their new 
environment, i.e., management as well as players have to make themselves familiar with the more 
talented and better qualified squads they have to face on the pitch every weekend. Since the higher 
quality of the opponents is to be anticipated, promoted teams usually try to increase their probability 
of survival by signing better and more experienced players who, in turn, have to be integrated into a 
team that proved to be successful in the recent past. In addition, due to the increasing fan and media 
attention, players on the rosters of first division clubs may experience a higher level of pressure, 
leading to 'choking behavior' when it really counts. Finally, teams that have just been promoted very 
often lack the financial resources to keep up with the more established clubs, increasing the 
probability of immediate relegation after their first season in the higher division. 
 
The coefficient of the number of previous championship titles as well as the coefficient of average 
attendance (our two complementary measures of 'liability of smallness') is also negative and 
statistically significant. Every league title is associated with a 21% reduction in the relegation hazard. 
This result is again very similar across the different leagues (only in German ice hockey and German 
basketball did it prove to be insignificant). Unfortunately, average attendance is only available for the 
clubs playing in the English and German soccer league. It appears, from Table 2-5 (models 5c and 5d 
for German and 6c and 6d for English soccer), that an additional audience of 1000 spectators reduces 
the relegation hazard by around 7% in both leagues. 
 
As before, our results are in line with the literature on organizational ecology: smaller organizations 
experience more difficulties in a competitive environment due to, for example, their difficulty in 
raising capital for investments (in our case, for signing new and better players). This, in turn, is 
familiar to every sports economist, as money does indeed 'buy success' (see, e.g., Forrest and 
Simmons 2004; Frick 2005). This may induce a 'virtuous cycle:' successful clubs are able to attract
                                                          
19
  Calculated as follows: exp(-0.045) -1 = -4.4%. We present the increase/decrease in the hazard in percent if not indicated 
otherwise. 
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better players not only due to their financial resources but also because players want to win titles 
and to appear in international cup competitions. Thus, the 'liability of newness' and the 'liability of 
smallness' have to be distinguished, as there are a number of rather 'young' clubs that have large 
investors behind them (in German soccer the most prominent examples are VfL Wolfsburg 
(supported by automobile producer, Volkswagen), Bayer Leverkusen (supported by chemicals 
producer, Bayer), and TSG 1899 Hoffenheim (supported by Dietmar Hopp, one of the co-founders of 
SAP), none of which have been relegated since their arrival in the first division. 
 
In models 5c and 6c we include average attendance as an additional explanatory variable in our 
estimations. In both models, the coefficient of our original measure of market size (the number of 
championship titles) loses in significance, but nevertheless, remains important, suggesting that the 
two variables are (highly) correlated. Since average attendance is perhaps a better measure of size, 
its coefficient does not change very much if we exclude the number of championship titles (as in 
models 5d and 6d). This is also supported by the change in the AIC20 decreasing e.g., from 98 to 77 
for the German soccer league (since a lower AIC denotes a better fit of the model, our preferred 
specifications are 5d and 6d). 
 
The impact of the overall market conditions a club experienced when it arrived in the first division 
(representing the 'founding conditions' in the terminology of organizational ecology) is clearly 
different from what we expected: the number of clubs that were relegated in a club's first season in 
the first division (a measure of 'environmental threats') is not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
coefficient of that variable even has different signs in the different models, suggesting that the 
impact of the number of relegations is, by and large, random. The only exception here is the German 
first division in soccer—but here, the result is counterintuitive in the sense that a larger number of 
relegations at the end of a club's first season in the first division is associated with a lower hazard of 
being relegated (our initial hypothesis was that the hazard should increase. A possible explanation is 
that the variation in the number of relegated clubs is quite low, ranging only from zero to four). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
  The Akaike Information Criterion is calculated as follows: AIC = – 2 ln L + 2 (k + c); see Appendix 5-2 for a more detailed 
explanation. 
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German soccer 
Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 5d 
Number of championship titles 
-0.243 ** -0.242 ** -0.221 *     
(0.123)   (0.123)   (0.128)       
Average attendance 
        -0.070 *** -0.072 *** 
        (0.015)   (0.015)   
Years of experience 
-0.064 *** -0.064 *** -0.054 *** -0.063 *** 
(0.021)   (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.020)   
Number of relegations (1. season) 
-0.408 * -0.411 * -0.538 ** -0.555 ** 
(0.246)   (0.247)   (0.256)   (0.257)   
TV revenues (1. season) 
    -0.001   0.003   0.002   
    (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004)   
Bosman dummy (1. season) 
-1.188 ** -1.075   -1.492   -1.476   
(0.577)   (0.861)   (0.979)   (0.974)   
Year (1. season) 
0.047 *** 0.048 *** 0.040 ** 0.043 ** 
(0.016)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   
Number of clubs 
-0.035   -0.038   -0.261   -0.277   
(0.222)   (0.222)   (0.238)   (0.239)   
Number of relegations 
0.452 * 0.453 * 0.558 ** 0.564 ** 
(0.239)   (0.239)   (0.237)   (0.237)   
Forced relegation 
2.621 ** 2.621 ** 3.752 *** 3.817 *** 
(1.073)   (1.073)   (1.115)   (1.115)   
Previous relegations 
0.057   0.057   0.024   0.071   
(0.106)   (0.106)   (0.097)   (0.095)   
Constant 
-93.432 *** -95.910 *** -74.506 ** -80.745 ** 
(31.466)   (34.540)   (35.296)   (35.121)   
Gamma 
0.042 * 0.042 * 0.061 *** 0.060 *** 
(0.022)   (0.022)   (0.020)   (0.021)   
LL -37   -37   -25   -27   
CHI2 68   68   93   89   
P>chi2 0   0   0   0   
No of subjects 50   50   50   50   
No of failures 122   122   122   122   
Time at risk 844   844   844   844   
AIC 96.4   98.3   75.6   77.3   
Table 2-5 Additional Gompertz models for four soccer leagues 
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English soccer 
Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c Model 6d 
Number of championship titles 
-0.339 *** -0.339 *** -0.192 *     
(0.109)   (0.109)   (0.110)       
Average attendance 
        -0.072 *** -0.078 *** 
        (0.013)   (0.012)   
Years of experience 
-0.024 ** -0.024 ** -0.007   -0.015   
(0.012)   (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.012)   
Number of relegations (1. season) 
0.601   0.590   0.829 * 0.730   
(0.456)   (0.455)   (0.466)   (0.462)   
TV revenues (1. season) 
    -0.002   0.000   0.000   
    (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   
Bosman dummy (1. season) 
0.032   0.848   0.941   0.895   
(0.639)   (1.546)   (1.567)   (1.566)   
Year (1. season) 
0.011   0.012   -0.021   -0.020   
(0.015)   (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
Number of clubs 
0.084   0.088   -0.098 ** -0.114   
(0.145)   (0.146)   (0.139)   (0.138)   
Number of relegations 
0.196   0.186   -0.011   -0.036   
(0.246)   (0.246)   (0.238)   (0.235)   
Forced relegation (omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
  
        
Previous relegations 
0.045   0.044   0.143 * 0.204 *** 
(0.079)   (0.079)   (0.080)   (0.073)   
Constant 
-27.062   -29.276   41.745   40.007   
(29.222)   (29.466)   (31.745)   (31.503)   
Gamma 
0.026 * 0.027 ** 0.002   -0.001   
(0.013)   (0.013)   (0.014)   (0.014)   
LL -19   -19   -2   -4   
CHI2 64   64   99   95   
P>chi2 0   0   0   0   
No of subjects 59   59   59   59   
No of failures 166   166   166   166   
Time at risk 1371   1371   1371   1371   
AIC 58.5   60.2   27.4   29.2   
Table 2-5 continued 
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Spanish soccer Italian soccer 
Model 7a Model 7b Model 8a   Model 8b   
Number of championship titles 
-0.567 *** -0.567 *** -0.117 * -0.118 * 
(0.169)   (0.169)   (0.065)   (0.065)   
Average attendance 
                
                
Years of experience 
-0.037 *** -0.037 *** -0.044 *** -0.043 *** 
(0.011)   (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.010)   
Number of relegations (1. season) 
-0.067   -0.085   0.239   0.291   
(0.127)   (0.131)   (0.212)   (0.212)   
TV revenues (1. season) 
    -0.002       -0.006   
    (0.003)       (0.005)   
Bosman dummy (1. season) 
-0.620   -0.006   -0.465   2.712   
(0.477)   (1.133)   (0.633)   (3.077)   
Year (1. season) 
0.023 ** 0.024 ** 0.003   0.007   
(0.012)   (0.012)   (0.009)   (0.010)   
Number of clubs 
-0.138   -0.138   -0.103 * -0.092 * 
(0.094)   (0.094)   (0.055)   (0.055)   
Number of relegations 
0.361 *** 0.358 *** 0.327 ** 0.331 ** 
(0.102)   (0.103)   (0.138)   (0.138)   
Forced relegation (omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
  1.843 *** 1.836 *** 
    (0.357)   (0.357)   
Previous relegations 
0.003   0.002   0.078   0.077   
(0.054)   (0.054)   (0.059)   (0.058)   
Constant 
-45.074 ** -47.149 ** -6.705   -15.356   
(21.770)   (22.014)   (18.230)   (19.349)   
Gamma 
0.025 ** 0.025 ** 0.017 ** 0.017 ** 
(0.012)   (0.012)   (0.008)   (0.008)   
LL 22   22   31   31   
CHI2 119   120   117   118   
P>chi2 0   0   0   0   
No of subjects 56   56   57   57   
No of failures 197   197   198   198   
Time at risk 1238   1238   1135   1135   
AIC -24.6   -23.0   -39.7   -38.9   
Table 2-5 continued 
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The coefficient of the 'Bosman dummy' (another proxy for 'environmental turmoil') appears to be 
marginally significant (at the 10% level) in the full model and in the model for German soccer only. 
For clubs that played their first season after the 'Bosman-ruling,' the hazard is about 27% lower than 
a club that played its first season before that verdict. This is consistent with findings reported in 
detailed analyses of the labor market effects of its liberalization (see, e.g., Frick 2009b): small market 
teams may benefit most from the opportunity to sign high quality players from abroad. A good 
example is Energie Cottbus, a small-market club from the eastern part of Germany that was 
promoted to the first division in German soccer for the first time in 2000 with just five Germans on its 
roster of 24 players. As Battré and Meyer (2010) show, the salaries of players from Eastern Europe 
are—all other things being equal—lower than the salaries of their colleagues from either Western 
Europe or South America (see also Szymanski 2000 for a detailed analysis of the consequences of pay 
discrimination in professional football). 
 
The linear time trend that we have included in our estimations is also statistically significant, 
suggesting that arriving one year later in the first division increases the hazard of being relegated by 
1.4%. However, this effect appears to be statistically significant only in the models for German and 
Spanish soccer, while in some other leagues (such as German basketball) the sign of the coefficient is 
reversed, or as in the case of English and Italian soccer, remains positive, but far away from statistical 
significance. Since modern training and coaching techniques as well as management expertise can be 
easily purchased by each of the clubs, the information disadvantage for new clubs may be smaller 
than it used to be decades ago. Therefore, the hazards of relegation are likely to be the same for all 
teams—irrespective of the time of their arrival in their sports first division. 
 
Finally, the amount of money available from the sale of broadcasting rights in the first season that a 
club spends in its respective first division is available only for the four soccer leagues (models 5b-8b 
in Table 2-5). As expected, higher TV revenues do not affect the hazard. All coefficients are very small 
and statistically insignificant. Moreover, including the TV revenues in the estimations leaves the 
coefficients of the other variables completely unaffected. 
 
The coefficients of the control variables that we have included in our estimations are mainly as 
expected. The number of clubs playing in the respective first division decreases each club's hazard: 
one more club in the league is associated with a hazard that is 11% smaller. The coefficients for the 
individual leagues are similar in magnitude and are mostly statistically significant. The number of 
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clubs that are relegated at the end of a season is also associated with a larger hazard of 36% (this 
result is virtually identical across the different leagues with the exception of English soccer).21 
 
The coefficient of the number of previous relegations is marginally significant (at the 10% level) 
suggesting that each previous relegation increases the hazard of being relegated again by about 5%. 
While the sign and the magnitude of the coefficient is as expected, we are somewhat surprised by its 
marginal significance. Since there are a number of 'yoyo teams' playing in each of the leagues, we 
expected a much stronger impact of the number of previous relegations on the current hazard.22 On 
the one hand, it is conceivable that some of these yoyo teams are not at all interested in surviving in 
the first division for a longer period of time but try to harvest the higher media and ticket revenues, 
already anticipating being relegated after their first season. These teams 'contaminate' the 
competition and their existence will bias our results.23 On the other hand, there are also some teams 
that either need to stay in their current league or even need to be promoted in order to survive 
financially. A recent example is Dynamo Dresden that needed a bank guarantee before the start of 
the 2011/12 season to get their license from the German Football Association. The association asked 
for a guarantee of €2.045 million in case Dresden stayed in the third division and €830,000 in case 
they were promoted to the second division (Kicker 2011). Unfortunately, the necessary data is not 
available to control for these different motivations and restrictions. 
 
In the full model, most of the league dummies turned out to be statistically significant (with the 
exception of the Spanish and Italian soccer leagues). The basis for comparison is the German soccer 
league. The hazard is lower in the German basketball, handball, and ice hockey leagues while it is 
higher in the other European soccer leagues. In Italian and Spanish soccer, the number of yoyo teams 
is particularly high and competitive balance is lower than in either German or English soccer. It is, 
therefore, quite likely that in the latter two countries in every single year a group of five to six teams 
are fighting relegation while about eight clubs are far away from the championship as well as the 
relegation zone. In German and in English soccer, on the other hand, the majority of the clubs is 
either involved in the fight against relegation or the fight for qualification for international cup 
                                                          
21
  The same is true for the control variable for forced relegations. Since a forced relegation always includes being 
relegated, the coefficient is extremely high and not interpretable. For the English and Spanish soccer league, the 
variable is omitted since there were no forced relegations (see Table 2-1). 
22
  Moreover, estimation of a stratified Cox model that takes into account that there may be a difference in the baseline 
hazard for the first, second, third, and so forth relegation, yields almost identical results. These results are, of course, 
available from the authors upon request. 
23
  It is, of course, very unlikely that managers will ever admit engaging in this kind of 'free-rider behavior.' 
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competitions. Moreover, especially in German ice hockey and basketball, the relegation hazard is 
lower since there is always a large number of teams competing for the championship.24 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this article we have analyzed the survival times of individual clubs in seven different professional 
team sports leagues since their inaugural season (varying between 1939 and 1966) up until today. 
Based on a detailed comparison of the different models that are available, we have chosen a 
Gompertz survival model to estimate our results. Using an organizational ecology approach, we find 
that two of the fundamental propositions in the organizational ecology literature find much support 
in professional team sports leagues: 'liability of newness' and 'liability of smallness.' New and/or 
small clubs have a disadvantage compared to old and large clubs in the sense that the former have a 
significantly lower probability of surviving in the long run (we find no signs of either a liability of 
adolescence or of senescence in sports). 
 
Table 2-6 displays a summary of our results: all other things being equal, we find a statistically 
significant and economically relevant impact of a new club's size and experience on the survival 
probability. Clubs that have been playing in the first division for a longer period of time have more 
experience and more resources, enabling them to survive in a highly competitive environment for an 
extended period of time while less experienced and poorer clubs have a considerable disadvantage. 
 
We find the coefficients of both variables of club size and club resources (number of championship 
titles and average attendance) to support the liability of smallness-hypothesis in sports. Average 
attendance, however, is a better proxy of club size and club revenues with its impact being almost 
identical in the German and the English soccer league. Unfortunately, attendance figures are not 
available for the other leagues. Future research should, therefore, try to collect that information and 
use it to test the liability of smallness-hypothesis using data for other periods and other team sports 
leagues. 
 
 
                                                          
24
  The Gompertz model gives us two more parameters that are of interest here, gamma and β0. Both are necessary to 
determine the underlying baseline hazard that is independent of the covariates of the model. As mentioned above, the 
baseline hazard is h0(t) = exp(β0) exp(γt). For our most general model 1 with a gamma of 0.023 and a β0 of -28.224, this 
implies that the baseline hazard is monotonically increasing with time. On the other hand, a very small exp(β0) implies 
that the starting point for the increase is very low at 0.00000000000055. Even with the increase over time, the baseline 
hazard is still very low after 50 years at 0.00000000000175. Thus, most of the overall hazard seems to be driven by the 
covariates of our model. 
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Type of variable Variable Hazard increase Significance level 
Liability of newness Years of experience -4% 1% 
        
Liability of size 
Number of championship titles -21% 1% 
Average attendance -7% 1% 
        
Founding conditions 
Year (1. season) 1% 1% 
Bosman dummy (1. season) -27% 10% 
        
Control 
Number of relegations 36% 1% 
Number of clubs -11% 1% 
Previous relegations 5% 10% 
German basketball dummy -50% 1% 
German ice hockey dummy -56% 1% 
German handball dummy -37% 1% 
English soccer dummy 52% 1% 
Table 2-6 Summary of (statistically significant) findings 
 
One of the most interesting findings is that the 'Bosman-ruling' had—contrary to the expectations by 
many sports officials—a positive and significant impact on the survival probabilities of recently 
promoted clubs. Thus, the liberalization of the player market now allows small market teams to sign 
better players from foreign leagues and countries, enabling them to field a competitive roster. Since 
the wages of players from Eastern Europe have not yet reached the levels of their colleagues from 
either Western Europe or South America, 'cheap labor' is still available, allowing even small market 
teams to avoid relegation in a highly 'dangerous' environment. 
 
Admittedly, the potential of organizational ecology to explain the observable patters of the 
emergence and dissolution of firms—be it for-profit or non-profit—has not yet been fully explored. 
Based on our empirical analysis on the one hand, and our reading of the available literature on the 
other hand, we suggest the following three areas for future research: 
 
— First, the human capital of players and head coaches as well as the arrival and departure of 
players and head coaches is likely to affect the survival probabilities of teams. Therefore, the 
composition as well as changes in the composition of the teams should be taken into account 
when estimating more elaborate models as in e.g., Pennings et al. (1998) as well as Pennings 
and Wezel (2010), both using a large sample of Dutch accounting firms to analyze the impact 
of individuals' skills and expertise on the performance of their respective companies. 
— Second, other 'fragments' of organizational ecology such as geographical overlap and 
crowding should be considered as (potential) determinants of firm survival too. It is, for 
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example, possible that a certain 'crowding' of clubs—such as e.g., in the Ruhr area—
increases the individual club’s survival probability because local 'derbies' are particularly 
attractive to fans which, in turn, increase the club’s revenues. On the other hand, crowding 
can also be detrimental to the different clubs' performances, as it may induce a 'rat race' in 
attracting sponsors. 
— Third, differences in the institutional arrangements across leagues and changes in these 
arrangements over time are likely to affect the survival probabilities of new and established 
teams perhaps in similar, perhaps in different ways: 'inertia', i.e., a particular club's approved 
routines and structures, may either be helpful to adapt to a changing environment, or may 
also turn out to be a particular 'burden' in times of change (see, e. g., the case study by Zhou 
and Witteloostuijn 2010). 
 
2.8 Appendix 2-1: Testing the Equality of Survivor Functions 
 
There are different tests that can be used to compare survivor functions. Two commonly used tests 
are the Log-rank and the Wilcoxon test. As displayed in Figure 2-1, the survivor functions converge 
towards the end of the observation period while they are quite different in the first years. Since the 
Log-rank (or Savage) test stresses increasing differences at the end of the process while the Wilcoxon 
test emphasizes differences at the beginning (Blossfeld et al. 2007), we use the Wilcoxon test here. 
 
Table 2-7 displays the pairwise correlation coefficients (including their significance levels) of the 
different survivor curves. It appears that according to the results of the Wilcoxon test, we have to 
reject the assumption that the survivor functions for most pairs of leagues are correlated. 
 
Wilcoxon 
German  
ice hockey 
German 
handball 
German 
basketball 
German 
soccer 
Spanish 
soccer 
English 
soccer 
Italian 
soccer 
German ice hockey -             
German handball 0.009 -           
German basketball 0.092 0.537 -         
German soccer 0.210 0.076 0.363 -       
Spanish soccer 0.001 0.744 0.368 0.040 -     
English soccer 0.875 0.000 0.003 0.075 0.000 -   
Italian soccer 0.002 0.410 0.984 0.127 0.598 0.000 - 
Table 2-7 Correlation of survivor curves 
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2.9 Appendix 2-2: Comparison of the Fit of the Different Parametric Models 
 
The choice of the appropriate parametric model is usually based on the Akaike information criterion 
(see Cleves et al. 2002). Following the estimation of the different parametric models the AIC is 
compared. It is defined as 
 
           (   ) 
 
where L is the log likelihood, k the number of model covariates, and c the number of model-specific 
distributional parameters. According to Akaike (1974), the log likelihood values should be adjusted by 
the number of the parameters that have been included in each model. The model with the best fit is 
the one with the lowest AIC. In our case, the Gompertz model is to be preferred (see Table 2-8). 
 
2.10 Appendix 2-3: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The first column of Table 2-9 is identical with model (1) displayed in Table 2-4 above. We have 
performed a number of additional estimations to document the robustness of our findings. First, we 
have right-censored our data after the 2008/09 season (column 2). It appears that nearly all the 
coefficients retain their sign and level of significance. Only the coefficient of the 'Bosman dummy' 
becomes insignificant. This is probably due to the difference in the duration of the two regimes (1939 
to 1995 = 56 years, 1996 to 2010 = 14 years). 
 
In addition, we have also taken into account the differences in the inaugural season of the seven 
leagues. We did that in two ways: First, we only looked at the first 44 years of the leagues in our 
sample and, second, we looked at the period 1966-2010 because the German handball and 
basketball, as the youngest leagues, started 44 years ago in 1966. Again, the majority of the 
coefficients retain their sign and their statistical significance, indicating that the results we have 
presented above are indeed robust and independent of changes in the length of the observation 
period. 
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  Gompertz Weibull Exponential 
Number of championship titles 
-0.240 *** -0.243 *** -0.233 *** 
(0.041)   (0.041)   (0.041)   
Years of experience 
-0.045 *** -0.036 *** -0.026 *** 
(0.005)   (0.005)   (0.004)   
Number of relegations (1. season) 
0.027   0.037   0.028   
(0.028)   (0.028)   (0.028)   
TV revenues (1. season) 
-0.001   -0.001   -0.001   
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Bosman dummy (1. season) 
-0.224   -0.116   -0.188   
(0.226)   (0.227)   (0.226)   
Year (1. season) 
0.015 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 
(0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   
Previous relegations 
0.051 * 0.108 *** 0.149 *** 
(0.029)   (0.024)   (0.022)   
Dummy for each league 
German basketball 
-0.712 *** -0.673 *** -0.668 *** 
(0.162)   (0.162)   (0.162)   
German ice hockey 
-0.839 *** -0.778 *** -0.791 *** 
(0.179)   (0.179)   (0.179)   
German handball 
-0.491 *** -0.482 *** -0.482 *** 
(0.149)   (0.149)   (0.149)   
English soccer 
0.433 *** 0.456 *** 0.455 *** 
(0.141)   (0.142)   (0.141)   
Spanish soccer 
0.116   0.127   0.114   
(0.129)   (0.129)   (0.130)   
Italian soccer 
0.050   0.070   0.078   
(0.122)   (0.121)   (0.121)   
Number of clubs 
-0.123 *** -0.114 *** -0.113 *** 
(0.018)   (0.018)   (0.017)   
Number of relegations 
0.309 *** 0.312 *** 0.302 *** 
(0.030)   (0.030)   (0.030)   
Forced relegation 
1.931 *** 1.922 *** 1.954 *** 
(0.163)   (0.163)   (0.162)   
Constant 
-29.212 *** -25.765 *** -24.777 *** 
(5.878)   (5.777)   (5.756)   
Gamma 
0.023 ***         
(0.004)           
Ln_p 
    0.139 ***     
    (0.033)       
P 
    1.149       
    (0.038)       
1/p 
    0.871       
    (0.029)       
Log likelihood   -288   -292   -300   
Chi2   580   579   588   
AIC   611   620   634   
Table 2-8 Alternative specifications 
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Censored 2010 Censored 2009 
Censored after 
44 years 
All leagues from 
1966 onward 
Number of championship titles 
-0.241 *** -0.241 *** -0.287 *** -0.211 *** 
(0.041)   (0.041)   (0.052)   (0.040)   
Years of experience 
-0.045 *** -0.044 *** -0.063 *** -0.047 *** 
(0.005)   (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.006)   
Number of relegations (1. season) 
0.023   0.024   0.034   0.021   
(0.028)   (0.028)   (0.029)   (0.030)   
Bosman dummy (1. season) 
-0.321 * -0.295   -0.132   -0.029   
(0.191)   (0.196)   (0.244)   (0.200)   
Year (1. season) 
0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 0.000   
(0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004)   
Number of clubs 
-0.121 *** -0.120 *** -0.125 *** -0.117 *** 
(0.017)   (0.018)   (0.020)   (0.021)   
Number of relegations 
0.306 *** 0.306 *** 0.311 *** 0.300 *** 
(0.030)   (0.031)   (0.034)   (0.035)   
Forced relegation 
1.933 *** 1.931 *** 1.852 *** 1.964 *** 
(0.162)   (0.163)   (0.168)   (0.169)   
Previous relegations 
0.050 * 0.054 * 0.041   0.041   
(0.029)   (0.030)   (0.045)   (0.031)   
German basketball 
-0.685 *** -0.678 *** -0.714 *** -0.673 *** 
(0.157)   (0.160)   (0.167)   (0.168)   
German ice hockey 
-0.824 *** -0.809 *** -0.766 *** -0.782 *** 
(0.178)   (0.179)   (0.193)   (0.190)   
German handball 
-0.462 *** -0.463 *** -0.477 *** -0.429 *** 
(0.144)   (0.145)   (0.151)   (0.149)   
English soccer 
0.419 *** 0.421 *** 0.442 *** 0.531 *** 
(0.139)   (0.141)   (0.171)   (0.148)   
Spanish soccer 
0.109   0.106   0.051   0.333 ** 
(0.129)   (0.130)   (0.166)   (0.147)   
Italian soccer 
0.043   0.043   0.066   0.136   
(0.122)   (0.123)   (0.144)   (0.134)   
Constant 
-28.224 *** -27.912 *** -25.918 *** -1.212   
(5.733)   (5.774)   (7.762)   (7.559)   
Gamma 
0.023 *** 0.022 *** 0.038 *** 0.024 *** 
(0.004)   (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.006)   
LL -288   -294   -445   -412   
CHI2 579   565   441   486   
P>chi2 0   0   0   0   
No of subjects 425   423   396   404   
No of failures 990   976   764   818   
Time at risk 6547   6418   5061   5212   
Table 2-9 Sensitivity analyses 
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3 Location and Success in German Soccer: The Impact of Location on the Performance of 
'Bundesliga' Soccer Clubs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The following paper discusses location and its effects on success in German 'Bundesliga' soccer. In 
particular, I will try to answer the following question: which club-external locational factors of 
'Bundesliga' soccer teams have an effect on their sportive success? To be able to do that, I have to 
clarify two questions: 
 
— What are club-external locational factors? 
— What is success? 
 
Locational factors are attributes of a particular place. Since the paper examines the German 
'Bundesliga,' this place is always a city or region within the borders of Germany.25 ‘Club-external’ 
means that I only include factors that the club cannot (or only marginally) influence. Club-external 
locational factors could therefore be population, GDP, number of other soccer clubs, climate, and so 
forth. All factors that a club can influence—e.g., players or coaches and their salaries, (ability of) club 
management, stadium size, legal form of the club—are not part of this paper.  
 
Success can mean different things in soccer: winning the championship, qualifying for international 
cup competitions, reaching a specific rank, scoring the most goals or even receiving the lowest 
number of yellow and red cards. For the purposes of this paper, I will consider 'not being relegated' 
as success. 
 
The empirical study will therefore analyze the 'survival time' of each club in the 'Bundesliga.' I use 
event history analysis,26 a technique that focuses on the effects of factors that determine the length 
of time until the occurrence of an event. In the beginning of event history analysis, these events have 
often been the death of a patient or the dismissal of an employee (Allison 1984; Cox and Oakes 1984; 
Yamaguchi 1991). The technique has also been used in sports e.g., by Ohkusa (1999; 2001) to analyze 
quit decisions of baseball players in Japan and by Barros, Frick, and Passos (2009) to analyze coach 
career durations in German 'Bundesliga' soccer. 
 
                                                          
25
  Seasons 1963/64 until 1990/91 Federal Republic of Germany without German Democratic Republic, from 1991/92 
onwards Germany. 
26
  Also known as survival analysis or duration analysis. 
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This article is organized as follows. First I will give an overview of the relevant literature (chapter 3.2). 
Then I explain the promotion and relegation system in Germany in chapter 3.3. After that I will 
discuss club-external factors that are relevant for the analysis (chapter 3.4). In chapter 3.5 I will 
discuss the statistical model for the analysis and present the empirical results. Chapter 3.6 presents 
the regression results, chapter 3.7 discusses these findings and chapter 3.8 summarizes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
In his first research on sports economics, Rottenberg (1956) concludes that a rich club is located in an 
area where attendance is high and a poor club is located where the attendance is low. El-Houdiri and 
Quirk (1971) recognize the link between city dimensions and club dimensions based on the density of 
the population from which fans are drawn. The greater the revenue generating ability of a team's 
location, the greater will be its long-term stock of skills. In addition, Szymanski (2003) states that 
most clubs are in or near big cities but the implications of population density for revenue generation 
remain to be explored. 
 
Since there are no studies on the impact of socioeconomic factors on team performance in soccer, I 
focus on three neighboring topics in the literature overview.  
 
— Impact of club-internal factors on team performance 
— Impact of sports on economy (economic impact studies) 
— Impact of socioeconomic factors on sport performance 
 
 
 
Much research has been conducted on club-internal determinants of team performance. In the U.S., 
Quirk and Fort (1999) first showed that there is a correlation between team salary and performance 
in the NBA and NHL but not in MLB and NFL. After that, several authors found that this link between 
salary and performance is true for all major leagues in the U.S. (Forrest and Simmons 2002; Frick et 
al. 2002; Hall et al. 2002; Szymanski 2003; Wiseman and Chatterjee 2003). 
 
In Europe, many studies show the above mentioned relationship between salary and team 
performance for soccer leagues (Lehmann and Weigand 1997; Szymanski and Smith 1997; Frick et al. 
1999; Szymanski and Kuypers 1999; Szymanski 2000; Forrest and Simmons 2002; Hall et al. 2002; 
Forrest and Simmons 2004; Frick 2004). In addition, several other variables were tested. Frick (2004) 
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shows that besides player salaries, head coach salary has a positive impact on team success in  the 
German 'Bundesliga.' Lehmann and Weigand (1997) find that the average age of players also has an 
effect on the team's success. Overall, the impact of salary on performance in Europe is higher than in 
the U.S. The interpretation is that the player market in the U.S. is highly regulated compared to the 
player market in Europe. 
 
The overall result is that 'money scores goals.' The more money you invest in players, coaches, and so 
forth, the more success you have. 
 
 
 
Costs of hosting a mega sport event such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup are massive. 
Expenditure for new infrastructure in Japan for the 2002 World Cup exceeded $5.6 billion (Sloane 
2002). Most candidate cities or countries argue that those events also promise an economic windfall. 
Scientific research has failed to support this thesis. 
 
Baade and Matheson (2000) analyzed the 1999 Super Bowl and found that the NFL had 
overestimated the economic impact by factor 10. Porter (1999) expects that if measured properly, 
the Super Bowl's economic impact would be zero. The same holds true for other mega events. For 
the recent FIFA World Cups, several authors have found negative impact of the event on the local 
economy. Baade and Matheson (2004) showed a negative result of 60% for the 1994 World Cup. 
While Kurscheidt (2006) expects it to be slightly better for the 1998 World Cup in France. Finer (2002) 
expects the economic impact of the 2002 World Cup to be a great illusion. Since the Olympic Games 
are much more complex (due to e.g., more events, more athletes) than the other two mega events 
mentioned, researchers have a hard time evaluating the impact of Olympic Games. Problems 
especially arise for the long-term effect of Olympic Games. St. Moritz, which hosted the Winter 
Olympics in 1928 and 1948, may still profit from the image it acquired back then. Munich and 
Montreal have to rebuild their Olympic parks now (35 years after the respective games), which 
means new expenses for the host cities for renovation or destruction of the facilities. In total, 
whether or not hosting the Olympics is a lottery jackpot or 'fool’s gold' (Baade and Matheson 2002), 
seems to depend on the new infrastructure a city needs. Since the impact of mega sport events is 
difficult to isolate, Baumann et al. (2009) analyze the impact of sports events in Hawaii using airport 
arrival data. They show that there is a net increase in airport arrivals for three of the big sport 
events—the Marathon, the Ironman Triathlon, and the Pro Bowl—but it is not nearly as much as the 
sponsors claim it is. 
3.2.2 Impact of Sport on Economy 
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On a smaller scale, the same holds true for investments in professional sports facilities and 
franchises. Economic impact studies have been used for a long time to determine the impact of sport 
facilities and franchises on the local economy. One of the first to study the relationship between 
sports facilities and municipal economy was Okner (1974). He found that clubs primarily benefit from 
the civic largesse directed at sports. These results could not be supported by research by other 
authors. Almost no study revealed any significant gains for metropolitan areas. In general, sports has 
no noteworthy impact on metropolitan economies (Quirk 1987; Baade and Dye 1988; Baade and Dye 
1990; Baim 1990; Baim 1992; Quirk and Fort 1992; Euchner 1993; Greco 1993; Baade 1994; 
Rosentraub et al. 1994; Baade 1996). If results were statistically significant, they tended to be 
generally negative (Coates and Humphreys 1999). Housing prices are higher in cities with sports 
franchises, which could be explained by the willingness of buyers to pay a premium in cities with 
sports franchises (Carlino and Coulson 2004a). On the other hand, one could argue that sports 
franchises are located in bigger cities that also have more cultural and other offerings. Only one 
study, when determining quality-of-life benefits and including them in the model, found that building 
new stadiums for NFL franchises may be a good deal for cities and their residents (Carlino and 
Coulson 2004b). 
 
The overall result is that mega sport events, sports facilities and franchises do not have a statistically 
significant positive effect on the local economy.  
 
 
 
Studies on the impact of socioeconomic factors have mainly focused on the Olympic Games. Several 
authors showed, during the 1970s, that a country's population and GDP per capita have a significant 
positive effect on their ability to win Olympic medals (Ball 1972; Grimes et al. 1974; Levine 1974). 
Due to the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow by the USA and the 1984 Games in Los 
Angeles by Russia, no research was done in the 1980s. Recently, more authors have covered the 
topic with the same outcome that population and GDP per capita have a statistically significant 
positive impact on the number of medals won by a country (Johnson and Ali 2000; Andreff 2001; 
Bernard and Busse 2004).  
 
Besides those on the Olympic Games, there are only a few other papers that cover the impact of 
socioeconomic factors on team performance. Jones and Ferguson (1988) analyzed the location and 
survival of franchises in the NHL 1977-1978. They argued that population (as indicated in the papers 
on Olympic Games) has a positive impact on team performance. On the other hand, they showed 
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that per capita income has a negative effect. They argued that hockey must therefore be an inferior 
good. However, Siegfried and Peterson (2000) found that audiences for professional sports tend to 
be of higher-than-average income. Barros (2006) analyzed socioeconomic determinants of sport 
expenditure for 308 municipalities in Portugal and found that area size, tax base, and population 
have a positive impact and GDP has a negative impact on sports expenditures. 
 
The overall result is that population has a positive impact on sports performance. The effect of GDP is 
unclear. It has a positive effect on a macro level (athletes from specific countries winning medals at 
Olympic Games) and negative effect on regional level (clubs winning championships). 
 
3.3 Promotion and Relegation in German 'Bundesliga' Soccer 
  
In all but three of the 47 seasons that are covered in this paper, 18 teams were playing in the 
'Bundesliga.' 1963/64 and 1964/65 only 16 teams were playing and after German reunification there 
were 20 teams in 1991/92. In the first seasons, until the '2. Bundesliga' was introduced in 1974, two 
teams were relegated to the 'Regionalligen' every season. The only exception was the season 
1964/65, when only Hertha BSC Berlin was relegated and the league expanded to 18 clubs. After 
1974/75 (with the exception of 1991/92 when 4 teams were relegated), three teams were relegated. 
Between 1981/82 and 1990/91 the third to last team played a relegation match against the third 
team from the '2. Bundesliga.' Seven out of ten times the team from the 'Bundesliga' won and stayed 
in the league.  
 
In total, 50 teams have played in the 'Bundesliga' since it was founded in 1963. One hundred and 
twenty-two relegations have been recorded so far. While some clubs have only played in the 
'Bundesliga' for one year (six clubs), some clubs have played there over 40 years. Hamburger SV has 
even played all 47 seasons since 1963/64. Only one time (Hertha BSC Berlin 1964/65) a club got 
relegated by league ruling while being qualified for the next season by its rank. See Figure 3-1 for 
details. 
 
Some clubs have not been relegated at all while other clubs have been relegated up to seven times. 
Record holders are 1. FC Nuremberg and Arminia Bielefeld. Next to Hamburger SV, there are four 
other clubs27 that have never been relegated. Figure 3-2 shows the distribution of clubs by number of 
relegations. 
 
                                                          
27
  Bayern München since 1965, Bayer Leverkusen since 1979, VfL Wolfsburg since 1997, TSG 1899 Hoffenheim since 2008. 
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Figure 3-1 Number of clubs by number of seasons played in the 'Bundesliga' 
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Figure 3-2 Number of clubs by number of relegations 
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In event history analysis with multiple episode data, the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier survival 
method can be used to estimate the probability of survival past a certain point in time (Kaplan & 
Meier, 1958). Figure 3-3 shows that the chances of survival for a club in the 'Bundesliga' for more 
than three years are less than 50%. And there is a 30% chance of being relegated in the first season. 
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Figure 3-3 Kaplan-Meier estimate for survival in the 'Bundesliga' since 1963/64 
 
3.4 Club External Factors 
 
To identify the club-external socioeconomic factors for my analysis, I use a model suggested by 
Andreff (2006).  
 
Until the end of the 1980s, income of a soccer club in Europe was mainly driven by spectators and 
their entry fees.28 Other sources of income included sponsoring, which began to pick up in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and subsidies from municipal governments. However, those subsidies were a relevant 
portion of income only in France. In other countries, and especially in Germany, there were few 
direct subsidies (mostly in the case of bankruptcy of clubs). Most subsidies are in the form of 
supplying  police forces at games and supporting clubs financially in building new stadiums or putting 
in guarantees at banks (Breuer 2010). 
 
                                                          
28
  See, e.g., Frick (2006) for Germany, Bolotny (2006) for France. 
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Starting in the early 1990s, other sources of revenue emerged. Most European leagues signed their 
first notable TV contracts when private TV stations entered the broadcasting bids.29 Other clubs 
became limited companies to raise money during the IPO. In addition, some clubs started to issue 
bonds.30 Also merchandising increased to become a significant revenue stream. 
 
Andreff's first financial model, which contains mainly local revenue streams, is called SSSL-model 
(Spectators, Subsidies, Sponsors, and Local). Since subsidies are less important in Germany, I adjust 
the model to the situation in Germany, making it the SSL-model. The second and more contemporary 
MCMMG-model (Media, Corporations, Merchandising, Markets, and Global) contains more revenues 
from a global (or at least national) level. 
 
In addition to the Andreff financial models, I also analyze the ability of a region to provide talent. In 
the past, clubs had junior teams where young talent, mostly from the region, played. Nowadays, 
every club must have a high performance center for young talent (DFL 2007). These talents are 
recruited from all regions of Germany and even worldwide.  
 
To analyze local determinants of team success, I mainly focus on factors that can be influenced by 
the location. These factors are: spectators, sponsors, merchandising and talent. Each factor in my 
analysis is at least allocated to one of the revenue streams stated by Andreff or the talent dimension. 
Table 3-1 shows detailed data for the independent covariates. 
 
3.5 Research Design 
 
In my analysis of German 'Bundesliga' soccer I want to explain the survival of clubs in the league. In 
the survival or event history analysis, I use relegation as the event I want to explain. The relegation 
can either be the first relegation of a club or a subsequent relegation. As shown above, the majority 
of clubs has been relegated at least two times. In event history analysis, one speaks of repeated 
events. Such repeated events can be independent of each other. In the case of relegations, it is 
unlikely that repeated events are independent.  
 
Therefore, using event history analysis for single event data would give us possibly wrong estimates 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002). This has two main reasons. First, having dependent or correlated 
                                                          
29
  England 1992 - £167 million for four years (Szymanski 2006a), Italy 1993 - €93 million per season (Lago 2006),  Spain 
1990 - €30 million per season (García and Rodrígues 2006), Germany 1988 - €40 million per season (Frick 2006). 
30
  The first team to be listed on the stock market was Tottenham Hotspur in 1983. After that, many followed (Gerrard 
2006). In Germany, only Borussia Dortmund is listed. 
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events is similar to having autocorrelation in conventional regression models. Second, the model 
restricts the influence of the covariates to be the same across all events (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 
2002). 
 
Another option could be to analyze only the data up to the first event. Two problems arise: I would 
not analyze the second and the following relegations and could only assume that the results are the 
same. In addition, I would waste a lot of data. In my analysis, I could only use 45 instead of 122 
relegations. 
 
The most appropriate option is using semi-parametric proportional hazard-type models. Several 
authors have proposed models for repeated events. I present four widely used variance-correction 
models for repeated events that estimate risk-set and event-time differently. 
 
The 'independent increments' model by Anderson and Gill (1982) is the simplest of the four models. 
It assumes that an event is not affected by any earlier event of the same subject. In practice, it is 
impossible to differentiate between the widely used Cox partial likelihood method (Cox 1972) and 
the method by Anderson and Gill (1982), since the Cox model is a special case of the Anderson and 
Gill (1982) model (Fleming and Harrington 1991).  
 
The 'marginal risk-set' model by Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld (1989) is similar to traditional competing risk 
models. Each individual is at risk for the first, second, etc. event from the beginning. This means that 
in my case, the fourth relegation could occur before the first relegation does.  
 
In the 'conditional risk-set' models developed by Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981) a subject is 
not at risk of an event k until it has experienced all prior k-1 events. The time measured in the 
conditional risk-set model can either be elapsed time or inter-event time. Elapsed time means that 
time is measured from the entry of the subject in the study. In the inter-event time option, time is 
measured from the previous event. 
 
Since the Andersen/Gill model assumes independence between events of the same subject and since 
in the Wei/Lin/Weissfeld model a subject is at risk of all events at the same time, I find the 
conditional risk set model the most appropriate for my analysis. I will use the elapsed time option 
and cluster the data by club and stratify it by its number of relegation (i.e., first relegation, second 
relegation, etc.).  
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Variable Unit Description 
Relevant for 
revenue 
stream 
Min Max Mean SD 
countypop M 
Population in county where the 
club is located 
Spectators, 
Merchandising, 
Talent 
0.08 3.43 0.65 0.60 
countygdppc 1000 
Per capita GDP (or gross value 
added) in the county where the 
club is located 
Spectators, 
Merchandising 
7.56 83.34 34.53 14.68 
1clubs 1 
Number of 'Bundesliga' clubs 
within a 50km radius13 
Spectators 0.00 8.00 1.47 1.92 
123clubs % 
Percentage of 1., 2., and 3. 
league clubs within a 50km 
radius 
Talent 0.00 15.84 6.24 4.29 
othersport 1 
Number of other first league 
clubs (Basketball, Handball, Ice 
hockey) within a 50km radius 
Talent, 
Spectators, 
Sponsors 
0.00 12.00 3.22 2.99 
tvrevenue €m 
TV revenue of the 'Bundesliga' 
in total 
Media 0.00 500.00 103.68 155.95 
newstadium binary 
1 if new stadium was built 
within the last 10 years14, 0 
otherwise 
Spectators,  
(Subsidies) 
0.00 1.00 0.22 0.42 
spectators 1000 
Average number of spectators 
in the respective season 
Spectators 6.10 79.60 25.68 12.34 
stadiumfull binary 
1 if stadium was sold out more 
than 75% of the home games 
Spectators 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 
companies 1 
Number of ´large companies 
(>150 full time employees) in 
the county where the club is 
located 
Sponsors 20.00 513.00 142.97 111.39 
berlin binary 
1 if club is from Berlin, 0 
otherwise 
control 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 
relegations 1 
Number of teams that are 
relegated in the respective 
season 
control 1.00 4.00 2.60 0.57 
timedummy 1 
Number of years since start of 
the league in 1963 
control 1.00 47.00 24.12 13.50 
experience 1 
Number of years played in the 
'Bundesliga' before the 
respective season by the 
respective club 
 control 0.00 46.00 15.58 12.21 
statepopperclub m 
Population in state where the 
club is located divided by 
amount of clubs located in the 
same state 
Spectators, 
Merchandising, 
Talent 
0.52 18.08 5.34 3.70 
stategdppc-
perclub 
1000 
Per capita GDP in state where 
the club is located divided by 
number of clubs located in the 
same state 
Spectators, 
Merchandising 
2.44 50.65 17.16 11.50 
Table 3-1 Summary of independent covariates 
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The hazard of being relegated is 
 
   (     )     ( ) 
     
 
where k denotes the event number, h0k(t) is the baseline hazard and varies by event number k, Xik is a 
vector of i covariates which can be time dependent and β is a vector of parameters. 
 
In the survival analysis the parameters are estimated using the partial likelihood, which can be 
specified as 
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where δ is a censoring indicator which is equal to one if failure is observed and zero if the 
observation is censored. Y is a risk indicator. If the individual is at risk for the current event, Y equals 
one. For all other observations Y is zero. 
 
Next to the 'conditional risk-set' model, I use the regular non-stratified Cox model as comparison. 
The only difference is that the baseline hazard is not stratified. Therefore, the hazard is 
 
   (     )    ( )    (    ) 
 
where h0(t) is no longer dependent on k. 
 
In addition, I estimate two stratified parametric models: the exponential and the Gompertz model 
(see Appendix 3-1 for detailed comparison of the fit for the parametric models). In both parametric 
models, the baseline hazard h0k(t) is stratified by event k.   
 
The hazard of the exponential model is 
 
   (     )     (   )    (    ) 
 
where β0k is the constant coefficient that varies by event k.  
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The hazard rate of the stratified Gompertz model is 
 
   (     )     (   )    (   )    (    ) 
 
where β0k is again the constant coefficient that varies by event k and γk is the Gompertz coefficient 
that also varies by event k. If γk is equal to 0, one can see that the exponential model is a special case 
of the Gompertz model. The next chapter shows that γk is close to 0 in my analysis. Therefore, the 
Gompertz and the exponential model fit the data best. 
 
As discussed above, there are clubs with up to seven relegations. Since the amount of data for more 
relegations becomes very small (see Fig. 2), I stratify by first, second, third, fourth and more than four 
relegations, meaning that I merge the fifth, sixth, and seventh relegation into one group. 
 
3.6 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
The data used in the study was obtained from different sources. Population and GDP data is provided 
by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany and the regional statistical offices of the federal states, 
respectively. Population and GDP data at county31 level was not available for the whole period. 
Therefore, I estimated the data using 2007 county data and growth rates for 1963–2009 on a state 
level, assuming that growth rates within a state did not differ largely. Since there is no better data 
available I have to take this assumption. In addition, I also used the state population and state GDP 
per capita to estimate the results. Since there are cases with more than one club per state, I divided 
the state population and GDP per capita by the number of 'Bundesliga' clubs. See regression results 
in Appendix 3-2. 
 
Information on the final league tables of the 'Bundesliga' is from Kicker soccer magazine. For minor 
leagues ('2. Bundesliga', 'Regionalliga', 'Oberliga', 'Verbands-', and 'Landesliga'), the data was taken 
from www.fussballdaten.de and www.f-archiv.de (unofficial German soccer archive). Attendance 
information is listed in Kicker soccer magazine as well. Information on other sports (handball, 
basketball, ice hockey) was received from the respective national associations.32  
 
Information on the construction of the new stadiums was researched from the stadium and club 
websites and newspaper articles. 
                                                          
31
  County is used as translation for the administrative unit 'Landkreis.’ 
32
  Handball: 'Deutscher Handball Bund,’ Basketball: 'Deutscher Basketball Bund,’ Ice hockey: 'Deutscher Eishockey Bund.’ 
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Data on companies comes from the "Establishment History Panel" of the Institute for Employment 
Research (IAB). The data does not give information on how many companies have their headquarters 
within a specific region but rather how many establishments are situated in a specific county. Since 
the IAB uses a complete count of all establishments in Germany, this is the best data available to 
estimate a 'company landscape' for Germany. Unfortunately, IAB data just covers the years 1975 
until 2006. Therefore, all analyses, including the 'company' variable, include only 84 of 122 
relegations. In addition, data for two counties is not available in the IAB dataset, which means that 
the datasets for Dynamo Dresden and Alemannia Aachen had to be disregarded. 
 
To analyze geographical distances in Germany, I used the World Geodetic System (WGS 84) 
coordination data available on Google Maps. I used the stadium as the location of the respective 
club. 
 
Table 3-2 summarizes the regression coefficients, the standard errors, and the significance levels of 
all four models including all variables. 
 
As you can see, the regular Cox model shows quite similar results to the other models even though 
the other models fit the data better statistically. Therefore, I used the Cox model to estimate more 
models with different sets of variables in Table 3-3. 
 
3.7 Findings and Discussion 
 
The results of the four models presented in Table 3-2 are quite similar. GDP per capita, number of 
spectators, the dummy variable for sold out games, and experience of the club in the league are 
statistically significant and have a negative influence on the hazard. Media revenues and the number 
of relegations per season are significant and have a positive influence on the hazard.  
 
The population around the club has no significant results (see Table 3-2). However, if we look at 
model 1c in Table 3-3 we can see that the 'berlin' variable is important. Leaving 'berlin' out changes 
the coefficient from negative to positive. This is unexpected at first, but at a second glance, we find 
that Berlin, the county with by far the most inhabitants,33 has had four clubs in the 'Bundesliga' and 
has seen nine relegations.  
 
                                                          
33
  Berlin has 3.4 million inhabitants while the second biggest county is Hamburg, with 1.7 million, followed by Munich, 
with 1.3 million, and Hannover, with 1.1 million—the smallest is Zweibrücken with 34000 inhabitants. 
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Covariate 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cox 
Conditional  
risk set 
Parametric 
exponential 
Parametric 
Gompertz 
    
   
countypop 
-0.176   0.107   0.100   -0.088   
(0.284)   (0.323)   (0.283)   (0.283)   
countygdppc 
-0.01   -0.017 ** -0.011   -0.013 * 
(0.008)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.007)   
1clubs 
-0.073   -0.116   -0.074   -0.081   
(0.108)   (0.097)   (0.077)   (0.083)   
123clubs 
0.018   0.029   0.033   0.026   
(0.044)   (0.043)   (0.046)   (0.046)   
othersport 
0.010   0.013   -0.024   -0.007   
(0.059)   (0.072)   (0.061)   (0.067)   
tvrevenue 
0.002   0.003 * 0.002 ** 0.002 * 
(0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
newstadium 
-0.313   -0.184   -0.180   -0.228   
(0.312)   (0.314)   (0.294)   (0.300)   
spectators 
-0.080 *** -0.082 *** -0.069 *** -0.080 *** 
(0.019)   (0.021)   (0.014)   (0.015)   
stadiumfull 
-2.016 * -2.461 *** -1.474   -2.054 *** 
(1.073)   (0.614)   (1.003)   (0.578)   
berlin 
0.914   0.280   0.466   0.768   
(0.698)   (0.743)   (0.668)   (0.656)   
relegations 
0.452 * 0.387 * 0.493 *** 0.500 *** 
(0.246)   (0.214)   (0.173)   (0.160)   
timedummy 
-0.004   0.001   -0.002   -0.005   
(0.020)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.018)   
experience 
-0.066 *** -0.079 *** -0.022   -0.080 *** 
(0.020)   (0.026)   (0.014)   (0.023)   
constant 
        -1.691 *** -1.212 ** 
        (0.602)   (0.604)   
T2 
        0.520 * 0.132   
        (0.273)   (0.433)   
T3 
        1.044 *** -1.305 ** 
        (0.267)   (0.548)   
T4 
        1.106 *** 0.679   
        (0.276)   (0.958)   
T5 
        0.719 ** -2.475   
        (0.334)   (2.128)   
Gamma 
            0.046 * 
            (0.024)   
Gamma T2 
            0.024   
            (0.023)   
Gamma T3 
            0.113 *** 
            (0.026)   
Gamma T4 
            0.002   
            (0.040)   
Gamma T5 
            0.077   
            (0.059)   
Log likelihood -330.37   -202.63   -25.19   -14.64   
Wald Chi2 83.71   65.7   140.7   115.57   
 Table 3-2 Event history analyses results for Cox and parametric models 
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Covariate Model 1 Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 1e Model 1f Model 1g 
countypop 
-0.176   -0.172   0.114   -0.211   -0.375   -0.291   -3.258 *** 
(0.284)   (0.283)   (0.166)   (0.278)   (0.363)   (0.361)   (1.209)   
countygdppc 
-0.010   -0.011   -0.013 * -0.010   -0.004   -0.004   -0.037 ** 
(0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.017)   
1clubs 
-0.073   -0.074   -0.117                   
(0.108)   (0.108)   (0.103)                   
123clubs 
0.018   0.019   0.036                   
(0.044)   (0.043)   (0.041)                   
othersport 
0.010   0.010   0.015                   
(0.059)   (0.059)   (0.059)                   
tvrevenue 
0.002   0.002 * 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 * 0.002   0.003 ** 
(0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
newstadium 
-0.313   -0.316   -0.356   -0.320   -0.459   -0.451   -0.401   
(0.312)   (0.312)   (0.312)   (0.304)   (0.383)   (0.382)   (0.386)   
spectators 
-0.080 *** 0.079 *** -0.083 *** -0.076 *** -0.061 *** -0.067 *** -0.079 *** 
(0.019)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022)   
stadiumfull 
-2.016 * -2.010 * -1.998 * -1.970 * -46.27  34         
(1.073)   (1.070)   (1.067)   (1.064)   .           
companies 
                        0.016 *** 
                        (0.006)   
Berlin 
0.914   0.903       1.061   1.177   1.037   2.535 *** 
(0.698)   (0.697)       (0.657)   (0.841)   (0.840)   (0.987)   
relegations 
0.452 * 0.428 * 0.47 ** 0.385 * 0.487   0.472   0.460   
(0.246)   (0.221)   (0.216)   (0.210)   (0.307)   (0.305)   (0.306)   
timedummy 
-0.004                           
(0.020)                           
experience 
-0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.071 *** -0.065 *** 
(0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.019)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)   
Log likelihood -330.4   -330.3   -330.9   -330.3   -185.8   -189.5   -185.7   
Wald Chi2 83.7   83.7   82.0   83.1   54.5   45.7   53.2   
Clubs 50   50   50   50   40   40   40   
Relegations 122   122   122   122   84   84   84   
Time at risk 844   844   844   844   538   538   538   
 Table 3-3 Event history analyses results for different Cox models35 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
  As mentioned earlier, there is no company data available for Alemannia Aachen. Since Alemmania Aachen is the only 
club that was relegated despite the fact of having most of their home games sold out, there is no data set for this 
analysis that combines a full stadium with being relegated.  
35
  All models were estimated in Stata 11; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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In the beginning of the 'Bundesliga' the German Football Association tried to have a club from Berlin 
in the league for political reasons. For example, when Hertha BSC Berlin was relegated in 1964/65 
due to a match fixing attempt, the 'Bundesliga' expanded to 18 clubs so that another club from Berlin 
could be promoted. I also tried population density in addition and instead of the 'population' 
variable, but 'population density' had no significant impact.36 
 
GDP per capita has a statistically significant influence on the hazard rate with coefficients of -0.010 to 
-0.017, meaning that an increase in GDP per capita by €1000 would decrease the hazard by exp(-
0.012)-1≈-1.2%. This is expected, since people in wealthier regions can buy more game tickets and 
merchandising. On the other hand, there are studies arguing that some sports are inferior goods 
(Cairns 1990). For soccer, in particular, the results have been mixed. The results of my study (see also 
all coefficients for GDP per capita in Table 3-3) are in favor of soccer being a normal rather than an 
inferior good.  
 
The existence of other 'Bundesliga' club or a club from the first three divisions has no significant 
influence. Having other first league sports clubs around is also not significant. Since the significance 
levels are not even close to at least 10%, there is no need to interpret the coefficients. If you 
compare models 1b and 1d in Table 3-3, you can see that leaving the three variables out does not 
change the coefficients, nor does it change the fit of the model.37  
 
An increase in TV revenues is significant in most models but shows just a minor increase in the 
hazard rates. A €1 million increase in TV revenues for the whole league increases the hazard of being 
relegated for all clubs by 0.2%. Unfortunately, the TV revenues for individual teams are not available. 
Since the TV revenues have increased steadily over the complete period, I expect this effect to be 
another time dummy.  
 
The effect of a new stadium is not significant. This result does not support results of other authors 
analyzing the effect of stadiums. Noll determines that the novelty of a new stadium lasts somewhere 
between seven and 11 years (Noll 1974). 
 
The higher the average attendance in a season, the lower the relegation hazard. More precisely, 
1000 spectators more decrease the hazard rate by around 8%. Since the stadium capacity is 
restricted, I accounted for stadiums being sold out by inserting the dummy variable 'stadiumfull.' The 
                                                          
36
  Full results of these additional regressions are available from the author upon request. 
37
  The Wald test shows a chi2 of 83.11 for the model without and of 83.66 for the model with the variables. 
Chapter 3. Location and Success in German Soccer: The Impact of Location on the 
Performance of 'Bundesliga' Soccer Clubs 
57 
 
dummy was one if the stadium was sold out in more than 75% of the home games. This was the case 
in only 31 out of 844 data records. The coefficient of the dummy variable is statistically significant. If 
the stadium is sold out in more than 75% of the games the hazard decreases by around 90%. This is 
expected since normally stadiums are sold out at clubs that play for the championship. Indeed, only 
one38 out of these 31 data sets ended in relegation.  
 
The constant coefficient h0k(t), which is not estimated in the Cox model, is significant in the 
parametric models. This is the baseline hazard if all other covariates are equal to zero and it also 
accounts for other factors not included in the model. More interesting than the constant itself is the 
fact that in the stratified exponential and Gompertz models, the baseline hazard differs between the 
first and the other relegations. In the exponential model, the baseline hazard increases significantly 
from the first to the second relegation, again from the second to the third relegation and also from 
the third to fourth relegation. After that, the hazard decreases but is still higher for the fifth and later 
relegations than it is for the first and second. The data for the fifth and later relegations must be 
interpreted with caution since the number of observations is particularly low for these cases. 
 
In addition to the 'berlin' variable that I discussed above, I controlled for three other factors. First, I 
included the number of teams that were relegated. This is necessary since the number of relegations 
has changed over time. During the first seasons (until 1974/75), only two clubs were relegated per 
season. After that, three clubs were relegated. In the 1980s, a relegation match was introduced 
between the sixteenth of the first league against the third of the second league. Since the first league 
club often won, there were a couple of seasons with only two relegations. As expected, the variable 
is statistically significant. If you increase the number of clubs being relegated by one, the hazard of 
being relegated increases by 50-60%. Second, I included a time dummy to account for all other 
developments that just have to do with the point in time we are looking at. The time dummy is not 
significant. If you look at Table 3-3, I excluded the time dummy in the second model and it did not 
change any coefficients significantly. Third, I controlled for the experience a club had before the 
respective season to account for any other factors that derive from earlier seasons. This variable is 
also significant at the 1% level. One more year of experience in the 'Bundesliga' decreases the hazard 
by around 7%. 
 
Table 3-3 shows seven models. Model 1 is the same as model 1 in Table 3-2. The variations in models 
1b, 1c, and 1d were already discussed earlier. Since I want to include the number of large companies 
in model 1g and I do not have information on companies before 1975 and after 2006, the number of 
                                                          
38
  Alemannia Aachen was relegated in 2006/07 despite the fact that they sold out 16 of their 17 home games. 
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observations decreases. Model 1d and 1e are identical except for the fact that model 1e has fewer 
observations. Since none of the clubs whose stadium was sold out more than 75% of the games was 
relegated,39 the 'stadiumfull' variable becomes insignificant. I excluded the variable 'stadiumfull' in 
model 1f with no impact on the other variables. In model 1g I included the 'companies' variable. It is 
highly significant but the coefficient is unexpected. One more large company in the county increases 
the hazard by around 1%. In addition, three variables change. The population variable and the 'berlin' 
dummy become highly significant and the 'GDP per capita' variable becomes significant, as it also was 
in two other models in Table 3-2. All other variables retain their size and magnitude. Since the 
'companies' and the 'population' variables are highly correlated, the results must be analyzed with 
caution. However, if you include a variable 'large companies per 1000 inhabitants,' then this variable 
is not statistically significant.40 
 
3.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this article I analyze the survival time of German 'Bundesliga' soccer clubs in the seasons 1963/64 
to 2009/2010. I estimated a regular Cox model, a conditional risk-set model, and two stratified 
parametric models (exponential and Gompertz). I find that they all yield similar results. GDP per 
capita, the number of viewers, and the experience of a club in the 'Bundesliga' have a significant and 
positive impact on success. The increase in the number of relegations has a significant and negative 
effect on team survival. In addition, the chances of being relegated increase with each further 
relegation. The impact of companies in the region is unexpected but it is also biased by the 
correlation between companies and population in the county. A more detailed analysis is needed.  
 
Next to these significant factors, it is quite interesting that the presence of other clubs in the region 
has no impact on relegation chances. This could be an interesting topic of future research. Especially 
in American major leagues, competition by more than one franchise in a region is avoided with the 
argument that a newly established club would have an impact on the existing one. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
  As mentioned earlier, there is no company data available for the region where Aachen is located. 
40
  Regression results for additional analysis are available from the author upon request. 
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3.9 Appendix 3-1: Fit of Parametric Models 
 
There are two strategies for choosing the adequate parametric model (Cleves et al. 2002).  
 
— Fitting a gamma model and testing hypothesis with the Wald test 
— Fitting each model and comparing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values 
 
Table 3-4 displays the results for the gamma model in column 5. The gamma model is the most 
general parametric model (available in Stata). Two hypotheses can be tested: 
 
H0: κ = 1, in which case if H0 is true then the model is Weibull 
H0: κ = 1, σ = 1, in which case if H0 is true then the model is exponential 
 
From the results of my models I cannot preclude the use of neither the Weibull nor the exponential 
model. 
 
The AIC is defined as  
 
           (   ) 
 
where L is the log likelihood, k is the number of model covariates, and c the number of model-
specific distributional parameters. Akaike (1974) proposed that the models' log likelihood not simply 
be compared, but rather that it be adjusted by the number of parameters being estimated by each 
model and then for the adjusted value to be compared. The best fitting model is the one with the 
lowest AIC. It appears from Table 3-4 that the Gompertz model is the best fitting model. In addition 
to the Gompertz model, I used the exponential model. Since the number of relegations is more or 
less constant over the years, I expected the exponential model to be the best fitting model. However, 
looking at the parameters of the Gompertz and Weibull model, we find that both models are very 
close to the exponential model. The exponential model is a special case of the Gompertz model if 
gamma = 0 and is a special case of the Weibull model if p = 1. Looking at Table 3-4, it appears that 
gamma is 0.07 and p is 1.24. For these reasons, I used the exponential instead of the Weibull model. 
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Covariate 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model8 
Parametric 
exponential 
Parametric 
Gompertz 
Parametric 
Weibull 
Parametric 
Lognormal 
Parametric 
Loglogistic 
Parametric 
Gamma 
ROBUST SE ROBUST SE ROBUST SE ROBUST SE ROBUST SE ROBUST SE 
countypop 
0.061   -0.181   0.029   0.052   0.306   -0.008   
(0.350)   (0.319)   (0.331)   (0.407)   (0.400)   (0.257)   
countygdppc 
-0.014   -0.011   -0.013   0.012   0.012   0.010   
(0.009)   (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.008)   (0.007)   
1clubs 
-0.048   -0.028   -0.046   -0.009   -0.005   0.032   
(0.094)   (0.082)   (0.089)   (0.119)   (0.113)   (0.071)   
123clubs 
0.034   0.020   0.035   -0.004   0.009   -0.027   
(0.051)   (0.047)   (0.051)   (0.050)   (0.053)   (0.039)   
othersport 
-0.036   -0.030   -0.038   0.014   0.024   0.031   
(0.070)   (0.067)   (0.070)   (0.085)   (0.098)   (0.052)   
tvrevenue 
0.002   0.002 * 0.002 * -0.003 * -0.003   -0.001   
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   
newstadium 
-0.351   -0.253   -0.393   0.876 ** 0.645 ** 0.278   
(0.302)   (0.315)   (0.305)   (0.355)   (0.299)   (0.270)   
spectators 
-0.063 * -0.075 *** -0.064 *** 0.041 ** 0.026   0.050 *** 
(0.016)   (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.018)   (0.016)   (0.014)   
stadiumfull 
-1.884   -1.920 *** -1.790 * 2.443 *** 2.664 *** 1.343   
(1.037)   (0.638)   (0.958)   (0.850)   (0.662)   (0.876)   
berlin 
0.707   1.075   0.756   -1.192   -1.921 * -0.581   
(0.766)   (0.712)   (0.756)   (0.954)   (0.983)   (0.576)   
relegations 
0.442 *** 0.443 *** 0.460 *** -0.314 * -0.286   -0.362 *** 
(0.155)   (0.156)   (0.166)   (0.177)   (0.211)   (0.136)   
timedummy 
0.021   0.000   0.015   -0.008   -0.007   -0.012   
(0.016)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.014)   
experience 
-0.020   -0.075 *** -0.041 ** 0.041 * 0.060 ** 0.033 *** 
(0.015)   (0.021)   (0.019)   (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.013)   
constant 
-1.650 *** -1.278 ** -2.075 *** 1.030   1.073 * 1.734 *** 
(0.644)   (0.621)   (0.638)   (0.663)   (0.592)   (0.574)   
gamma 
    0.065 ***                 
    (0.015)                   
ln_p 
        0.215 **             
        (0.088)               
ln_sigma 
            -0.307 ***     -0.217 ** 
            (0.087)       (0.090)   
ln_gamma 
                -1.007 ***     
                (0.119)       
kappa 
                    1.121 *** 
                    (0.355)   
Log likelihood -33.79   -25.29   -31.55   -44.12   -57.28   -31.45   
Wald Chi2 67.66   89.87   72.72   117.52   236.31   56.85   
AIC 95.58   80.58   93.1   118.25   144.55   94.91   
Table 3-4 Regression analysis comparison for non-stratified models 
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3.10 Appendix 3-2: State vs. County Data 
 
As discussed above, I used county population and GDP data from 2007 and growth rates for federal 
states to calculate the county population and GDP data for the other years that I used in my analysis. 
I will now show that the data is not significantly different if I use state data. Since there is often more 
than one club per state I divide the population and GDP data by the number of clubs in the state. See 
Table 3-5 for the comparison county vs. state data per club.  
 
All coefficients point in the same direction and they are mostly quite similar in both county and state 
models. The coefficients for the covariate 'GDP per capita' vary a little more between the five tested 
models with the state data and they are more significant. The population data varies a bit more with 
the county data, and state data is also more significant than the county data.  
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4 Up and Down: Competing Risks in Second Tier Soccer 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Every year the worst two to four clubs are relegated from each of the professional soccer leagues in 
Europe and replaced by the best teams from lower tier leagues. In those leagues there is generally 
less attendance, cheaper ticket prices and sponsors, and TV stations are likely to pay less since 
people prefer to watch better teams. As a consequence, revenues of relegated teams decrease 
dramatically. Additionally, higher tier teams' salaries and reputations attract the best talent from 
lower tier clubs. Therefore, relegated teams have to sell their best players. More and more contracts, 
however, include clauses that allow players to transfer to other teams without a (or for a low) 
transfer fee in case of relegation, leaving their clubs without adequate compensation. Thus, 
relegation has a huge financial impact on the affected teams. Still, only a few sports economists have 
researched determinants of relegation and promotion. Existing research only covers short time 
periods and focuses on first tier sports. Lower leagues where teams face the opportunity of 
promotion and the risk of relegation at the same time have not been subject to in-depth analysis so 
far. This paper works towards closing this gap.   
 
The paper studies the determinants not only of relegation but also of promotion—a characteristic 
specific to lower leagues. I therefore focus my research on six second tier soccer leagues in Europe 
since their inaugural season. In England, second tier soccer was introduced in 1892. In total, my 
dataset contains 419 season-league-observations. I use competing risks analysis, a special case of 
event history analysis (also known as 'survival analysis'), to estimate determinants of promotion and 
relegation simultaneously. 
 
Sports clubs, as any other enterprise, often identify potential chances as well as risks too late to take 
effective, strategic measures. Since buying players to increase playing talent is restricted to so-called 
transfer periods, one in summer and one in winter, reacting to a crisis or making use of an 
opportunity, respectively between those transfer windows, can hardly be done in the short-term. 
Therefore, having an early warning system is even more important in soccer. Early warning systems 
as suggested by e.g., Müller-Merbach (1977) have, in one way or the other, been implemented by 
most companies in most industries. Using my regression results and an out-of-sample forecast, I 
propose an early warning system, which identifies second tier soccer clubs with a high probability of 
promotion or relegation. 
 
Chapter 4. Up and Down: Competing Risks in Second Tier Soccer 
65 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In chapter 4.2, I give an overview of the literature on promotion and 
relegation. In chapter 4.3, my data is presented. I discuss the regression model in chapter 4.4 and the 
estimation results in chapter 4.5. In chapter 4.6, I point out the differences between the six leagues. 
In chapter 4.7, I suggest a forecasting model for future promotions and relegations and chapter 4.8 
concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review on Promotion and Relegation 
 
The discussion of promotion and relegation is part of a broader issue in sports economics: open vs. 
closed leagues. In closed leagues the number and the identity of member teams do not change from 
season to season.41 New clubs can only be added by the vote of the existing league members. On the 
other hand, in open leagues the worst teams—normally measured by winning percentage—are 
relegated to a lower tier league and the best teams from that league (or leagues42) are promoted. 
The former is widely used in the United States (e.g., the National Basketball Association, the National 
Football League, Major League Baseball) while the latter is e.g., used in European soccer leagues.43  
 
The impact this structural difference has on the individual soccer club as well as consumer welfare 
has been studied by several authors. Ross and Szymanski (2002, p. 625) argue that "the institution of 
promotion and relegation tends to raise consumer welfare by increasing effective competition 
among the teams in a league." Noll (2002) finds that players earn higher wages and attendance is 
higher in an open league. Szymanski and Valletti (2005) show that an open league incentivizes each 
team to win. Even the bottom teams need to keep up their effort until the end of the season to avoid 
relegation. However, the willingness to share income (such as media or gate revenues) between the 
teams in open leagues is lower. While Ross and Szymanski (2002) use a theoretical approach only, 
Noll (2002) as well as Szymanski and Valletti (2005) empirically support their model by using the 
English football league as an example. 
 
In their literature reviews on soccer economics, Matheson (2006) and Szymanski (2006b) point out 
that there is little research on the determinants of promotion or relegation. The reason for this may 
be that sports economic research is mainly focused on U.S. sports and, as mentioned earlier, U.S. 
sports use closed leagues and are therefore not affected by promotion and relegation.  
 
                                                          
41
  Only relocation of teams can change the cities that have a major league team. 
42
  In many league systems there is more than one league at the next lower hierarchy level. 
43
  Szymanski (2006b) gives a good overview of benefits and costs of the two systems. 
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In the following paragraph I will discuss the few available studies on the determinants of promotion 
and relegation. Dherbecourt and Drut (2009) analyzed promotion and relegation in the five biggest 
top tier European soccer leagues from 2004 to 2009. Their regression model includes socio-economic 
variables such as GDP, population and unemployment of the region. Club internal factors such as 
average age of the team, coach seniority, percentage of foreign players or championship history are 
also accounted for in their model. They find that regional factors play a significant role. Clubs from 
regions with a higher percentage of services industries and a higher percentage of educated people 
have a lower relegation probability. They suggest that while soccer used to be fueled by the 
industrial revolution—it was a way to socialize for people who moved to industrial cities from rural 
areas (see Kuper and Szymanski 2009)—globalization and the decrease of industry in Europe are 
responsible for the decline of elite clubs from industrial regions increasing the chances of clubs from 
other regions. Moreover, the promotion probability is negatively impacted by GDP growth and 
positively by unemployment as well as by the fact that another club from the same city is playing in 
the first tier league. In addition, experience in the top tier league, qualification for a European cup 
competition and stadium attendance reduce the probability of relegation. They also include the 
shareholder structure of the clubs in their analyses. The fact that a billionaire owns the majority of 
shares of a club—such as Roman Abramowitsch at Chelsea London or Silvio Berlusconi at AC Milan—
also decreases (increases) its relegation (promotion) probability. 
 
Wallbrecht (2010) uses a dataset from the German soccer 'Bundesliga' between 1963 and 2010 to 
analyze the impact of regional factors such as GDP or population as well as some club related factors 
(e.g., experience, attendance, previous relegations) on relegation chances. He finds that higher GDP, 
higher attendance, and more experience in the 'Bundesliga' decrease the chances of being relegated 
while previous relegations increase the chances of being relegated again. 
 
Frick and Wallbrecht (2012) analyze seven top tier sports leagues in Europe from four different sports 
and four different countries for all seasons after World War II. Using an organizational ecology 
approach, they find that previous club performance (number of previous championship titles) and 
average attendance affect 'survival' in the league in a statistically significant and economically 
relevant sense. In line with results from Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) and Wallbrecht (2010), they 
find that the number of previous relegations increase the chances of being relegated again. 
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Frick and Prinz (2004) analyze 12 major European soccer leagues over a 25-year period (1976-2000) 
and find the 'Bosman-ruling' to have different effects on stronger than on weaker leagues.44 In 
countries such as England, Italy or Spain, survival probabilities of newcomers have decreased since 
the 'Bosman-ruling.' The reason for this is the signing of many foreign-born players by established 
teams in these leagues. In countries such as Yugoslavia, Russia or Belgium, the dominant teams have 
lost their star players to foreign clubs. Therefore, survival chances of promoted teams have 
increased. 
 
This article analyzes the determinants of promotion and relegation further. In particular, I add two 
aspects that have not been investigated before. First, my research covers leagues since their 
inaugural season. This gives me the opportunity to study up to 110 seasons in one league alone. The 
long timespan of the study should help to eliminate short-term trends. Second, I expand the research 
on promotion and relegation to second tier leagues. These leagues are interesting for several 
reasons. Two competitions can be studied at the same time. Some teams in the league are fighting 
for promotion while other teams fight against relegation. Additionally, there are no teams that 
dominate the leagues for a long period of time because if a team plays well, it is promoted to a 
higher tier league.  
 
4.3 Data Description 
 
The analysis focuses on six second tier soccer leagues in Europe: England, Spain, Italy, Germany, 
France and Portugal. The selection of these leagues is based on their Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA) coefficients (retrieved summer 2011). There are two main reasons for studying 
the top countries: first, the top countries' second leagues are more relevant financially. The top 20 
clubs, by revenues, are all from the top 5 countries of the UEFA ranking (Deloitte 2012). Secondly, 
weaker leagues are more receptive to corruption, match fixing, and so forth, which would 
compromise the results of my study. Forrest and Simmons (2003) as well as Preston and Szymanski 
(2003) conclude that corruption is more likely (a) the lower player wages and (b) the lower the 
probability of detection—both of which is true for weaker leagues. I use the complete history of 
these leagues from their foundation until the end of the 2010/2011 season. This covers 419 seasons 
in total, 110 seasons in England alone since the inaugural season of the second division in 1892. 
Seven hundred and twenty-eight clubs have played in these leagues during that time; 1060 
promotions and 1431 relegations have taken place; 8896 team-season-observations are available. To 
                                                          
44
  Strength of a league is defined by its Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) coefficient. 
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my knowledge, this is the largest sample used in promotion/relegation analysis so far (see Table 4-1 
for an overview). 
 
  England Germany Italy Spain France Portugal Total 
Start 1892 1974 1929 1929 1933 1990   
End 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011   
Breaks (War time) 
1916 - 
1919 
- 
1943 - 
1945 
1936 – 
1939 
1939 - 
1945 
-   
1940 - 
1946 
Seasons 110 37 90 89 72 21 419 
Clubs 100 119 136 159 154 60 728 
Events 486 289 561 566 466 123 2491 
Promotions 252 101 231 217 202 57 1060 
Relegations 234 188 330 349 264 66 1431 
Table 4-1 Overview of six leagues 
 
On average, each club can be observed 12.2 seasons in my sample. One hundred and sixteen clubs 
only survived one season. Barnsley F.C. has the most experience in the second league, with 70 non-
consecutive seasons. RCFC Besançon had the longest spell, with 41 consecutive seasons without 
being promoted or relegated from 1945 until 1986. Real Murcia has the most spells, with 16. The 
average number of promotions and relegations per club is 1.5 and 2, respectively. The two clubs with 
the most promotions from second to first league are Atalanta Bergamo and Birmingham City F.C.. 
They have been promoted 12 times. Amiens SC has the most relegations from second to the third tier 
league (10 times). The team with the longest absence from the second tier is Crewe Alexandra F.C., 
which played in the second league until 1896, when they were demoted. After playing in lower 
leagues for 101 years, they returned to the second league in 1997. 
 
In the following paragraph I will discuss some assumptions:  
Merger/Acquisitions: Mergers and acquisitions are rare in European soccer. For those rare cases that 
did occur, I proceeded as follows. If both teams were in the second tier league at the time of the 
merger, I treat the higher ranked club as if nothing happened and the lower ranked club as if it was 
relegated (e.g., the merger of U.S. Taranto and AS Taranto Calcio in 1947). If one club merged with a 
lower tier club, the club from the second tier was continued. If both clubs were not in the second tier 
at the time of the merger, I continued the club with more experience in the second tier (e.g., the 
merger of TuS Schloß Neuhaus and 1. FC Paderborn in 1985). No second tier clubs ever merged with 
a first tier club. 
Refoundation: If a club was dissolved and a new club was founded, then there are two options. If the 
new club was founded directly after the dissolution of the old one with most of the same players, 
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management, stadium, and so forth, then the new club was treated as if the old club continued. If 
the new club was founded years later with new players, the club was treated as a completely new 
club. The reasoning is the same as with mergers and acquisitions.  
Time of War: The leagues in Italy, Spain and France were suspended once by war, respectively (World 
War II and the Spanish Civil War). The English league stopped twice (World War I and II). The German 
and Portuguese leagues were founded later and therefore not interrupted by war. Since almost all 
leagues continued after the war with the same clubs (or more) that had been in the league before 
the war, I treat the season after the war as if it had taken place immediately after the last season 
before the war. All teams that were in the second league before the war and did not play in the first 
season after the war were treated as relegated. This is a reasonable assumption because, in fact, the 
seasons were treated as if they had happened in subsequent years by the respective national soccer 
associations. 
Forced relegation: There are several incidents when a club was relegated as punishment for e.g., 
match fixing or due to financial difficulties, even if the club did not finish the season in the relegation 
zone. In total, there are 15 cases of clubs being relegated from the first to the second tier level and 
111 cases where a club was relegated from the second to the third tier level. In contrast to 
Dherbecourt and Drut (2009), who take only sportive results into account, I use the relegations that 
actually took place. For example, when Juventus F.C. was relegated for match fixing and Messina 
Peloro F.C. stayed in the league, despite the fact that they were the third worst team, Dherbecourt 
and Drut (2009) consider Messina as relegated and I consider Juventus as relegated. They argue that 
the sportive results are what should be analyzed by the model. I argue that if a team is relegated for 
e.g., match fixing, then the final table does not reflect the real sportive results that would have 
occurred without match fixing.  
 
I chose variables to measure the success history of a club as well as club and league specific factors 
based on the hypothesis that these are the major determinants of relegation and promotion. 
Including control variables, my data comprises a set of 25 variables. The data is mainly taken from 
final tables of the respective seasons. Sources for the more recent seasons are accessible over the 
websites of the national soccer association and league administrators. Older tables are available 
from the following sources. 
 
— England: "The Football League Match by Match" series (1892-1969) (Brown 2004-2007) and 
"Rothman's Football Yearbooks" (from 1970) (Rollin et al. 1969-2000) 
— Germany: Kicker Magazine's website (www.kicker.de) and Soccer Database website 
(www.fußballdaten.de) 
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   Covariate  Description Mean 
Stand. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Su
cc
e
ss
 h
is
to
ry
 o
f 
cl
u
b
 
title1 
Number of championship titles in first tier 
since foundation of the respective first 
league 
0.223 0.938 0 25 
Interaction: title1 x 
leagueage 
Interaction term: title1 * leagueage 14.06 63.016 0 1875 
experience1 
Years of experience in first tier since 
foundation of the respective first league  
8.896 14.535 0 79 
Interaction: 
experience1 x 
leagueage 
Interaction term: experience1 * leagueage 519.7 1117 0 8374 
title2 
Number of championship titles in second 
tier 
0.508 1.028 0 8 
Interaction: title2 x 
leagueage 
Interaction term: title2 * leagueage 29.679 72.504 0 642 
experience2 
Years of experience in second tier since 
foundation of the respective second league 
(=experience in second league / number of 
seasons) 
12.024 10.918 0 69 
Interaction: 
experience2 x 
leagueage 
Interaction term: experience2 * leagueage 662.64 900.65 0 7383 
pro1 
Number of previous promotions of the club 
from second to first tier 
1.296 1.899 0 11 
rel3 
Number of previous relegations of the club 
from second to third tier 
1.114 1.468 0 9 
C
lu
b
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 f
ac
to
rs
 
proprev1 
Team promoted in the previous season - 1 
if the club was promoted in the previous 
season, 0 otherwise 
0.161 0.367 0 1 
relprev1 
Team relegated in the previous season - 1 if 
the club was relegated in the previous 
season, 0 otherwise 
0.116 0.32 0 1 
otherteams 
Other clubs from the same city in the first 
tier - 1 if there is a club from the same city 
in the first tier league in the same season, 0 
otherwise 
0.246 0.831 0 7 
bigcity 
Club from a big city - 1 if the club is from a 
big city, 0 otherwise - big city if population 
was >100,000 in 2010 (≈ 50% of all clubs) 
0.67 0.47 0 1 
forcedrel1 
Forced relegation from first to second tier 
in the previous season - 1 if the club was 
forcibly relegated from the first to the 
second league in the previous season, 0 
otherwise 
0.002 0.041 0 1 
Table 4-2 Variable description 
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C
lu
b
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 f
ac
to
rs
 
forcedrel2 
Forced relegation from second to third in 
this season - 1 if the club is forcibly 
relegated from the second to the third 
league at the end of the current season, 0 
otherwise 
0.012 0.111 0 1 
reserveteam 
Reserve team - 1 if the team is run as a 
reserve or farm team of a first tier club, 0 
otherwise 
0.012 0.109 0 1 
Le
ag
u
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 f
ac
to
rs
 
league3prof 
Third tier league professional - 1 if the third 
tier league is run professionally in the 
current season, 0 otherwise 
0.512 0.5 0 1 
nrpro 
Number of clubs being promoted from the 
second to the first league this season 
2.694 0.713 0 6 
nrrel 
Number of clubs being relegated from the 
second to the third league this season 
4.122 3.607 0 33 
nrclubs 
Number of clubs playing in the second 
league this season 
24.232 7.949 10 60 
leagueage 
Number of years since the foundation of 
the league 
39.554 26.498 0 107 
england 
Country dummy England - 1 if the club is 
from England, 0 otherwise 
0.262 0.44 0 1 
germany 
Country dummy Germany - 1 if the club is 
from Germany, 0 otherwise 
0.096 0.295 0 1 
italy 
Country dummy Italy - 1 if the club is from 
Italy, 0 otherwise 
0.19 0.393 0 1 
spain 
Country dummy Spain - 1 if the club is from 
Spain, 0 otherwise 
0.203 0.403 0 1 
france 
Country dummy France - 1 if the club is 
from France, 0 otherwise 
0.206 0.404 0 1 
portugal 
Country dummy Portugal - 1 if the club is 
from Portugal, 0 otherwise 
0.042 0.2 0 1 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Interaction: bosman 
x small city 
Interaction term: Bosman dummy (1 for all 
seasons since the Bosman ruling (since 
1996), 0 otherwise) * Small city (1 if the 
club is from a small city, 0 otherwise - small 
city if population was <100,000 in 2010) 
0.077 0.266 0 1 
Interaction: war5 x 
small city 
Interaction term: War dummy (1 for the 
first five years after a league resumed after 
war time, 0 otherwise) * Small city (1 if the 
club is from a small city, 0 otherwise - small 
city if population was <100,000 in 2010) 
0.026 0.158 0 1 
 Table 4-2 continued 
 
 
Chapter 4. Up and Down: Competing Risks in Second Tier Soccer 
72 
 
 
  
titel1 
title1 x 
leagueage 
experience1 
experience1 x 
leagueage 
titel2 
title2 x 
leagueage 
experience2 
experience2 x 
leagueage 
pro1 
rel3 
proprev1 
relprev1 
otherteams 
bigcity 
forcedrel1 
forcedrel2 
reserveteam 
league3prof 
nrpro 
nrrel 
nrclubs 
leagueage 
germany 
italy 
spain 
france 
portugal 
bosman x small 
city 
war5 x small 
city 
ti
te
l1
 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ti
tl
e1
 x
 
le
ag
u
ea
ge
 
0
.9
6 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
1
 
0
.5
8 
0
.6
2 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
1
 
x 
le
ag
u
ea
ge
 
0
.5
4 
0
.6
4 
0
.9
4 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ti
te
l2
 
0
.1
9 
0
.2
3 
0
.6
1 
0
.5
6 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ti
tl
e2
 x
 
le
ag
u
ea
ge
 
0
.2
3 
0
.3
0 
0
.6
5 
0
.6
9 
0
.9
2 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
2
 
0
.0
6 
0
.1
2 
0
.3
6 
0
.4
2 
0
.4
8 
0
.5
4 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
2
 
x 
le
ag
u
ea
ge
 
0
.1
2 
0
.2
0 
0
.4
4 
0
.5
5 
0
.4
6 
0
.6
0 
0
.9
2 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
p
ro
1
 
0
.2
0 
0
.2
4 
0
.6
8 
0
.6
5 
0
.8
2 
0
.8
1 
0
.6
0 
0
.5
8 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
re
l3
 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
6 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
5 
0
.1
2 
0
.1
7 
0
.5
8 
0
.5
6 
0
.2
1 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
p
ro
p
re
v1
 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.1
5 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
6 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
4 
0
.0
9 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
re
lp
re
v1
 
0
.1
3 
0
.1
1 
0
.2
5 
0
.1
8 
0
.2
0 
0
.1
5 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
4 
0
.2
7 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.1
6 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
o
th
er
te
am
s 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
4 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
2 
0
.0
8 
0
.1
2 
0
.0
2 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
3 
0
.0
1 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
b
ig
ci
ty
 
0
.1
3 
0
.1
3 
0
.2
6 
0
.2
2 
0
.2
5 
0
.2
3 
0
.2
0 
0
.1
8 
0
.2
8 
0
.1
0 
-0
.0
9 
0
.1
0 
0
.2
0 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
fo
rc
ed
re
l1
 
0
.1
1 
0
.1
0 
0
.0
5 
0
.0
4 
0
.0
1 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2 
0
.1
1 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
0 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
fo
rc
ed
re
l2
 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
5 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
3 
0
.0
0 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
re
se
rv
e
te
am
 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
7 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
3 
-0
.0
4 
0
.1
9 
0
.0
7 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
3 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
le
ag
u
e3
p
ro
f 
0
.1
8 
0
.2
0 
0
.3
3 
0
.3
5 
0
.2
7 
0
.3
4 
0
.4
9 
0
.5
4 
0
.3
4 
0
.3
4 
-0
.0
3 
0
.0
1 
0
.1
3 
0
.0
6 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
5 
0
.0
2 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
n
rp
ro
 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
4 
0
.1
0 
0
.1
1 
0
.1
5 
0
.1
8 
0
.2
0 
0
.2
4 
0
.2
0 
0
.2
6 
0
.0
2 
0
.0
5 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
2 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
2 
0
.0
4 
0
.1
7 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
n
rr
el
 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.1
3 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
4 
-0
.1
3 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.0
5 
0
.0
5 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
8 
0
.0
2 
-0
.1
2 
0
.0
9 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
n
rc
lu
b
s 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.1
1 
0
.0
9 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
4 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
4 
0
.1
0 
0
.6
9 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
le
ag
u
ea
ge
 
0
.2
1 
0
.2
7 
0
.4
4 
0
.5
2 
0
.3
7 
0
.4
9 
0
.6
5 
0
.7
7 
0
.4
7 
0
.4
9 
-0
.0
3 
0
.0
4 
0
.1
5 
0
.1
3 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
7 
0
.0
3 
0
.7
9 
0
.3
2 
-0
.1
6 
-0
.0
9 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ge
rm
an
y 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.1
8 
-0
.1
9 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.1
2 
0
.0
2 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
4 
0
.1
1 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.2
9 
0
.0
3 
0
.1
6 
0
.0
8 
-0
.3
0 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
  
it
al
y 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
4 
0
.0
6 
0
.1
5 
0
.0
5 
0
.0
3 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
7 
0
.0
4 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.1
1 
0
.1
3 
0
.1
1 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.1
6 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
  
sp
ai
n
 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
3 
-0
.1
3 
0
.0
5 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
5 
0
.0
2 
0
.1
1 
0
.0
6 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
0 
0
.1
2 
-0
.0
2 
0
.0
1 
0
.2
1 
-0
.1
2 
0
.0
5 
0
.1
1 
0
.0
4 
0
.0
0 
-0
.1
7 
-0
.2
5 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
  
fr
an
ce
 
0
.0
2 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.2
2 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
6 
-0
.0
5 
0
.1
6 
0
.0
9 
0
.0
3 
0
.2
5 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.1
7 
-0
.2
5 
-0
.2
6 
1
.0
0 
  
  
  
p
o
rt
u
ga
l 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
5 
0
.0
1 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
5 
-0
.1
4 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
0 
0
.0
0 
0
.0
3 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.2
5 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.2
1 
0
.0
1 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.1
7 
-0
.2
3 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.1
1 
1
.0
0 
  
  
b
o
sm
an
 x
 
sm
al
l c
it
y 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
3 
-0
.0
5 
0
.0
4 
0
.0
3 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.4
1 
0
.0
1 
0
.0
0 
-0
.0
3 
0
.0
5 
0
.1
0 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.1
6 
0
.1
1 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
7 
0
.0
2 
0
.4
4 
1
.0
0 
  
w
ar
5
 x
 s
m
al
l 
ci
ty
 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.0
6 
0
.0
6 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.2
3 
-0
.0
1 
0
.0
4 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.1
3 
-0
.0
9 
0
.2
6 
0
.2
4 
-0
.1
5 
-0
.0
5 
0
.1
4 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
5 
1
.0
0 
Ta
b
le
 4
-3
 C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 t
ab
le
 
Chapter 4. Up and Down: Competing Risks in Second Tier Soccer 
73 
 
— Italy: Italian soccer almanac: "Almanacco Illustrato del Calcio—La Storia 1898-2004" 
(Melegari 2005)  
— Spain: Website of the "The Recreational Sport Soccer Statistics Foundation" (www.rsssf.com)  
— France: Website of the "The Recreational Sport Soccer Statistics Foundation" 
(www.rsssf.com) 
— Portugal: Online soccer database (www.fussballzz.de)  
 
Table 4-2 provides a detailed description of the variables and Table 4-3 the correlation matrix. 
 
Success history of club: 
Clubs' long-term histories are an indicator of their level of experience and of today's potential. This is 
why I included six variables to measure the teams' success history. The first two variables include a 
club's former success in the first tier league, and the other four variables give information on the 
success in the second tier league. In addition to the number of second tier titles, I included the 
number of previous promotions. It appears from Table 4-3 that these two variables are positively 
correlated. There are three reasons for including both: first, often there are more teams than just the 
second tier champion promoted to first tier. Second, in some rare cases, no club—not even the 
champion—is promoted; and third, sometimes the best teams—including the champion—from the 
second league qualify for play-off games for the promotion. In this case, the champion may not win 
the play-offs. Since the leagues were founded at different points in time, I added four interaction 
terms by multiplying the titles/experience variables with league age. In general, I expect experience 
in the first and second league and championship titles in the first and second tier to have a positive 
effect on promotion and a negative effect on relegation. Regarding the interaction terms, I expect 
titles as well as experience in both leagues to have a decreasing effect on promotion and relegation. 
Previous promotions (relegations) should have a positive effect on future promotions. Table 4-4 
shows the variables and the expected signs of the coefficients. 
 
Club specific factors: 
A number of variables related to recent sportive history and external influence factors are likely to 
influence success and failure. A promotion or relegation in the previous season should have a 
positive impact on relegation or promotion, respectively. This would be in line with the principle 
described as the ‘yoyo effect’ by Noll (2002). If there is already another team from the same city in 
the first tier league, I expect the impact on promotion to be negative. In line with earlier research on 
socio-economic determinants of sport performance (Jones and Ferguson 1988; Andreff 2001; 
Wallbrecht 2010), I expect clubs from larger cities to have increased (decreased) chances of being 
Chapter 4. Up and Down: Competing Risks in Second Tier Soccer 
74 
 
promoted (relegated). The sources for the variable 'bigcity' are the official city homepages as well as 
the national statistical institutes that publish population data. If a forced relegation occurred in the 
previous season, I expect the clubs to be promoted again in the following season. In addition, I 
control for forced relegation in the respective season. Obviously, if a club is relegated as punishment 
or because of financial difficulties, then the probability of being relegated (promoted) increases 
(decreases) equals 100%. If a team is a reserve or farm team of a first tier club, I expect the chances 
of being promoted to be lower since the leagues' regulations prevent farm teams from being 
promoted to the same league as the first team. On the other hand, due to their link to first tier 
teams, farm teams are often better off financially than other second tier teams and therefore, I also 
expect the chances of relegation to be lower. The information regarding whether a team is a 
reserve/farm team was either given by league tables or could be found on the clubs' official 
homepages. Table 4-5 displays the variables and the expected signs of the coefficients. 
 
Variable name 
Expected 
impact on 
promotion 
Expected 
impact on 
relegation 
Number of championship titles in first tier + - 
Number of experience in first tier + - 
Number of championship titles in second tier + - 
Number of experience in second tier + - 
Interaction term: First tier titles x League age - + 
Interaction term: First tier experience x League age - + 
Interaction term: Second tier titles x League age - + 
Interaction term: Second tier experience x League age - + 
Number of previous promotions from second to first tier + - 
Number of previous relegations from second to third tier - + 
Table 4-4 Expected effect of success history of club variables 
 
Variable name 
Expected 
impact on 
promotion 
Expected 
impact on 
relegation 
Team promoted in the previous season - + 
Team relegated in the previous season + - 
Other clubs from the same city in the first tier - 0 
Club from a big city (>100.000 inhabitants in 2010 ≈ 50% of all 
clubs) 
+ - 
Forced relegation from first to second tier in the previous 
season 
+ 0 
Forced relegation from second to third tier in this season - + 
Reserve team - - 
Table 4-5 Expected effect of club specific variables 
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League specific factors: 
In addition to club specific factors there are a number of league specific ones which I expect to have 
an impact on the probabilities of promotion and relegation. If the third tier league is a professional 
one, meaning that players, coaches and management are professionals, then I expect the relegation 
chances to increase since the financial implications for a club being relegated from the second to the 
third tier are not as serious as they are if a team is relegated to the amateur level. The number of 
promotions, relegations, and clubs should have a significant impact on the promotion and relegation 
probabilities. More promotions (relegations) should increase the chances of promotion (relegation). 
More clubs in a league should decrease the chances of promotion and relegation since more teams 
compete for the same number of promotions/relegations. In addition, I controlled for league age, 
i.e., the number of years since the foundation of the respective league. I also included a dummy 
variable for each country. I do not expect these variables to have a significant impact on promotion 
or relegation. Table 4-6 displays the variables and the expected signs of the coefficients. 
 
Variable name 
Expected 
impact on 
promotion 
Expected 
impact on 
relegation 
Third tier league professional 0 + 
Number of promotions this season + - 
Number of relegations this season - + 
Number of clubs this season - - 
League age 0 0 
Country dummy 0 0 
Table 4-6 Expected effect of league specific variables 
 
Control variables: 
Finally, I added two more variables controlling for changes in the environment of the league. The 
interaction between the 'bosman dummy' (which equals 1 for all years since 1996 and 0 otherwise) 
and the 'small city' dummy is expected to have a negative (positive) effect on relegation (promotion) 
since better talent is available at a cheaper price from other countries’ player markets making the 
leagues more balanced. The interaction between the 'war' dummy (indicating the five years after an 
interruption of the league, due to war time) and the 'small city' dummy is also expected to have a 
negative (positive) effect on relegation (promotion). Small city teams could be able to use the 
external shock to catch up with bigger city clubs. Table 4-7 shows the variables and the expected 
signs of the coefficients. 
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Variable name 
Expected 
impact on 
promotion 
Expected 
impact on 
relegation 
Interaction: bosman x small city + - 
Interaction: war5 x small city + - 
Table 4-7 Expected effect of the control variables 
 
There are a number of other potential factors that are likely to have an impact on the probability of 
relegation and promotion such as club finances, player salaries and macro-economic factors such as 
GDP or unemployment. Many researchers have analyzed the impact of these factors on success in 
sport. Quirk and Fort (1999) first showed that there is a correlation between team salary and club 
performance for the NBA and NHL. Other authors extended the field of research to other major 
leagues in the U.S. (Forrest and Simmons 2002; Frick et al. 2002; Hall et al. 2002; Szymanski 2003; 
Wiseman and Chatterjee 2003). In Europe, several studies have shown the relationship between 
salary and team performance for soccer leagues (Lehmann and Weigand 1997; Szymanski and Smith 
1997; Frick et al. 1999; Szymanski and Kuypers 1999; Szymanski 2000; Forrest and Simmons 2002; 
Hall et al. 2002; Forrest and Simmons 2004; Frick 2004). In addition, Frick (2004) showed that head 
coach salaries have a positive impact on team success in German 'Bundesliga.' Lehmann and 
Weigand (1997) found that the average age of players also affects team success. For the NHL, Jones 
and Ferguson (1988) showed that population size has a positive impact on team performance. On the 
other hand, they showed that per capita income has a negative effect, which led them to argue that 
hockey must be an inferior good. Wallbrecht (2010) showed that higher GDP, higher attendance, and 
more experience in the German 'Bundesliga' decrease the chances of being relegated while previous 
relegations increase the chances of being relegated again.  
 
Due to the long time span of my study—e.g., England since 1892, Spain and Italy since 1929—
variables to measure the factors discussed above are not available. Regional GDP, population size, 
and unemployment data are not available for all regions in all years. Financial data (e.g., club 
revenues, player salaries) has only been published in recent years (e.g., Deloitte's Football Money 
League (Deloitte 1998-2011) or German Kicker Magazine special editions (Kicker 1990-2011)). Annual 
reports are only available for clubs listed at the stock market.  
 
4.4 Regression Model 
 
Each season there is a population of clubs and at the end of each season some clubs leave this 
population, either by promotion or by relegation. The other clubs stay in the population and may 
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leave the population at another point in time. In addition, clubs that are relegated from the first 
league or promoted from the third league are added to the population. For this kind of data, event 
history analysis (also called survival or duration analysis) can be used. It analyzes the determinants of 
the length of time until an event (promotion or relegation) occurs for each club in the six leagues. 
Survival analysis is based on the concept of a hazard function. The hazard gives the probability of the 
occurrence of an event at each point in time. The method of survival analysis was first introduced in 
medical research to analyze the time until the death of a patient. More recently, it was also used in 
the social sciences to determine e.g., the length of job spells (see, e.g., Cox 1972; Andersen and Gill 
1982; Allison 1984; Cox and Oakes 1984). It has also been applied in sports economics research to 
examine quit decisions of baseball players by Ohkusa (1999; 2001), to analyze coach career durations 
in German 'Bundesliga' soccer by Barros, Frick and Passos (2009), and to investigate determinants of 
relegation from first tier soccer (Wallbrecht 2010; Frick and Wallbrecht 2012). Compared to 
traditional cross-section techniques such as OLS, Logit or Probit regression, duration analysis has 
several advantages: it can be used in the presence of right-censoring and it does not treat events at 
the beginning of a period as an event at the end of a period (see, e.g., Pérez et al. (2006) for a 
detailed analysis of the drawbacks of traditional models). 
 
In my case, the event investigated with the survival analysis is leaving the second tier league. This can 
either be by relegation or by promotion. Since these events are mutually exclusive, I use a special 
case of survival analysis, the competing risks analysis, to analyze my data. In competing risk analysis, 
instead of the regular hazard, a cause specific hazard is estimated. The cause specific hazard for a 
cause j is the instantaneous failure rate from this cause in the presence of all other possible causes of 
failure.  
 
  ( )     
   
(
  (                )
 
)
 
 
 
From the cause specific hazards, a cumulative incidence (CI) function is derived that depends on all 
cause specific hazards. This CI for a specific cause is the probability of the occurrence of this cause 
until time t while being at risk of experiencing all other possible causes (Bakoyannis and Touloumi 
2008).  
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Competing risks analysis, like survival analysis, was also first used in medical research to analyze 
different causes of death (Gichangi and Vach 2005). A historic example even dates back to Bernoulli's 
interest in estimating mortality rates (Kearns 1931). The first approach of analyzing competing risks 
was fitting two different regression models (Prentice et al. 1978; Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Kay 
1986). Obviously, having two different models makes it difficult to compare coefficients. Therefore, 
more complex models using Monte Carlo Simulation were introduced (Larson and Dinse 1985; Kuk 
1992). Later Lunn and McNeil (1995) as well as Fine and Gray (1999) proposed different models that 
can be estimated using standard software.  
 
I will use a model proposed by Lunn and McNeil (1995) to analyze my data. They use a data 
duplication method and Cox's proportional hazard regression model stratified by risk type δ to 
estimate the coefficients. The dataset is duplicated in such a way that each of the datasets is 
assigned to one cause of failure (in my case: one dataset for risk of promotion and one for risk of 
relegation). All other causes of failure are considered as being censored. With this model, the 
coefficients for both stratums are estimated simultaneously. Therefore, it is possible to estimate 
models where some covariates have the same effect on both risk types. The cause specific hazards, 
including the vector of covariates for a model with two competing risks, can be written as follows. 
 
  ( )     ( )    (  ) 
 
  ( )     ( )    (       ) 
 
where    ( ) and    ( ) are the baseline hazards for causes 1 and 2. b is a vector of regression 
coefficients and x is a vector of covariates. The hazards for causes 1 and 2 are different in their 
specific baseline hazard and the coefficient vector b differs by the vector θ. The partial likelihood for 
a Cox model stratified by risk type is 
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It is "treating the survival times of the two types of failure separately. In each case the risk set Ri 
consists of those subjects with the appropriate stratum identifier, δi = 0 for the first cause and δi = 1 
for the second" (Lunn and McNeil 1995, p. 526). 
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As further specification of the model, I use single episode data. Each new appearance in the second 
league is treated as 'new' club. Therefore, I have 2577 observations but only 728 clubs. Models with 
multiple episodes for each club only change the baseline hazard (Wallbrecht 2010; Frick and 
Wallbrecht 2012). Since the baseline hazard is not specified by Cox models there is no need to use 
multiple episode data in my case. To address the issue of multiple episodes, I control for previous 
promotions and relegations with covariates.45 
 
4.5 Regression Results 
 
As described above, the Lunn and McNeil model estimates both competing risks (promotion and 
relegation) in one regression. Table 4-8 displays the regression results. I will discuss the results in the 
same order I presented the hypotheses. 
 
Success history of club: 
The results reveal that years of experience in the first tier league increase a club's chances of 
promotion and decrease its chances of relegation to almost the same extent. This is expected since 
first tier soccer is far more lucrative than second tier soccer. Clubs that played in the first tier are 
more likely to receive financing from different sources (e.g., sponsors, banks, private investors) even 
when playing in the second league. In addition, clubs that used to play in the first tier with higher 
revenues have money to invest in stadium and other infrastructure that gives them a competitive 
edge. One more year of experience increases (decreases) the hazard of being promoted (relegated) 
by 4% (3%). The interaction term between first league experience and league age is negative. This 
means that the effect of experience becomes less important with league age. This is to be expected, 
since the older the league, the more teams have experience and so the impact of more experience 
becomes less important. The interaction term for relegation is not significant. 
 
Contrary to my expectation, first league titles have no significant impact on relegation or promotion. 
This can be attributed to the few occurrences in the sample. Only 59 of the 728 clubs that have 
played in the second league have also won a first league title before. In most cases, winning the 
championship lies in the distant past and therefore seems to have little effect on the present 
situation of the club. 
 
 
                                                          
45
  To my knowledge, there is currently no module in Stata available that is able to estimate competing risks models with 
multiple episode data. 
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Covariate 
Total 
  Promotion Relegation 
Su
cc
e
ss
 h
is
to
ry
 o
f 
cl
u
b
 
title1 
0.043   -0.124   
(0.100)   (0.204)   
Interaction: title1 x leagueage46  
-0.003   0.133   
(0.143)   (0.268)   
experience1 
0.041 *** -0.033 *** 
(0.009)   (0.012)   
Interaction: experience1 x leagueage  
-0.031 *** 0.023   
(0.012)   (0.016)   
title2 
0.009   0.108   
(0.095)   (0.113)   
Interaction: title2 x leagueage 
-0.124   -0.141   
(0.148)   (0.175)   
experience2 
-0.028 ** 0.015   
(0.013)   (0.011)   
Interaction: experience2 x leagueage 
0.049 *** -0.014   
(0.019)   (0.016)   
nrpro1 
0.062 ** -0.017   
(0.030)   (0.038)   
nrrel3 
-0.031   0.043   
(0.035)   (0.031)   
C
lu
b
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 f
ac
to
r 
proprev1 
-0.558 *** 0.280 *** 
(0.133)   (0.079)   
relprev1 
0.486 *** -0.629 *** 
(0.080)   (0.134)   
otherteams 
0.088 ** -0.025   
(0.040)   (0.042)   
bigcity 
0.448 *** -0.315 *** 
(0.105)   (0.069)   
forcedrel1 
0.009   0.836   
(0.480)   (0.727)   
forcedrel2 
-47.16   1.701 *** 
(0.000)   (0.107)   
reserveteam 
-46.14   0.095   
(0.000)   (0.209)   
Le
ag
u
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 
fa
ct
o
r league3prof 
-0.037   0.059   
(0.131)   (0.115)   
nrpro 
0.338 *** 0.028   
(0.052)   (0.045)   
 Table 4-8 Overall regression results 
 
 
                                                          
 
46
  Regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 for readability reasons. 
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 Covariate 
Total 
Promotion Relegation 
Le
ag
u
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 f
ac
to
r 
nrrel 
0.014   0.080 *** 
(0.016)   (0.008)   
nrclubs 
-0.028 *** -0.023 *** 
(0.007)   (0.005)   
leagueage 
-0.015 *** 0.010 *** 
(0.004)   (0.003)   
germany 
-0.046   0.686 *** 
(0.159)   (0.133)   
italy 
0.131   0.376 *** 
(0.134)   (0.115)   
spain 
0.211   0.347 *** 
(0.129)   (0.109)   
france 
0.150   0.127   
(0.123)   (0.114)   
portugal 
-0.053   0.627 *** 
(0.218)   (0.192)   
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
va
ri
ab
le
 Interaction: bosman x small city 
0.482 *** -0.319 *** 
(0.166)   (0.120)   
Interaction: war5 x small city 
-0.150   -0.264  * 
(0.338)   (0.160)   
  Observations 17,792   
  No of subjects 2,577   
  No of failures 2,491   
  LR chi2(56) 1,115   
  Prob > chi2 0   
  Log Likelihood -11,525   
 Table 4-8 continued 
 
More experience in the second league has a significant negative impact on promotion. The 
interaction term with league age suggests that the effect becomes less negative for older leagues. 
This is unexpected but can be explained by a phenomenon stated by Hoehn and Szymanski (1999). 
 
They show that if clubs are not promoted again in the first couple of years, then they are "trapped" in 
the second league. Dherbecourt and Drut (2009) find that experience in the second division is 
dependent on the tier level the team played in before the current second tier spell. Only experience 
after a relegation from the first league has a positive impact on promotion. For their small sample, it 
is easy to differentiate between experience after a promotion and experience after a relegation. 
There are two reasons why it is not possible for my data sample to differentiate in the same way: 
First, there are many teams in my sample that have experience after both a promotion and a 
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relegation. Second, since my research includes the whole history of the leagues, the founding clubs' 
experience cannot be assigned to an origin state (i.e., experience after promotion or experience after 
relegation). The impact on relegation is not significant. 
 
The only other significant coefficient in this group of variables is the number of previous promotions 
which is significant at the 10% level. Teams that had been promoted before increase their chances of 
being promoted again. The number of previous promotions has no significant effect on relegation. 
Other than expected, the results for the effect of second league titles is also not significant. There are 
no statistically significant results for previous relegations, either. As discussed before, I use single 
episode data. The effect of previous relegations and promotions might be accounted for in the 
baseline hazard but the baseline hazard is not estimated in a Cox model. Earlier research also shows 
that the number of previous relegations has no significant impact on future relegations (Frick and 
Wallbrecht 2012). 
 
Club specific factor: 
The fact that a club was relegated or promoted in the previous season has a statistically significant 
effect on the performance of the team. As expected, if a club was promoted from the third league, 
then its risk of being relegated is higher and its chances of being promoted again to the first league 
are lower. On the other hand, if a club was relegated from the first league, then the probability of it 
being promoted is higher and the probability of relegation into the third league are lower. The 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level and the hazard changes by up to 62%. These results extend 
earlier research by Hoehn and Szymanski (1999). They show that clubs are more likely to be 
promoted again in the first years following their demotion.  
 
The next two variables are closely related and thus call for a common explanation. First, clubs from 
big cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants have increased (decreased) probabilities of being 
promoted (relegated) with a significance level of 1% each. In addition, another team from the same 
city that plays in the first league has a positive effect on promotion. The results are driven by large 
cities such as London, Manchester, Barcelona, Madrid, Milan, Rome, Munich, Hamburg, Paris and 
Porto. This result is unexpected and conflicts with earlier research by Kuper and Szymanski (2009) as 
well as Dherbecourt and Drut (2009). They show that other teams in the first league decrease 
chances of promotion. Their explanation is that the majority of revenues from attendance and 
merchandizing already go to the soccer club of the city that plays in the higher tier. Therefore, there 
is little consumer demand for a second club. I argue that very large cities can afford two or more 
teams and that the demand for soccer exceeds the soccer provided by one club only. Since city 
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derbies are, in some cases, the main event of the year (Rome, Milan) and some clubs take advantage 
of synergies and even use the same stadium (Munich), first tier clubs can have an incentive to 
promote a second club from the same city in the same league.  
 
I control for forced relegations from the second league with the covariate 'forcedrel2'. Both 
coefficients (for promotion) are significant at the 1% level. For a team that is forcibly relegated from 
the first league in the previous season, the influence on promotion and relegation is—contrary to 
expectations—not significant. This can be attributed to the fact that I cannot separate the different 
reasons for forced relegations. On the one hand, if a team is relegated because of financial 
difficulties, one would expect that this will decrease the quality of the talent pool as well. On the 
other hand, if a team is relegated because of e.g., match fixing charges, assuming that the quality of 
the team can be maintained, then an immediate return to the first league is likely (see Juventus Turin 
in 2006/07). Since the effects point in opposite directions, the results for this compound variable are 
non-significant. One can only speculate that the variables may be significant if the reasons for the 
forced relegation could be tracked. Due to the long time frame of my analysis, it is difficult to find the 
exact reason for each forced relegation. This could be a topic for future research. 
 
In some countries, reserve or farm teams are (or have been) allowed to play in the second league by 
the national soccer associations (France and Spain). In the other leagues, farm teams are only 
allowed in lower leagues. No national soccer association allows both teams of one club in the same 
division. Therefore, the results of this variable are as expected. Being a reserve team is highly 
significant and decreases the probability of being promoted into the first league, i.e., the same 
league as the first team of the club by 100%. The impact on relegation to the third league is not 
significant. 
 
League specific factor:47 
The fact that the third tier league is a professional one does not have a significant impact on 
promotion or relegation. One explanation may be that even without the official professional status of 
the third league, many third leagues operate as if they were professional. Players and coaches 
receive salaries that allow them to focus on the sport without having to work another job. Therefore, 
the assumed financial implications may not be so serious even if the third league is not 
professional.48 
                                                          
47
  I also tested the competitive balance as a league specific variable, but it has no impact on promotion or relegation. 
48
  I also tested if it has an effect on promotion and relegation whether a club that was promoted from a professional third 
tier league (vs. a club that was promoted from an amateur league). The effect is not statistically significant for 
relegation probability. However, the probability of promotion increases significantly.  
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The number of promotions, the number of relegations, and the number of clubs competing in a given 
season impact relegations and promotions in line with expectations. The more clubs are promoted, 
the higher the probability of promotion. The more clubs are relegated, the higher the chances of 
relegation. And if there are more clubs in the league, then the chances of both promotion and 
relegation are reduced significantly to almost the same extent. 
 
The age of the league has a negative (positive) impact on promotion (relegation). For every year a 
league gets older, the hazard of promotion (relegation) decreases (increases) by 1-2%. Since the 
variable is used in four interaction terms, it is difficult to interpret the results for league age alone. 
The interaction terms are discussed above. 
 
The country dummies are significant for relegation coefficients and insignificant for promotion 
coefficients. For Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the relegation hazard is significantly higher than 
for England. We will discuss differences between the countries in the next chapter. 
 
Control variable: 
The interaction term between the 'Bosman dummy' (reflecting the time after the 'Bosman-ruling' of 
the European Court of Justice in December 1995) and the 'small city' variable (indicating clubs from 
cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants) has a significant and positive (negative) effect on promotion 
(relegation). If a club comes from a small city and the observation is after the 'Bosman-ruling,' its 
promotion (relegation) hazard changes by +62% (-27%). These results support earlier findings by Frick 
and Wallbrecht (2012). They argue that due to the liberalization of the labor market for soccer 
players and the lower income of players from e.g., Eastern European countries, it is easier for small 
market teams to sign high quality players from abroad that they would have been unable to sign 
before the 'Bosman-ruling.'  
 
The interaction term between the 'small city' variable and the 'war5' variable, indicating the first five 
seasons after a league resumed after a war, decreases the relegation hazard by 23%. It is insignificant 
for the promotion hazard. In the time after a war, many leagues started with the same clubs. In some 
cases, leagues were extended to more clubs in the first year after the war and shrunk in the following 
years. Since I have already controlled for the number of clubs and number of relegations, this cannot 
be the explanation. I therefore argue that for most clubs, the war meant that they had to begin with 
a new team and probably a new management—eliminating factors such as previous experience and 
financial status due to recent success. Many players as well as managers died or were injured serving 
in their country's military, or they were simply too old to play afterwards. Therefore, the established 
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ranking was mixed up and all teams including the yoyo teams from before the war, which usually 
came from smaller cities, had the chance to find new talent. Therefore, by 'leveling the playing field,' 
the chances of relegation decreased for small city clubs during that time. 
 
4.6 Differences in Regression Results Between Countries 
 
In addition to the overall model discussed in chapter 4.5, I estimate a number of separate country 
models. I insert interaction terms between different variables and the respective country dummies to 
identify differences between the countries (see Table 4-9 for the details on the new variables and 
Table 4-10 for the regression results).  
 
To explain all differences between the six countries, a more detailed socio-economic analysis would 
be necessary. In this paper, I can only present the results of my analysis. Differences in e.g., the effect 
of big cities could be attributed to the fact that people in some countries are more attached to their 
home town even if they moved to a city generations before, while in other countries, people identify 
with a new city faster. Therefore, the support for smaller cities and countryside clubs deteriorates 
more or less quickly. This might be an interesting field for future research in sports economics. In the 
following paragraphs I will discuss the differences between the six countries. 
 
Experience in first tier soccer has the same effect in all countries. The more experienced a club in the 
first league is, the higher (lower) its chances of being promoted (relegated). Almost all coefficients 
are significant. As the interaction term between experience and the country dummies show, there is 
no significant difference between England (as the base country for this analysis) and the other 
countries. As well as experience in first tier soccer, the effect of experience in second tier soccer is 
not different between the countries. 
 
The coefficient for the number of previous promotions that is significant at a 10% level for the overall 
model is not significant in any of the individual countries. On the other hand, the coefficient for 
number of previous relegations is not significant in the overall model while in England it significantly 
decreases the promotion hazard and in Germany it significantly increases the relegation hazard. Both 
results are in line with my expectations.  
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Interaction Covariate Description Mean 
Stand. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Te
am
's
 s
u
cc
es
s 
h
is
to
ry
 
experience1 x england 
Interaction term: (Years of experience in 
first tier since foundation of the respective 
first league) * (Country dummy - 1 if the 
club is from the respective country, 0 
otherwise) 
4.279 12.681 0 79 
experience1 x germany 0.458 2.923 0 42 
experience1 x italy 1.353 5.861 0 74 
experience1 x spain 1.067 4.715 0 68 
experience1 x france 1.353 5.568 0 56 
experience1 x portugal 0.385 3.156 0 72 
experience2 x england 
Interaction term: (Years of experience in 
second tier since foundation of the 
respective second league) * (Country 
dummy - 1 if the club is from the respective 
country, 0 otherwise) 
4.460 9.985 0 69 
experience2 x germany 0.585 2.524 0 26 
experience2 x italy 2.254 6.451 0 52 
experience2 x spain 2.323 6.485 0 49 
experience2 x france 2.230 6.089 0 41 
experience2 x portugal 0.171 1.112 0 18 
Te
am
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 
proprev1 x england 
Interaction term: (Team promoted in the 
previous season - 1 if the club was 
promoted in the previous season, 0 
otherwise) * (Country dummy - 1 if the club 
is from the respective country, 0 otherwise)  
0.028 0.165 0 1 
proprev1 x germany 0.018 0.131 0 1 
proprev1 x italy 0.037 0.190 0 1 
proprev1 x spain 0.041 0.199 0 1 
proprev1 x france 0.030 0.171 0 1 
proprev1 x portugal 0.006 0.080 0 1 
relprev1 x england 
Interaction term: (Team relegated in the 
previous season - 1 if the club was relegated 
in the previous season, 0 otherwise) * 
(Country dummy - 1 if the club is from the 
respective country, 0 otherwise)  
0.027 0.163 0 1 
relprev1 x germany 0.012 0.110 0 1 
relprev1 x italy 0.025 0.157 0 1 
relprev1 x spain 0.023 0.149 0 1 
relprev1 x france 0.021 0.145 0 1 
relprev1 x portugal 0.007 0.082 0 1 
otherteams x england 
Interaction term: (Other clubs from the 
same city in the first tier - 1 if there is a club 
from the same city in the first tier league in 
the same season, 0 otherwise) * (Country 
dummy - 1 if the club is from the respective 
country, 0 otherwise)  
0.153 0.762 0 7 
otherteams x germany 0.015 0.124 0 2 
otherteams x italy 0.008 0.094 0 2 
otherteams x spain 0.051 0.302 0 3 
otherteams x france 0.014 0.149 0 3 
otherteams x portugal 0.004 0.070 0 2 
bigcity x england 
Interaction term: (Club from a big city - 1 if 
the club is from a big city, 0 otherwise - big 
city if population was >100,000 in 2010 (≈ 
50% of all clubs)) * (Country dummy - 1 if 
the club is from the respective country, 0 
otherwise)  
0.215 0.411 0 1 
bigcity x germany 0.080 0.272 0 1 
bigcity x italy 0.115 0.320 0 1 
bigcity x spain 0.159 0.365 0 1 
bigcity x france 0.096 0.295 0 1 
bigcity x portugal 0.005 0.069 0 1 
Table 4-9 Additional variable description 
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 Covariate Description Mean 
Stand.  
dev. 
Min Max 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
bosman x small city x england Interaction term: (Bosman dummy (1 for 
all seasons since the Bosman ruling (since 
1996), 0 otherwise)) * (Small city (1 if the 
club is from a small city, 0 otherwise - 
small city if population was <100,000 in 
2010)) * (Country dummy - 1 if the club is 
from the respective country, 0 otherwise)  
0.007 0.083 0 1 
bosman x small city x germany 0.005 0.068 0 1 
bosman x small city x italy 0.013 0.112 0 1 
bosman x small city x spain 0.008 0.088 0 1 
bosman x small city x france 0.018 0.132 0 1 
bosman x small city x portugal 0.027 0.161 0 1 
war5 x small city x england Interaction term: (War dummy (1 for the 
first five years after a league resumed after 
war time, 0 otherwise)) * (Small city (1 if 
the club is from a small city, 0 otherwise - 
small city if population was <100,000 in 
2010)) * (Country dummy - 1 if the club is 
from the respective country, 0 otherwise)  
0.021 0.145 0 1 
war5 x small city x germany 0.000 0.000 0 0 
war5 x small city x italy 0.009 0.092 0 1 
war5 x small city x spain 0.010 0.099 0 1 
war5 x small city x france 0.007 0.085 0 1 
war5 x small city x portugal 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Table 4-9 continued 
 
The coefficients for being promoted or relegated in the previous season are similar between the 
country models and the overall model discussed in chapter 4.5. Most coefficients are significant and 
all coefficients point in the expected direction. Having been promoted recently increases (decreases) 
the relegation (promotion) hazard while having been relegated recently increases (decreases) the 
promotion (relegation) hazard. The interaction terms do not show any differences between the 
countries for clubs that have been relegated from the first league in the previous season. That is 
surprising because especially in England, demoted clubs receive larger shares of the TV revenues as a 
'parachute' so they do not have to sell all their players when being relegated (James 2006). On the 
other hand, clubs that have been promoted from the third division have significantly higher chances 
of being relegated in Germany, France and Portugal compared to England. The reason could be that 
the third tier leagues have less financial backing than the respective second tier leagues. In Germany, 
a professional third league was established as late as 2008 and in Portugal, the third division is still 
operating at an amateur level. In Italy, Spain and England the third league has been professional at 
least since the 1970s. Teams that are promoted from the amateur to the professional level are more 
likely to be relegated again. 
 
The fact that other teams from the same city have a positive effect on promotion cannot be 
supported by the results for all countries. Only in England and Italy is the coefficient significant. The 
coefficients for England can be explained by the fact that in England almost 25% of all events 
(promotion or relegation) happened to teams from cities with other clubs in the first league, 
compared to 5-15% in the other countries. In Italy, almost 50% of the teams that played in a city with 
another first division club were either promoted or relegated. The most interesting finding is that in 
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Italy, another club in the same city increases both the promotion and the relegation hazard. The 
results for the impact on the relegation hazard are significant at the 10% level only. 
 
The results for teams from big cities are similar and significant across the countries. Only the 
coefficients for Portugal show no significant results. This may be due to the fact that Portugal has 
only eight cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. The interaction terms between the 'bigcity' 
variable and the country dummies show that the effect on the promotion hazard is much smaller in 
Italy than it is in England. There is no difference between England and the other countries (except for 
Portugal where the results from the separate country model show insignificant results).  
 
The results for a forced relegation from the first league are in line with the overall model. However, 
the sample size is very small in all countries—e.g., the Italian league has the most forced relegations, 
with eight. Therefore, the results are either insignificant because the sample size is just too small or 
highly significant because e.g., in France all three teams49 that suffered forced relegation stayed at 
least two seasons in the second league and were neither promoted nor relegated in the season 
following the forced relegation. 
 
The league specific variables are either insignificant or show the same results in all countries, as in 
the overall model. The coefficients of the country dummies are still significant for some of the 
leagues. These differences between the leagues are not explained by any other variable. Future 
research should focus on explaining those differences with more detailed analysis on the country 
specific factors. 
 
The results from the overall model, that small city teams benefit more from the 'Bosman-ruling' than 
do big city teams, cannot be supported by the more detailed country analysis. In the individual 
country analyses, only the promotion hazards in England and Spain are significantly and positively 
affected by that variable. 
 
The same is true for the result that small city teams benefit from a war break more so than are big 
city teams. In the individual country analysis, only Spain shows a significant result for the promotion 
hazard. 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
  Lyon OU 1946, FC Rouen 1970, Olympique de Marseille in 1994. 
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4.7 Promotion and Relegation Forecasts 
 
In many business contexts, potential chances and risks are often detected too late. Early warning 
systems as suggested by Müller-Merbach (1977) have been established and have helped companies 
to detect risks early on. In soccer clubs, early warning systems could be similarly helpful. Each year 
there are different teams in the second league. Up to 1/3 of the teams are exchanged by promotion 
and relegation. The clubs' chances of promotion and risks of relegation can be higher or lower, 
depending on the relative advantages of their competitors. If e.g., three particularly strong teams are 
relegated from the first division, then chances of promotion are lower for all other teams in the 
second division. Knowing about these increased risks and chances can be useful to clubs. Saving 
money in seasons where chances of promotion (risks of relegation) are low and investing in another 
seasons when the chances are better (risks are higher) could boost a clubs' success. In addition, 
short-term reactions are very difficult in the soccer business since players can only be transferred 
twice a year during the so-called transfer windows or transfer periods. And during the winter transfer 
period there are not many players on the market. Therefore, early warning systems are even more 
crucial in soccer. 
 
In this section, I will discuss a promotion and relegation forecast calculated from the regression 
results that can help soccer clubs identify chances of promotion and risks of relegation before a 
season starts. It also gives them information for the summer transfer period. I used the country 
specific regression results shown in chapter 4.6 to calculate the forecast. Table 4-11 shows the 
promotion forecast for the season 2010/2011 and Table 4-12 shows the relegation forecast for the 
same season. 
 
There are three columns for each country showing the club's name, their actual final ranking in the 
season, and the survival hazard increase or decrease, given their characteristics at the beginning of 
the season. The teams are ordered by hazard change, beginning with the teams that have the highest 
hazard increase. In both forecast tables, the clubs that where actually promoted/relegated are typed 
in bold font. The thick line divides the teams above and below the mean hazard change. The shaded 
areas show the 90% confidence intervals around the mean hazard change. 
 
If being above the average hazard change is regarded as an early warning signal, then seven out of 16 
promotions and eight out of 18 relegations are predicted correctly by the forecast model. Including a 
confidence interval at the 90% level around the mean hazard change, it can be seen that almost all 
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teams are within this interval. This is in line with Dherbecourt and Drut (2009), who find that for 
second league clubs "almost each club stands a chance to finish in the upper level." 
 
There are limitations to the forecast model: only the promotion forecasts in Spain and Italy and the 
relegation forecasts in Germany and Spain are quite accurate. More than half of the promoted teams 
are above the mean hazard change. In addition, in Germany, VfL Bochum's final ranking was third 
place and they were not promoted because they lost the relegation game against Borussia 
Mönchengladbach. Otherwise, the two top teams from the German promotion forecast would have 
been promoted. To compare the forecast and the regression results I use the Nagelkerke (1991) 
predictor as a measure for the predictive power of the regression.   
 
  
       (
  
 
) 
 
to define the strength of dependence of outcome on the predictors. Since this predictor is negatively 
correlated with the proportion of censored observations, O'Quigley et al. (2005) proposed a measure 
that includes uncensored observations instead of total observations. Since the number of censored 
observations is limited, I use Nagelkerke's predictor for the comparison. It can be interpreted 
similarly to R-squared in linear models as the percentage of the variance of the dependent variable 
that is explained by the independent variables (see Table 4-13 for the results). 
 
Table 4-13 displays that only a small portion of the variance is explained by the variables included in 
the model. Therefore, promotions and relegations are not predicted perfectly by my regression 
models. These results point to the fact that some relevant determinants may be missing in the 
analysis, i.e., financial data on the clubs, player strength, and so forth. As explained above, these 
factors were not available for the long time span of my model.  
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  England Germany Italy Spain France Portugal 
Rank 6 1 5 4 2 3 
Nagelkerke's predictor 0.042 0.089 0.053 0.065 0.084 0.082 
Table 4-13 Predictive power of the country models 
 
4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this article I analyze the determinants of promotion and relegation in six second tier soccer leagues 
in Europe since their respective foundation (the oldest league started in 1892) until today and 
suggest an early warning system for teams with increased chances of being promoted or relegated. I 
use a competing risks analysis—a special case of survival analysis—with a data augmentation method 
and a Cox regression model as suggested by Lunn and McNeil (1995) to estimate coefficients for 
promotion and relegation simultaneously. 
 
I find that—ceteris paribus—experience of a club in the first division as well as being located in a big 
city increases the chances of being promoted and decreases the chances of being relegated by the 
same amount. Experience in the second league reduces chances of promotion. Teams get pulled 
down into the second league if they are not promoted shortly after being relegated from the first 
league. Surprisingly, previous promotions and relegations have no significant effect on promotion 
and relegation. Contrary to previous research, I find that another team from the same city playing in 
the first league has a positive impact on the promotion probability of a second tier team. The result is 
driven by large cities such as London or Madrid where more than one first tier club exists. Thus, my 
findings suggest that the demand for soccer in larger cities exceeds soccer supplied by one club 
alone. The principle known as the yoyo effect, meaning that teams that are relegated from (or 
promoted to) the first division have a higher probability of being immediately promoted (or 
relegated), is again confirmed by my findings. The same holds true for promotion from the third 
league. In addition, I find that small cities teams benefit from the 'Bosman-ruling'—increasing the 
freedom of movement of players within Europe—more so than do teams from big cities. In the years 
after the 'Bosman-ruling' their chances of promotion (relegation) increase (decrease) significantly. 
 
Looking at the country level, I find that most results are similar across countries. Most coefficients do 
not differ significantly from one another. The identified differences cannot be explained by my model 
alone. For example, being a team from a big city has a larger effect in England than it does in Italy. 
This could be related to the fact that Italians are more connected to their home town even after 
moving to a big city. A more detailed socio-economic analysis is required to explain these differences. 
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The suggested early warning system using an out of sample forecast does not predict the teams 
promoted and demoted accurately. Only seven out of 16 promotions and eight out of 18 relegations 
are predicted correctly. Most likely the lack of data—specifically financial data of the clubs or player 
strength, which is only available for recent years—is one major shortcoming. Future research should 
include financial data such as net transfer revenues and total salaries of players and coaches even if 
this means restricting the data to a shorter time scale. 
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5 Increasing Competitive Balance Differently: How Schedule Design Can Help Promoted Teams 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In his seminal paper on the baseball players' labor market, Rottenberg (1956) stated that if specific 
teams "will get the most capable players, there will be wide variation among teams in quality of play, 
contest will become certain, and attendance will decline." A few years later Neale (1964) confirmed 
that the "doubt about the competition is what arouses interest." And interest is essential for the 
revenues of sport leagues. 
 
The discussion about balanced competition is as old as sport itself. The first professional baseball 
league, the National Association of Professional Base Ball Players, failed in 1875 after only five years 
of existence. It was general practice that the richer clubs would buy the best players of the smaller 
clubs, causing the collapse of these clubs in mid-season, leaving the rich clubs without opponents 
and the players unpaid and unemployed50 (Congress 1952). The successor league, the National 
League, therefore introduced the reserve rule in 1879, which allowed all teams to reserve up to five 
players that could not be contracted by other teams. 
 
The discussion about competitive balance has been one of the major research areas in sports 
economics. Due to recent developments in professional European soccer, where the rich clubs get 
richer due to additional revenues from European cup competitions and the gap to the smaller teams 
widens (Hoehn and Szymanski 1999), competitive balance is as relevant as it was back in the 1870s. 
In Europe's professional soccer leagues, only a few teams actually compete for the respective 
national championship. The extreme is certainly Spain where only two clubs (Real Madrid and FC 
Barcelona) are 'real' competitors. To increase competitive balance in sports leagues, researchers and 
sports officials have suggested different measures, some of which have already been implemented 
(e.g., the draft system in U.S. sports leagues, broadcasting revenue sharing in European soccer 
leagues). This paper shows a different approach by suggesting the use of schedule design to improve 
competitive balance. 
 
Despite (a) suggestions by scientists that developed schedule design software and (b) increased 
computing power, soccer league administrators all over the world have designed their schedules 
manually until recently (Duran et al. 2007). In the German 'Bundesliga,' the first schedule, calculated 
by a sophisticated computer program including thousands of variables, was used in the 2007/08 
                                                          
50
  Quote by A.G. Mills, who first proposed the reserve rule. 
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season (Westphal 2011). Due to the number of different requirements from teams, TV stations, fans, 
police, European cup competitions, and so forth, even these new programs can only compute a 'best' 
solution. Fulfilling all requirements is impossible. To produce a 'fair' schedule, these programs treat 
all teams equally by trying to avoid games against many hard or easy opponents in consecutive 
games.  
 
Nevertheless, in the beginning and at the end of each season there is always a discussion among 
players, coaches, on TV shows and in newspapers about which team's schedule is particularly easy or 
hard. 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of game schedules on the teams' performance in German 'Bundesliga' 
soccer. In doing so, I find easy and difficult schedules. These results can be used to produce a 
schedule that improves competitive balance in giving the weak teams an easy schedule and the 
strong teams a difficult one. League authorities and legislators thus have an alternative to improve 
competitive balance that a) does not cost anything and b) has a minimum impact on the autonomy of 
the clubs and their financials. 
 
In the following chapters I give an overview of the work that has been done on competitive balance 
as well as schedule design. In chapter 5.3 I describe the data. Chapter 5.4 includes the model design 
and results. In chapter 5.5 I discuss my findings and chapter 5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical or theoretical analysis of the impact of schedule design on 
team performance in sports is available to date. In addition, no research has been done on the use of 
schedule design for competitive balance. 
 
 
 
5.2.1.1 Concept and Measures 
 
At first, competitive balance seems like an easy concept. Buzzacchi et al. (2003) describe competitive 
balance as the fans' expectations about who will be the winner. If the competition is perfectly 
balanced, fans think that all outcomes are equally possible. This would be a situation of complete 
5.2.1 Competitive Balance
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outcome uncertainty. If the contest is perfectly unbalanced, on the other hand, then the winner is 
already known for sure in advance. 
 
In more detail, competitive balance is a multifaceted concept. Do we want every game to be 
balanced so that both teams win with a probability of 0.5? Or do we want the championship race to 
be balanced, meaning that e.g., all 18 teams in the 'Bundesliga' have a probability of winning the 
championship of 1/18? Or do we want to have different champions over a longer period of time? 
Szymanski (2006d) divides competitive balance in two areas: match uncertainty and championship 
uncertainty. Kringstad and Gerrard (2007) divide it even further into three dimensions: the 
distribution of wins within a single season, the persistence of teams' records of wins over a longer 
period of time, and the degree of concentration of overall championship titles over a period of time. 
 
The first to address the topic of outcome uncertainty was Topkins (1949) when he mentioned that 
teams want to come close to a perfect team but they realize that it cannot be too perfect since 
"there would not be any money in that." The 'uncertainty of outcome' hypothesis explains that fans' 
interest in a competition is maximized if the outcome is perfectly uncertain. It was first stated by 
Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) and it has been used as a justification for different policy and 
rule changes since then. In an unrestricted competition there would be an equilibrium for the 
distribution of wins. The theoretical condition would be that the marginal revenue of an additional 
win should be equal to the marginal cost. Since the labor market is unrestricted as well, the marginal 
cost for a win should be equal for all teams. Unfortunately, this equilibrium does not generate 
enough outcome uncertainty. E.g., teams with larger stadiums would gain more from an additional 
win than a team with a smaller stadium. Therefore, the 'bigger' team would buy more talent than the 
'smaller' team and the outcome would become more and more certain (see, e.g., Késenne 2004).  
 
Today, most economists agree that a perfectly balanced league would not be ideal for a league. 
Szymanski (2006c), for example, suggests that a team in a large city that has more supporters should 
have a higher percentage of wins to generate the highest possible interest. He presents econometric 
evidence that a less balanced distribution of wins would have led to more attendance over the last 
25 years in MLB. Brandes and Franck (2007) analyze different European soccer leagues. For the 
German 'Bundesliga,' they find no evidence that competitive balance affects attendance. They argue 
that due to the promotion and relegation system and the qualification for European cup 
competitions, there are several competitions occurring simultaneously in one league. Therefore, 
lower levels of competitive balance are accepted by fans in European compared to nonacceptance in 
U.S. leagues. In addition, Borland and Macdonald (2003) surveyed 18 studies about the effect of 
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outcome uncertainty on attendance and found that fans would prefer to have their home team win 
rather than see a balanced game. More accurately, a probability of the home team to win of 60% 
maximizes attendance. In addition, see Szymanski (2003) for a literature review on uncertainty of 
outcome. 
 
Competitive imbalance is caused mainly by the difference in actual or potential market size of the 
teams in a league (Sloane 1976). Measures to change competitive balance can therefore either 
directly control the distribution of playing talent, or they can work indirectly by redistributing the 
revenues between clubs. As mentioned before, several measures have been suggested to improve 
competitive balance. Over the years, some of these measures have even been implemented in 
professional sports leagues. Salary caps, payroll minimums, luxury taxes, the draft system, gate and 
media revenue sharing are commonly used methods in the U.S. Compared to the U.S., European 
sports leagues in general and soccer leagues in particular51 are quite unrestricted. Only media 
revenue sharing is practiced in some European leagues. Broadcasting rights are often sold by the 
league and not by the clubs individually and revenues are distributed more or less equally among all 
teams in the league. In some national cup competitions, gate revenues are shared due to the fact 
that there is only one game and not two legs with a home game for both teams. Recently UEFA—the 
administrative and controlling body of European soccer—has designed the "Financial Fair Play Rules" 
(UEFA 2010), which all clubs have to fulfill from 2012 on in order to be able to compete in European 
soccer competitions. Though the document is quite long, it boils down to the fact that clubs need to 
make sure that they do not repeatedly spend more than they earn. Clubs will try to bend those rules 
and UEFA accountants will have quite a bit of work to do, but these regulations seem a step in the 
direction of increasing competitive balance. However, since the rules become effective in 2012, 
evidence of this has to be shown in future research.  
 
All of these measures that have been introduced in professional sports leagues strongly affect the 
management of the clubs. They either directly restrict the free movement of players and the right to 
contract all players that a club wants to sign or they are highly restrictive on the clubs' financial 
sovereignty. Table 5-1 evaluates the different measures along three dimensions: administrative cost 
for the league governing body, financial burden for the clubs and financial burden for the players. 
Column 5 shows studies on the different measures and their effect on competitive balance. 
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  We focus our research on European soccer. 
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5.2.1.2 Measurement of Competitive Balance  
 
As described above, the issue of outcome uncertainty is widely discussed in the literature and 
different authors have suggested different methods of calculating competitive balance. The simplest 
measure is the standard deviation of win percentages at the end of a season (Quirk and Fort 1992). 
According 
 
  
Administrative 
cost 
Financial 
burden for 
clubs  
Financial 
burden for 
players  
Studies on the effect of the 
measure  
Draft system  High  Low  High  
Fort (2003), Booth (2004), 
Taylor and Trogdon (2002) 
Salary cap, 
luxury tax  
High  Low  High  
Quirk and Fort (1992), 
Késenne (2000), Quirk 
(1997), Berri (2006), Lavoie 
(2006), Vrooman (2009) 
Revenue 
sharing  
High 
Low (small 
clubs), High 
(big clubs)  
Low  
Vrooman (2009), Szymanski 
(2003), Szymanski and 
Késenne (2004) 
Roster Limits  Low  Low  High  
To the best of my 
knowledge there are no 
studies that analyze the 
effect of roster size on 
competitive balance 
Reserve clause 
(Retain and 
transfer 
system)  
Medium  Low  High  
Rottenberg (1956), El-Hodiri 
and Quirk (1971), Daly and 
Moore (1981) 
Promotion 
relegation  
Low  High  Low  Buzzacchi et al. (2003) 
UEFA financial 
fair play rule  
High  High  Low  Not implemented yet 
Table 5-1 Assessment of measures to increase competitive balance 
 
to this measure, a league is unbalanced if the deviation of win percentages in a league is high. Other 
authors have suggested using the number of games/points a specific team (e.g., the 5th ranked) is 
behind the leader. A measure for concentration of championship titles can be the number of teams 
winning the championship within a certain period. Depken (1999) uses a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) which was originally used to measure the degree of concentration of market shares within an 
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industry. Leeds and von Allmen (2005) apply the HHI to the concentration of championship wins over 
a period of seasons.52 
 
Due to the problem that the standard deviation of win percentages cannot be compared across 
different leagues with e.g., a different number of teams, Fort and Quirk (1995) adjusted their earlier 
model (Quirk and Fort 1992). In comparing the standard deviation of the league with a standard 
deviation for a completely balanced league with the same number of clubs, they made different 
leagues comparable. In this completely balanced league, all wins are distributed randomly, i.e., each 
team has a win probability of 0.5 in every game. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, I will use the measure developed by Fort and Quirk (see Figure 5-1 for 
the development of competitive balance since the inaugural season of the German 'Bundesliga' in 
1963). For comparison, in 2009/10 Italy had a competitive balance of 1.59, Spain, of 2.01 and 
England, of 2.04. 
Competitive balance
1960
1.0
0.0
Year
2.0
1.5
0.5
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 5-1 Competitive balance in the German 'Bundesliga' since 1963 
 
 
 
According to Kendall et al. (2010), the schedule can have significant financial implications for the 
teams involved in the competition. In addition, it interferes with the performance of every team. 
                                                          
52
  Several other measures have been developed by e.g., Schmidt and Berri (2001) or Horowitz (1997). 
5.2.2 Schedule Design
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Finding a schedule is highly difficult: in a league with 18 teams that play against one another two 
times, there are 6,402,373,710,000,000 possible schedules (Westphal 2011). While designing a 
schedule, the league governing body has to consider different objectives and constraints by different 
stakeholders (clubs, media, sponsors, minor leagues, national teams, and so forth). Therefore, the 
schedule design literature often divides the objectives of schedules into three areas: organization, 
attractiveness, and fairness. 
 
One may be tempted to think that highly sophisticated computer programs are used to design 
schedules, as there are 6.4 quadrillion possibilities and often thousands of variables. For the German 
'Bundesliga,' this is true—but only since 2007 (Westphal 2011). Before that, as it is common in most 
professional sports leagues, templates were used and teams were moved around until the schedule 
fitted most requirements (see Appendix 5-1 for an example illustrating the template style of 
schedules from the German 'Bundesliga'). In 1996, Bartsch et al. (2006) suggested a model with 13 
variables (organization: 4, attractiveness: 6, fairness: 3). Most important in that model were the 
requests/objectives from the broadcasting companies. Fairness objectives were considered 'nice to 
have' but not 'required' (see Appendix 5-2 for details on the variables). In 2007, Stephan Westphal 
from the University of Göttingen designed a program that was able handle a large number of 
variables. For the 2010/11 season, this program was expanded and improved to fulfill more of the 
requirements simultaneously. Even with today's computer programs, it is not possible to fulfill all 
requirements. In literature on schedule design, fairness is considered inferior to attractiveness and 
other restraints. 
 
In the U.S., sports schedules are even more complicated since leagues are not playing a simple 
round-robin tournament where every team plays each other team twice. The U.S. leagues are divided 
into conferences and divisions. For example, in the NBA 82, games are played in the regular season 
(before the playoffs). Every team has to play four games against teams from the same division, either 
three or four times against the teams from the other two divisions of the same conference, and twice 
against the teams from the other conference. While in the NBA every team plays each team at least 
twice, the schedule in the NFL can be much more difficult for some teams. Every team plays each 
other team of the same division twice, each team from one other division in the same conference 
once (on a rotating three year cycle), each team from one division of the other conference once (on a 
rotating four year cycle), and each team in its own conference that finished in the same place in their 
respective division once. Weiss (1986) states that schedules in U.S. sports are always biased since 
division winners continue to the playoffs even if teams from other divisions (that did not win their 
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division) have better winning records. Teams with high (low) winning percentage are biased 
negatively (positively) by these schedules. 
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify fairness. The models that are currently being discussed divide 
teams in groups of different strengths according to their final ranks in the previous season. In a 
league with 18 teams, there is a 'hard' group (ranks 1 to 6), a 'medium' group (ranks 7 to 12), and a 
'weak' group (ranks 13 to 1853). In a schedule that is considered 'fair,' teams should either not play 
against two teams from the same strength group in two consecutive games (group-changing) or they 
should not play against two teams from the same strength group within x games (group-balanced) 
(Briskorn and Knust 2010). 
 
Two problems arise from this way of handling fairness. First, last year's table may be a good 
approximation of the strength of a team but it is certainly not ideal. Instead, one could use betting 
odds or expert predictions to account for the quality of transfers, new coaches, new management, 
etc. Second, a fair schedule as it is currently implemented in scheduling software tries to fulfill the 
requirements equally for all teams. While that might be considered fair, the discussion about 
competitive balance suggests that a more balanced league (that could be achieved by giving more 
difficult schedules to stronger teams) could be favored over an equally hard schedule for all teams. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I analyze schedules of the German 'Bundesliga' and find hard and easy 
schedules. By giving weaker teams an easier schedule and stronger teams harder schedules, league 
governing bodies could increase competitive balance. An increased competitive balance would 
increase the survival probabilities for promoted teams (or reduce the promotion probabilities of 
relegated teams in the second division).  
 
5.3 Data Description 
 
To analyze the impact of schedule design on competitive balance, I use the German 'Bundesliga' 
since its inaugural season in 1963. Due to different league sizes in the first two seasons of the 
'Bundesliga' (1963/64 and 1964/65 only 16 teams competed) and after the German Unification in 
1991 (1991/92 20 teams competed) I excluded these seasons. In total, I analyze 44 seasons with 18 
teams each. 
 
                                                          
53
  Depending on the number of promotions and relegations the ranks 15-18 are used for the promoted teams that ranked 
1-4 in the second tier last season. 
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As the dependent variable, I use the delta in win percentage54 compared to the previous season to 
measure how much better or worse a team performed in a particular season. A positive value means 
that the team has a higher win percentage in the observed season than in the previous one. For 
example, Borussia Dortmund had 59 points at the end of the 2008/09 season and 57 points at the 
end of the 2009/10 season. The maximum number of points in both seasons was 102.55 Therefore, 
the win percentage for Borussia Dortmund was 57.84% in 2008/09 and 55.88% in 2009/10. This is a 
change in win percentage of -1.96 basis points. To check for robustness I use two different 
calculations: 
 
— Converting all season before the introduction of the 3-point-rule56 in 1995 to the 3-point-rule 
(hence called 'Delta WP3') 
— Keeping the 'old' 2-point-rule win percentages for the years before 1995 (hence called 'Delta 
WP2') and the 3-point-rule win percentages for the years after 1995 
 
My primary independent variables are the opponents' strength on each of the game days. The final 
ranking of the opponent in the previous season is used as an approximation of their playing strength. 
The stronger teams have lower values and the weaker teams have higher values according to their 
rank. The opponents of Borussia Dortmund in the 2009/10 season are displayed in Table 5-2. Column 
3 shows their ranking in 2008/09 as an approximation of their strength. Since Borussia Dortmund 
itself was ranked sixth in 2008/09 there is obviously no opponent in 2009/10 with final rank of six. 
 
I use one independent variable per game day. The German 'Bundesliga' is designed as a mirrored 
round-robin tournament where every team plays each other team twice and the second leg is 
identical to the first leg except for the stadium where the game is played. Each team has one home 
and one away game against each opponent. Therefore, I use only variables for the first 17 games. 
 
Using the ranking of the previous season as an indicator of the strength of a team can be criticized 
but better indicators such as betting odds and expert predictions are only available for shorter time 
periods. Compared to schedule design software, I not only use three strength groups but also the 
actual ranking. 
 
 
                                                          
54
  Win percentage is understood here as the number of points achieved by a team divided by the maximum number of 
points possible in a season. 
55
  34 game days times 3 points for a win = 102 points. 
56
  Starting in 1995/96 a win was worth three points. Prior to 1995 a win was worth 2 points. The returns of a draw which 
gives 1 point to each team were not affected by the introduction of the 3-point-rule. 
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Game day Opponent 
Opponent's final 
rank in 2008/09 
1 1. FC Köln 12 
2 Hamburger SV 5 
3 VfB Stuttgart 3 
4 Eintracht Frankfurt 13 
5 FC Bayern Munich 2 
6 Hannover 96 11 
7 FC Schalke 04 8 
8 Borussia M'gladbach 15 
9 VfL Bochum 14 
10 Bayer Leverkusen 9 
11 Hertha BSC Berlin 4 
12 SV Werder Bremen 10 
13 1. FSV Mainz 05 17 
14 1899 Hoffenheim 7 
15 1. FC Nuremberg 18 
16 VfL Wolfsburg 1 
17 SC Freiburg 16 
Table 5-2 Borussia Dortmund's schedule in 2009/10 
 
In addition, I use several other variables to check the robustness of my 17 game day variables. The 
source of the following variables is the final season tables accessed on www.kicker.de: 
 
— Own ranking previous season 
— Own win percentage previous season 
— Dummy for 3-point-rule 
— Dummy for participation in a European cup competition 
— Dummy for starting a season with a home game 
— Dummy for each season following a European or World Cup 
— One dummy for each club (in total 50 club dummies) 
 
The information for the following transfer related variables is retrieved from www.weltfußball.de: 
 
— Number of arriving players 
— Number of departing players 
— Dummy for change in coach before the season 
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In addition, I use two measures to account for a change in playing strength compared to the last 
season. Unfortunately, these variables are not available for all seasons. The data is drawn from the 
special edition of the Kicker magazine that is published before each season.  
 
— Market value of team – only seasons 1995/96 to 2008/09 
— Net transfer revenues – only seasons 1992/93 to 2009/10 
 
 
Covariate Abbreviation 
Obser-
vations 
Mean 
Stand. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Delta win percentage (2- and 3-point-rule) Delta WP2 792 -0.07 10.67 -38.24 33.33 
Delta win percentage (only 3-point-rule) Delta WP3 792 0.64 11.29 -38.24 36.80 
Table 5-3 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent variables 
 
Tables 5-3 and 5-4 display descriptive statistics of the used variables. Since the game day variables 
and club dummies are all almost identical in mean and standard deviation, I do not show them in 
detail here.57 
 
Covariate Abbreviation 
Obser-
vations 
Mean 
Stand. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Own ranking previous season OR 792 9.50 5.19 1 18 
Own win percentage previous season (2- and 3-
point-rule) 
OWP2 792 0.49 0.12 0.25 0.81 
Own win percentage previous season (only 3-
point-rule) 
OWP3 792 0.45 0.13 0.18 0.77 
Dummy for 3-point-rule 3PR 792 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Dummy for participation in a European club 
competition 
UEFA 792 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Number of players bought Buy 792 4.74 3.10 0 18 
Number of players sold Sell 792 4.38 2.78 0 15 
Dummy for change in coach Coach 792 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Dummy for starting a season with a home game Home start 792 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Dummy for season following a European or World 
Cup 
World Cup 792 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Market value in million Market value 252 36.71 19.45 9.10 116.30 
Net transfer revenues in million Transfer 324 -2.45 7.31 -52.10 19.40 
Table 5-4 Descriptive Statistics: Control variables 
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  Details can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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5.4 Regression Model and Results 
 
The impact of the schedule on team performance was estimated using an ordinary least squares 
model: 
 
          ∑           
  
   
 (∑        
 
   
)    
 
where ΔWPt,c  =  Delta of win percentage of club c between seasons t and t-1 (WPt - WPt-1)  
 OppRi,t,c 
= Last season's final rank of the opponent of club c on game day i in  
   season t   
 Vj,t,c = Other variable j
58 in season t for club c 
 e = Error term 
 
Table 5-5 displays the regression results of a model with opponent's strength variables as 
independent variables and no further control variables. The dependent variable is the change in a 
team’s win percentage based on the 3-point-rule. 
 
It appears from Table 5-5 that the constant β0 is 166.43 and all other regression coefficients are 
negative. To calculate the change in win percentage of a team, one has to subtract a value 
(regression coefficient * opponent strength) for each game day from β0.  
 
I now get back to my example of Borussia Dortmund from Table 5-2. The following equation shows 
the estimated change in win percentage for Borussia Dortmund between seasons 2008/09 and 
2009/10: 
 
               (      )     (      )    (      )    (      )     
 (      )    (      )     (      )    (      )     (      )     
 (      )    (      )    (      )     (      )   (      )    
 (      )     (      )    (      )     
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  I used different regression models with different sets of variables from Table 5-4 to test the robustness of my results. 
See Tables 5-9 and 5-10 for the regression results. 
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The team had a win percentage of 57.84% (59 points) in 2008/09. The estimated change in win 
percentage is 0.64 base points. The calculated win percentage for 2009/10 is therefore 58.48%. This 
means that Borussia Dortmund should have reached 59.7 points in the championship in 2009/10.  
 
To maximize ∆WPt,c for a team, a schedule must be designed in a way that the team plays against the 
most difficult opponent (value=1) on the game day that has the highest regression coefficient βi. In 
this regression model, this would be the coefficient of game day 15, which is -0.899. The easiest 
opponent (value=18) should be played on game day 11 where the coefficient is lowest at -1.171. 
 
In my analysis, the actual value of the regression coefficient is of minor importance for identifying an 
easy or difficult schedule. More important is the order of the coefficients from highest to lowest. 
Since it is hard to see at a glance which regression coefficients are highest and lowest in a regular 
regression results table, I will present my findings differently throughout this paper. The x-axis of 
Figure 5-2 shows the game days and the y-axis shows the regression coefficients. This way it is easier 
to see that e.g., the highest coefficient is on game day 15 and the lowest on game day 11. 
 
I estimate 22 different regression models with the two different dependent variables and different 
sets of independent variables (see Appendix 5-3 for detailed regression results). The game day 
variables always show almost the same pattern (see Figure 5-359) as in the regressions without any 
further variables. On game days 4, 12 and 15 it is best to play against an easy opponent, whereas on 
game days 5, 8 and 11 it is better to play against a strong one. The results displayed in Figure 5-2 are 
displayed in bold in Figure 5-3. The correlation between the different regression results ranges from 
0.927 to 1.000. 
 
Including the market value and net transfer revenues a different pattern emerges. However, these 
two variables are only available for a shorter time period (1995-2008). Comparing the pattern with 
the ones obtained from the regression models without these two variables but for the same time 
period, the correlation is again very high at 0.867 and 1.000 (see Figures 5-4 for 5-5 different 
regression models). 
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  To avoid “overcomplexity” I did not include all 22 models in the figure. See Appendix 5-3 for the other regression 
results. 
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Covariate Delta WP3 
Game day 1 
-1.115 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 2 
-1.070 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 3 
-1.116 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 4 
-0.930 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 5 
-1.123 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 6 
-0.986 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 7 
-1.004 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 8 
-1.154 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 9 
-0.971 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 10 
-1.042 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 11 
-1.171 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 12 
-0.926 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 13 
-0.966 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 14 
-0.964 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 15 
-0.899 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 16 
-1.020 *** 
(0.000)   
Game day 17 
-0.994 *** 
(0.000)   
Constant 
166.434 *** 
(0.000)   
Number of obs 792   
F( 17,   774) 15.61   
Prob > F 0.000   
R-squared 0.260   
Adj R-squared 0.240   
Root MSE 9.850   
Table 5-5 Regression results for dependent variable 'Delta WP3' with game day variables only 
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Regression coefficient
0.000
Game day
-1.050
-1.000
1716151413121110987654321
-0.950
-1.100
-1.200
-1.150
Figure 5-2 Example regression results 
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-0.850
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+ Coach
-1.250
Delta WP2
Delta WP3
0.000
-0.950
Figure 5-3 Regression results60 
 
                                                          
60
  The legend of the respective figure displays the dependent variables used and the additional control variables. 
Descriptions of the variables can be found in Tables 5-3 and 5-4. 
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Delta WP3
Delta WP2 + OR
+ Home start
+ UEFA + Coach
+ Market value
Delta WP2 + Buy
+ Sell + Coach
+ Market value
6 7 8 9
Delta WP2
54321
Delta WP3 + OR
+ Net transfer
revenue
-1.800
-1.700
-1.600
Regression coefficient
-1.400
-1.300
10 11 12 13 14 15
-1.500
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16
Figure 5-4 Regression results including market value and net transfer revenues for 1995 to 2008 
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Figure 5-5 Regression results – Decade models 
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I conclude that the regression results—while being very robust for different regression models for a 
specific time period—are not robust over different time periods (see Figure 5-5 for different 
regressions for the five decades (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s)). As we have seen in the two 
figures above, the pattern of coefficients is almost identical for different models. In the remainder of 
this paper I therefore use the model with 'Delta WP3' as the dependent variable, the primary 
independent variables for the opponent's strength on the 17 game days and no further control 
variables. 
 
5.5 Findings and Discussion 
 
 
 
Since the results are not robust over time, we have to decide on the model that fits the data best. 
There are good reasons to use the complete model and not to divide the data by e.g., decades. First, 
using decades, only 180 instead of 792 observations remain for each decade (for the 1960s and the 
1990s there are even less observations61). Since each of the 17 game day variables can take 18 
different values, a data base with 180 observations will not be a large enough population. The second 
reason is that schedule designers have recently used programs that prevent schedules from being 
random. As mentioned earlier, schedules are now set in such a way that teams do not consecutively 
play against teams of similar strength. In addition, I have no information on any changes in the 
schedule design templates used earlier and therefore cannot account for any changes made. 
 
To see the impact of schedule design, I use my findings for the 'Delta WP3' model without further 
control variables. For these regression results, the easiest possible schedule for last season's 
champion is displayed in Figure 5-6. In this easy schedule the team would play against the sixth team 
of the last season on game day one, against the seventh team on game day two, and so forth. 
 
The influence of having an easy compared to a hard schedule can be seen (Table 5-6) when 
calculating the values of the dependent variable for the easiest and hardest schedule. The first of the 
previous season obviously cannot play against the first and the second cannot play against the 
second. Therefore, the value of the dependent variable differs for the teams. If the first ranked team 
from the previous season has the easiest possible schedule, the win percentage decreases 
statistically by 1.36 basis points. It may seem counter-intuitive that a team's win percentage 
                                                          
61
  The league started in 1963 with 16 teams. In 1965 the league expanded to 18 teams. Since I only look at seasons with 
18 teams, the observations for the 1960s are reduced by five seasons. Since 20 teams played in 1991/92 the there are 
only nine seasons observed in the 1990s.  
5.5.1 Win Percentage
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decreases with the easiest schedule. However, a club must have played an exceptional season to 
become champion. Even with an easy schedule it will be hard to repeat last year’s performance.62 If 
the first gets the hardest schedule possible, the win percentage decreases by 14.79 basis points. For 
the tenth of the last season, the win percentage decreases by 6.15 basis points with the hardest and 
increases by 8.45 basis points with the easiest schedule.  
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Figure 5-6 Easiest possible schedule for the team ranked first in the previous season 
 
 
 
In Table 5-6 the change in win percentage with the easiest/hardest possible schedule is presented. 
To be able to assess a real schedule I now introduce an additional measure: degree of schedule 
difficulty (DSD). The DSD compares the real schedule to the easiest and hardest schedule possible. It 
is calculated on a linear scale between the values of the change in win percentage for the easiest and 
hardest schedule as displayed in Table 5-6. If the real schedule is equal to the easiest schedule, then 
the DSD is zero and if it is equal to the hardest schedule, then it is one. It appears from Figure 5-7 
that Hoffenheim and Hannover had the most difficult schedules, while Mainz and Stuttgart had the 
easiest ones in the season 2009/10.  
                                                          
62
  For the team that ranked last in the previous season (or the last team that was promoted respectively), the reasoning is 
similar. If a team is relegated, they played a bad season. As with an exceptionally good season, it is also hard to repeat a 
particularly bad one. 
5.5.2 Degree of Schedule Difficulty
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Ranking 
previous season 
Win percentage  
increase/decrease with 
Easiest 
schedule 
Hardest 
schedule 
1 -1.36 -14.79 
2 -0.19 -13.89 
3 0.96 -12.96 
4 2.08 -12.03 
5 3.20 -11.07 
6 4.31 -10.10 
7 5.38 -9.13 
8 6.43 -8.15 
9 7.45 -7.15 
10 8.45 -6.15 
11 9.44 -5.13 
12 10.43 -4.09 
13 11.40 -3.02 
14 12.37 -1.90 
15 13.33 -0.79 
16 14.26 0.34 
17 15.19 1.49 
18 16.09 2.66 
Table 5-6 Change in win percentage with easiest and hardest schedule 
Degree of schedule difficulty (DSD)
0.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10.0
Ø 0.5
Hertha BSC Berlin
VfL Bochum
1. FC Nuremberg
Hannover 96
SC Freiburg
1. FC Cologne
Borussia M’gladbach
1899 Hoffenheim
Eintracht Frankfurt
1. FSV Mainz 05
VfL Wolfsburg
Hamburger SV
VfB Stuttgart
Borussia Dortmund
Bayer Leverkusen
SV Werder Bremen
FC Schalke 04
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Figure 5-7 Degree of schedule difficulty for season 2009/10 
 
Chapter 5. Increasing Competitive Balance Differently:  
How Schedule Design Can Help Promoted Teams 
119 
 
Comparing all teams across all seasons (as shown in Figure 5-8) reveals that the average DSD is quite 
similar for all teams that participated for more than ten seasons. Some had slightly harder schedules 
(e.g., Mönchengladbach, Cologne, and Leverkusen) and some had easier ones (e.g., Stuttgart, 
Duisburg, and Düsseldorf). The DSD varies more for the teams with fewer seasons. Fortuna Cologne 
only played one season. Despite their easy schedule they were relegated at the end of the 1973/74 
season. 
 
Figure 5-7 displays the DSD for one season, Figure 5-8 displays the DSD for the complete history of 
the 'Bundesliga.' Now, I discuss the DSD per decade. As presented in the previous section, the 
regression results are not identical for different periods of time. The base regression for calculating 
the DSD so far has been the complete regression model from Table 5-5. Now, I compare the DSD 
calculated from the complete regression model with the DSD calculated from the decade regression 
models (see Figure 5-5). In Figure 5-9 there are two DSDs for each club per decade (one on the x-axis 
and one on the y-axis). Since only some of the 50 teams have been in the 'Bundesliga' in all decades, 
Figure 5-9 displays only 143 (instead of five decades * 50 teams = 250) observations. 
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Figure 5-8 Average degree of schedule difficulty for all 'Bundesliga' clubs since 1964/65 
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Figure 5-9 Comparison of degree of schedule difficulty for complete model vs. decade models 
 
In the white areas of the graph, both DSDs are either above or below 0.5. The results in the grey 
areas include observations where the decade model implies an average DSD above 0.5 and the 
complete model implies an average DSD below 0.5 (and vice versa). Only about a third of the 
observations are in the grey areas. The results are positively correlated at 0.83. 
 
 
 
The dependent variable indicates an increase/decrease of the win percentage compared to the 
previous season. Using the 'real' schedules with the regression estimates, I can now calculate the 
final ranking for all seasons. From the final rankings, the competitive balance can be derived. Figure 
5-10 displays the real competitive balance (as seen in Figure 5-1) and the one calculated from my 
model using the 'real' schedule. 
5.5.3 Competitive Balance
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Figure 5-10 Real and estimated competitive balance 
 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this article I have analyzed the impact of schedule design on team performance in the German 
'Bundesliga' between 1965 and the most recent seasons. Using several linear regression models, I 
extracted schedules that are easy and schedules that are difficult, i.e., leading to a better or worse 
performance of the respective team.  
 
I use these results to estimate the competitive balance for all seasons63 of the 'Bundesliga' since 
1965. Figure 5-11 shows the competitive balance estimated with my model given the real schedule 
(black line/triangle markers), as well as the range between the most balanced and most unbalanced 
schedules possible. In the most unbalanced (balanced) schedule, the best team of the previous 
season gets the easiest (hardest) schedule and the last team gets the hardest (easiest). This range is 
indicated by the grey bars. 
 
                                                          
63
  In 1991/92 there were 20 teams in the league. Therefore, we excluded this season from our analyses. 
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Figure 5-11 Competitive balance with real, most balanced, and most unbalanced schedule 
 
If a league governing body wants to increase or decrease competitive balance, schedule design is a 
'cheap' measure. In addition, scheduling can be used as a new revenue stream by the league if easy 
schedules are auctioned to the teams. These revenues could then be used e.g., to close the financial 
gap between the rich and the poor clubs. 
 
Regarding future research goals, I have to mention that I have not taken into account the difference 
between home and away games in my analysis. In addition, future research could focus on a shorter 
time span to be able to include the difference between the actual ranking at the end of the season 
and the estimated ranking calculated from betting odds at the beginning of the season as dependent 
variable. 
 
5.7 Appendix 5-1: Schedule Example of German 'Bundesliga' from 1983/84 
 
To give an example of the templates that were used I have randomly picked a season. In my case, it is 
the 1983/84 season. As displayed in Table 5-7, there are sequences of games that most teams share. 
E.g., most teams play against the 15th, 16th and 13th of the previous season in a row (see the white 
areas with a black border). The teams that were 15th, 16th or 13th (Braunschweig, Mannheim, and 
Bochum) themselves still have the same sequence with just one different opponent. There are more 
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identical sequences marked grey and black and there are even more that I have not marked in this 
example. E.g., teams often play against the 11th and 8th of the last season after they played the grey 
sequence. 
 
Table 5-7 Example for schedule template for German 'Bundesliga' 1983/84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Club 
Ranking 
previous 
season 
Opponent's strength on game day 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
VfB Stuttgart 3 15 6 16 7 13 18 12 11 5 8 4 9 14 17 10 2 1 
Hamburger SV 1 6 7 18 8 9 11 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 4 14 10 3 
Borussia M'gladbach 12 9 17 2 15 16 13 3 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 8 
FC Bayern München 4 11 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 3 14 10 1 6 7 18 
SV Werder Bremen 2 16 13 12 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 8 9 17 3 15 
1. FC Köln 5 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 3 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 
Bayer Leverkusen 11 4 14 10 6 7 1 18 3 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 
Arminia Bielefeld 8 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 3 9 17 2 15 13 12 16 
Eintracht Braunschweig 15 3 16 13 12 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 8 9 17 2 
KFC Uerdingen 05 18 14 10 1 6 7 3 11 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 4 
SV Waldhof Mannheim 16 2 15 3 13 12 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 9 17 8 
1. FC K'lautern 6 1 7 3 18 11 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 4 14 10 
Borussia Dortmund 7 10 6 1 3 18 11 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 4 14 
Fortuna Düsseldorf 9 12 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 8 3 17 2 15 16 13 
VfL Bochum 13 17 2 15 16 3 12 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 8 9 
Eintracht Frankfurt 10 7 18 11 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 4 14 3 1 6 
Kickers Offenbach 17 13 12 5 4 14 10 1 6 7 18 11 8 9 3 2 15 16 
1. FC Nürnberg 14 18 11 8 9 17 2 15 16 13 12 5 4 3 10 1 6 7 
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5.8 Appendix 5-2: Variables of Bartsch et al. for Scheduling German 'Bundesliga' 1995/96 
 
Area Variable name Description Required 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
Stadium 
availability 
Stadiums are also used for other purposes (concerts, etc.) X 
Regions 
In some regions (e.g., North Rhine-Westphalia) many clubs are 
located. To avoid heavy traffic and high demand for local safety staff, 
only a maximum number of home games should take place. 
X 
Security aspects 
Some games between clubs with well-known hooligans have to be 
scheduled e.g. in day time. 
X 
League 
interdependent 
Other leagues / competitions have to be taken into consideration. 2nd 
league, national and European cup competitions are relevant. 
O 
A
tt
ra
ct
iv
en
es
s 
  
Breaks 
The number of breaks has to be minimized. In a 'normal' schedule 
each team should have home and away games alternately. If this 
pattern is broken, one speaks of a break. 
X 
Min # 
days/match 
Every team plays each other team twice. The competition is divided 
into two half-seasons. The time between the games of the same 
teams has to be minimized. 
X 
Home 
preferences 
Some teams have preferences for home game dates. E.g., Bayern 
Munich wants to play at home during 'Oktoberfest'. In addition, 
promoted teams should start with a home game. All other teams that 
started with an away game in the previous season should have a 
home game, too. 
  
Attractive games 
Broadcasting companies require that attractive games (games 
between teams that performed well last season or local derbies are 
evenly distributed over the whole season). 
X 
Fixed matches 
'Fixing' matches means that specific matches should be scheduled in 
the last three rounds of the season (e.g., the first and the second of 
the previous season should play against each other at the end of the 
season). 
X 
Min/max # of 
games 
A minimum and maximum number of games has to be scheduled on 
every weekday to fulfill broadcasting, radio, and lottery companies' 
requirements. 
X 
Fa
ir
n
es
s 
 
Days without 
games 
Teams should have at least two days between two matches (incl. 
national and European cup competitions). 
X       
Opponent 
strength 
Tough and weak opponents have to be distributed evenly over the 
season. Tough and weak is measured by the final score at the end of 
the previous season. The six teams with the highest score are 'hard', 
the next six teams are 'medium' and the last six teams are 'weak'. The 
schedule is then designed in a way that no two teams belonging to the 
same group are scheduled against each other in two consecutive 
rounds. 
O 
Forbidden 
breaks 
In the second and last round, there should be no breaks, so no team 
starts or ends with two away games. 
X 
Table 5-8 Constraints for designing a schedule for the German 'Bundesliga' 
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5.9 Appendix 5-3: Detailed Regression Results 
 
Covariate Delta WP2 
Delta WP2 + 
World cup 
Delta WP2 + 
World cup + 
3PR 
Delta WP2 + 
Home start 
Delta WP2 + 
UEFA 
Delta WP2 
+ UEFA + 
OWP2 
Delta WP2 + 
UEFA + OR 
Delta WP2 + 
OR 
Number of obs 792   792   792   792   792   792   792   792   
F( 17,   774) 11.67   11.04   10.46   11.05   11.58   11.62   11.04   11.10   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.20   0.20   0.20   0.20   0.21   0.22   0.21   0.21   
Adj R-squared 0.19   0.19   0.19   0.19   0.19   0.20   0.19   0.19   
Root MSE 9.62   9.62   9.63   9.62   9.58   9.52   9.57   9.62   
Game day 1 
-0.927 *** -0.927 *** -0.927 *** -0.921 *** -1.130 *** -0.572 *** -11.964   -12.297   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.006)   (0.217)   (0.207)   
Game day 2 
-0.886 *** -0.886 *** -0.886 *** -0.881 *** -1.070 *** -0.511 ** -11.898   -12.251   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.015)   (0.219)   (0.208)   
Game day 3 
-0.948 *** -0.948 *** -0.948 *** -0.942 *** -1.145 *** -0.574 *** -11.973   -12.313   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.008)   (0.217)   (0.206)   
Game day 4 
-0.803 *** -0.802 *** -0.802 *** -0.801 *** -1.007 *** -0.447 ** -11.838   -12.171   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.034)   (0.222)   (0.211)   
Game day 5 
-0.966 *** -0.966 *** -0.966 *** -0.964 *** -1.180 *** -0.624 *** -12.008   -12.331   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.215)   (0.205)   
Game day 6 
-0.835 *** -0.836 *** -0.836 *** -0.834 *** -1.035 *** -0.477 ** -11.868   -12.205   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.023)   (0.221)   (0.210)   
Game day 7 
-0.868 *** -0.867 *** -0.867 *** -0.868 *** -1.068 *** -0.520 ** -11.895   -12.232   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.014)   (0.219)   (0.209)   
Game day 8 
-0.980 *** -0.980 *** -0.980 *** -0.981 *** -1.170 *** -0.619 *** -11.999   -12.346   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.216)   (0.205)   
Game day 9 
-0.830 *** -0.830 *** -0.830 *** -0.832 *** -1.035 *** -0.477 ** -11.867   -12.199   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.026)   (0.221)   (0.210)   
Game day 10 
-0.873 *** -0.873 *** -0.873 *** -0.875 *** -1.072 *** -0.511 ** -11.902   -12.240   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.016)   (0.219)   (0.209)   
Game day 11 
-0.983 *** -0.983 *** -0.983 *** -0.983 *** -1.188 *** -0.619 *** -12.022   -12.354   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.215)   (0.205)   
Game day 12 
-0.771 *** -0.771 *** -0.771 *** -0.768 *** -0.981 *** -0.429 ** -11.813   -12.139   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.041)   (0.223)   (0.212)   
Game day 13 
-0.816 *** -0.816 *** -0.816 *** -0.812 *** -1.023 *** -0.470 ** -11.858   -12.189   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.026)   (0.221)   (0.211)   
Game day 14 
-0.823 *** -0.823 *** -0.824 *** -0.821 *** -1.020 *** -0.471 ** -11.848   -12.187   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.024)   (0.221)   (0.210)   
Game day 15 
-0.759 *** -0.759 *** -0.759 *** -0.752 *** -0.967 *** -0.404 * -11.801   -12.129   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.060)   (0.223)   (0.213)   
Game day 16 
-0.873 *** -0.872 *** -0.872 *** -0.866 *** -1.067 *** -0.509 ** -11.897   -12.241   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.016)   (0.220)   (0.209)   
Game day 17 
-0.811 *** -0.811 *** -0.811 *** -0.805 *** -1.009 *** -0.456 ** -11.842   -12.180   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.031)   (0.222)   (0.211)   
Own ranking previous 
season 
    0.433                   -10.831   -11.366   
    (0.527)                   (0.264)   (0.243)   
Own win percentage 
previous season 
                    -26.710 ***       
                    (0.002)           
Dummy for 3-point-
rule 
        -0.403                       
        (0.578)                       
Dummy for being a in 
a EC competition 
                3.015 *** 3.280 *** 2.992 ***   
                (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.005)       
Number of players 
bought 
                                
                                
Number of players 
sold 
                                
                                
Dummy for change in 
coach 
                                
                                
Dummy for starting 
the season with a 
home game 
            -0.572                   
            (0.415)                   
Dummy for season 
following a EC/WC 
        0.415                       
        (0.545)                       
Constant 
140.097 *** 139.867 *** 140.004 *** 139.918 *** 171.454 *** 94.291 *** 2023.529   2083.927   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.222)   (0.211)   
Table 5-9 Regression results – Regular models 
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Covariate 
Delta WP2 
+ Buy + Sell 
+ Coach 
Delta WP2 
+ OR + 
Home start 
+ UEFA + 
Coach 
Delta WP2 
+ UEFA + 
Coach 
Delta WP2 
+OR + 
OWP2 + 
World cup + 
3PR + 
Home start 
+ UEFA + 
Buy + Sell + 
Coach 
Delta WP2 
+OR + 
World cup + 
3PR + 
Home start 
+ UEFA + 
Buy + Sell + 
Coach 
Delta WP2 
+ OR + 
World cup + 
3PR + 
Home start 
+ UEFA + 
Coach 
Delta WP2 
+ OR + 
World cup + 
3PR + 
Home start 
+ Coach 
Delta WP2 
+ OWP2 
Number of obs 792   792   792   792   792   792   792   792   
F( 17,   774) 14.50   14.19   15.61   12.82   12.25   12.94   12.98   11.59   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.27   0.28   0.28   0.30   0.29   0.28   0.27   0.21   
Adj R-squared 0.25   0.26   0.26   0.28   0.26   0.26   0.25   0.19   
Root MSE 9.21   9.18   9.18   9.05   9.16   9.19   9.24   9.57   
Game day 1 
-0.963 *** -10.580   -1.145 *** -7.078   -8.912   -10.361   -10.759   -0.396 * 
(0.000)   (0.255)   (0.000)   (0.442)   (0.338)   (0.266)   (0.251)   (0.051)   
Game day 2 
-0.958 *** -10.551   -1.120 *** -7.046   -8.882   -10.332   -10.750   -0.357 * 
(0.000)   (0.256)   (0.000)   (0.444)   (0.340)   (0.267)   (0.251)   (0.083)   
Game day 3 
-0.983 *** -10.592   -1.162 *** -7.068   -8.923   -10.374   -10.778   -0.406 * 
(0.000)   (0.254)   (0.000)   (0.442)   (0.337)   (0.265)   (0.250)   (0.052)   
Game day 4 
-0.855 *** -10.483   -1.047 *** -6.968   -8.803   -10.263   -10.662   -0.271   
(0.000)   (0.260)   (0.000)   (0.449)   (0.344)   (0.271)   (0.255)   (0.185)   
Game day 5 
-0.996 *** -10.626   -1.193 *** -7.124   -8.954   -10.408   -10.796   -0.437 ** 
(0.000)   (0.253)   (0.000)   (0.439)   (0.336)   (0.264)   (0.249)   (0.033)   
Game day 6 
-0.872 *** -10.493   -1.054 *** -6.986   -8.819   -10.274   -10.677   -0.305   
(0.000)   (0.259)   (0.000)   (0.448)   (0.343)   (0.270)   (0.254)   (0.134)   
Game day 7 
-0.933 *** -10.551   -1.117 *** -7.056   -8.874   -10.332   -10.734   -0.347 * 
(0.000)   (0.256)   (0.000)   (0.443)   (0.340)   (0.267)   (0.251)   (0.089)   
Game day 8 
-1.046 *** -10.647   -1.210 *** -7.163   -8.985   -10.428   -10.841   -0.458 ** 
(0.000)   (0.252)   (0.000)   (0.436)   (0.334)   (0.263)   (0.247)   (0.024)   
Game day 9 
-0.871 *** -10.504   -1.065 *** -6.990   -8.826   -10.285   -10.683   -0.299   
(0.000)   (0.259)   (0.000)   (0.447)   (0.343)   (0.270)   (0.254)   (0.148)   
Game day 10 
-0.934 *** -10.547   -1.109 *** -7.045   -8.880   -10.329   -10.732   -0.341 * 
(0.000)   (0.257)   (0.000)   (0.444)   (0.340)   (0.268)   (0.252)   (0.099)   
Game day 11 
-1.030 *** -10.652   -1.211 *** -7.134   -8.985   -10.433   -10.830   -0.442 ** 
(0.000)   (0.252)   (0.000)   (0.438)   (0.334)   (0.263)   (0.248)   (0.032)   
Game day 12 
-0.799 *** -10.436   -0.999 *** -6.932   -8.757   -10.217   -10.609   -0.245   
(0.000)   (0.262)   (0.000)   (0.451)   (0.347)   (0.273)   (0.257)   (0.226)   
Game day 13 
-0.866 *** -10.496   -1.058 *** -6.991   -8.819   -10.276   -10.672   -0.291   
(0.000)   (0.259)   (0.000)   (0.448)   (0.343)   (0.270)   (0.255)   (0.153)   
Game day 14 
-0.873 *** -10.482   -1.049 *** -6.998   -8.815   -10.264   -10.669   -0.301   
(0.000)   (0.259)   (0.000)   (0.447)   (0.343)   (0.270)   (0.254)   (0.136)   
Game day 15 
-0.825 *** -10.449   -1.016 *** -6.935   -8.777   -10.231   -10.624   -0.224   
(0.000)   (0.261)   (0.000)   (0.451)   (0.346)   (0.272)   (0.257)   (0.281)   
Game day 16 
-0.930 *** -10.539   -1.108 *** -7.026   -8.861   -10.319   -10.728   -0.344 * 
(0.000)   (0.257)   (0.000)   (0.445)   (0.341)   (0.268)   (0.252)   (0.093)   
Game day 17 
-0.861 *** -10.480   -1.045 *** -6.977   -8.803   -10.261   -10.664   -0.285   
(0.000)   (0.260)   (0.000)   (0.448)   (0.344)   (0.271)   (0.255)   (0.164)   
Own ranking previous 
season 
    -9.439       -6.744   -7.736   -9.218   -9.822       
    (0.310)       (0.463)   (0.406)   (0.322)   (0.294)       
Own win percentage 
previous season 
            -40.864 ***           -24.591 *** 
            (0.000)               (0.004)   
Dummy for 3-point-rule 
            -2.725 *** -1.295   -0.271   -0.143       
            (0.007)   (0.184)   (0.695)   (0.837)       
Dummy for being a 
participant in a European 
club competition 
    3.014 *** 3.049 *** 3.768 *** 3.204 *** 3.038 ***       
    (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.003)           
Number of players 
bought 
-0.140           -0.111   -0.072               
(0.334)           (0.507)   (0.672)               
Number of players sold 
0.336 **         0.384 ** 0.406 **             
(0.038)           (0.018)   (0.014)               
Dummy for change in 
coach 
-6.963 *** -6.791 *** -6.813 *** -7.084 *** -6.958 *** -6.769 *** -6.763 ***   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)       
Dummy for starting the 
season with a home game 
    -0.504       -0.441   -0.435   -0.505   -0.545       
    (0.451)       (0.505)   (0.515)   (0.451)   (0.418)       
Dummy for season 
following a European or 
World cup 
            0.123   0.196   0.243   0.253       
            (0.849)   (0.764)   (0.710)   (0.701)       
Constant 
148.7 *** 1791.7   178.0 *** 1219.3   1504.2   1754.2   1825.8   66.5 ** 
(0.000)   (0.260)   (0.000)   (0.438)   (0.344)   (0.271)   (0.254)   (0.016)   
Table 5-9 continued 
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Covariate Delta WP3 
Delta WP3 
+ OR 
Delta WP3 
+ OR + 50 
club 
dummies 
Delta WP3 
+ 50 club 
dummies 
Delta WP3 
+ OWP3 
Delta WP2 
+ OR + 
Coach 
Number of obs 792   792   792   792   792   792   
F( 17,   774) 15.61   14.82   6.30   6.37   17.02   15.03   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.26   0.26   0.36   0.36   0.28   0.27   
Adj R-squared 0.24   0.24   0.31   0.31   0.27   0.25   
Root MSE 9.85   9.85   9.40   9.41   9.67   9.22   
Game day 1 
-1.115 *** -12.543   -12.616   -1.598 *** 0.010   -10.719   
(0.000)   (0.208)   (0.191)   (0.000)   (0.965)   (0.251)   
Game day 2 
-1.070 *** -12.492   -12.555   -1.543 *** 0.050   -10.710   
(0.000)   (0.210)   (0.193)   (0.000)   (0.822)   (0.251)   
Game day 3 
-1.116 *** -12.538   -12.639   -1.626 *** 0.022   -10.738   
(0.000)   (0.208)   (0.190)   (0.000)   (0.923)   (0.250)   
Game day 4 
-0.930 *** -12.355   -12.423   -1.408 *** 0.171   -10.619   
(0.000)   (0.215)   (0.197)   (0.000)   (0.433)   (0.255)   
Game day 5 
-1.123 *** -12.546   -12.620   -1.607 *** -0.008   -10.753   
(0.000)   (0.208)   (0.190)   (0.000)   (0.970)   (0.249)   
Game day 6 
-0.986 *** -12.414   -12.489   -1.472 *** 0.124   -10.632   
(0.000)   (0.213)   (0.195)   (0.000)   (0.571)   (0.255)   
Game day 7 
-1.004 *** -12.425   -12.485   -1.475 *** 0.089   -10.689   
(0.000)   (0.212)   (0.195)   (0.000)   (0.683)   (0.252)   
Game day 8 
-1.154 *** -12.577   -12.617   -1.605 *** -0.051   -10.794   
(0.000)   (0.207)   (0.190)   (0.000)   (0.814)   (0.248)   
Game day 9 
-0.971 *** -12.398   -12.467   -1.451 *** 0.140   -10.636   
(0.000)   (0.214)   (0.196)   (0.000)   (0.529)   (0.255)   
Game day 10 
-1.042 *** -12.466   -12.535   -1.521 *** 0.077   -10.686   
(0.000)   (0.211)   (0.193)   (0.000)   (0.730)   (0.252)   
Game day 11 
-1.171 *** -12.600   -12.635   -1.617 *** -0.020   -10.785   
(0.000)   (0.206)   (0.190)   (0.000)   (0.930)   (0.248)   
Game day 12 
-0.926 *** -12.353   -12.378   -1.361 *** 0.175   -10.566   
(0.000)   (0.215)   (0.199)   (0.000)   (0.423)   (0.258)   
Game day 13 
-0.966 *** -12.396   -12.448   -1.429 *** 0.139   -10.631   
(0.000)   (0.214)   (0.197)   (0.000)   (0.528)   (0.255)   
Game day 14 
-0.964 *** -12.386   -12.418   -1.407 *** 0.129   -10.625   
(0.000)   (0.214)   (0.197)   (0.000)   (0.554)   (0.255)   
Game day 15 
-0.899 *** -12.327   -12.397   -1.380 *** 0.223   -10.586   
(0.000)   (0.216)   (0.198)   (0.000)   (0.319)   (0.257)   
Game day 16 
-1.020 *** -12.445   -12.452   -1.438 *** 0.096   -10.690   
(0.000)   (0.212)   (0.196)   (0.000)   (0.664)   (0.252)   
Game day 17 
-0.994 *** -12.422   -12.456   -1.439 *** 0.116   -10.625   
(0.000)   (0.213)   (0.196)   (0.000)   (0.601)   (0.255)   
Own ranking previous season 
    -11.423   -11.014           -9.777   
    (0.252)   (0.253)           (0.295)   
Own win percentage 
previous season 
                -47.976 ***   
                (0.000)       
Dummy for 3-point-rule 
                        
                        
Dummy for being a 
participant in a European 
club competition 
                        
                        
Number of players bought 
                        
                        
Number of players sold 
                        
                        
Dummy for change in coach 
                    -6.786 *** 
                    (0.000)   
Dummy for starting the 
season with a home game 
                        
                        
Dummy for season following 
a European or World cup 
                        
                        
Table 5-9 continued 
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Covariate Delta WP3 
Delta WP3 
+ OR 
Delta WP3 
+ OR + 50 
club 
dummies 
Delta WP3 
+ 50 club 
dummies 
Delta WP3 
+ OWP3 
Delta WP2 
+ OR + 
Coach 
Dummy for SV Werder Bremen 
        -7.100 *** -7.105 ***       
        (0.001)   (0.001)           
Dummy for Hamburger SV 
        -7.087 *** -7.084 ***       
        (0.001)   (0.001)           
Dummy for VfB Stuttgart 
        -7.744 *** -7.466 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Borussia Dortmund 
        -8.374 *** -8.371 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Borussia 
M'gladbach 
        -7.975 *** -7.959 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for 1. FC Köln 
        -8.439 *** -8.440 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for 1. FC K'lautern 
        -10.006 *** -9.995 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for FC Schalke 04 
        -9.213 *** -9.202 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Eintracht Frankfurt 
        -10.584 *** -10.591 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Bayer Leverkusen 
        -6.503 *** -6.491 ***       
        (0.004)   (0.004)           
Dummy for VfL Bochum 
        -14.928 *** -14.902 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Hertha BSC Berlin 
        -9.371 *** -9.362 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for 1. FC Nürnberg 
        -13.626 *** -13.595 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for MSV Duisburg 
        -15.515 *** -15.511 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Karlsruher SC 
        -14.436 *** -14.410 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Fortuna Düsseldorf 
        -12.341 *** -12.324 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Hannover 96 
        -16.492 *** -16.482 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for TSV 1860 München 
        -11.438 *** -11.408 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Eintracht 
Braunschweig 
        -11.860 *** -11.842 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for VfL Wolfsburg 
        -10.724 *** -10.727 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Arminia Bielefeld 
        -17.323 *** -17.309 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for KFC Uerdingen 05 
        -13.918 *** -13.877 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Hansa Rostock 
        -15.313 *** -15.312 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for SC Freiburg 
        -16.282 *** -16.252 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for SV Waldhof 
Mannheim 
        -14.001 *** -14.015 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Kickers Offenbach 
        -9.879 ** -9.883 **         
        (0.013)   (0.013)           
Dummy for Rot-Weiss Essen 
        -13.711 *** -13.695 ***       
        (0.001)   (0.001)           
Dummy for FC St. Pauli 
        -18.777 *** -18.790 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for FC Energie Cottbus 
        -17.250 *** -17.258 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Table 5-9 continued 
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Covariate Delta WP3 
Delta WP3 
+ OR 
Delta WP3 
+ OR + 50 
club 
dummies 
Delta WP3 
+ 50 club 
dummies 
Delta WP3 
+ OWP3 
Delta WP2 
+ OR + 
Coach 
Dummy for 1. FSV Mainz 05 
        -11.850 ** -11.864 **         
        (0.018)   (0.018)           
Dummy for 
Alemannia Aachen 
        -14.299 *** -14.270 ***       
        (0.004)   (0.004)           
Dummy for SG Wattenscheid 
09 
        -15.573 *** -15.543 ***       
        (0.007)   (0.007)           
Dummy for 1. FC 
Saarbrücken 
        -16.487 *** -16.449 ***       
        (0.001)   (0.001)           
Dummy for Dynamo Dresden 
        -24.380 *** -24.288 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Dummy for Rot-Weiß 
Oberhausen 
        -17.464 *** -17.476 ***       
        (0.001)   (0.001)           
Dummy for 1899 Hoffenheim 
        -7.267   -7.214           
        (0.292)   (0.295)           
Dummy for Wuppertaler SV 
        -18.729 *** -18.729 ***       
        (0.001)   (0.001)           
Dummy for Borussia 
Neunkirchen 
        -20.807 *** -20.779 ***       
        (0.003)   (0.003)           
Dummy for FC 08 Homburg 
        -16.766 *** -16.773 ***       
        (0.004)   (0.004)           
Dummy for SpVgg 
Unterhaching 
        -16.933 ** -16.974 **         
        (0.015)   (0.015)           
Dummy for Stuttgarter 
Kickers 
        -9.675   -9.725           
        (0.317)   (0.315)           
Dummy for SV Darmstadt 98 
        -17.015 ** -17.026 **         
        (0.015)   (0.015)           
Dummy for Tennis Borussia 
Berlin 
        -22.000 *** -21.962 ***       
        (0.002)   (0.002)           
Dummy for SSV Ulm 1846 
        -15.651   -15.683           
        (0.106)   (0.105)           
Dummy for Fortuna Köln 
        -14.309   -14.262           
        (0.140)   (0.141)           
Dummy for SC Preußen 06 
e.V Münster 
        (omitted) (omitted)         
                        
Dummy for Blau-Weiß 90 
Berlin 
        -25.207 *** -25.180 **         
        (0.009)   (0.010)           
Dummy for VfB Leipzig 
        -22.018 ** -22.011 **         
        (0.023)   (0.023)           
Dummy for Tasmania 1900 
Berlin 
        -35.004 *** -34.916 ***       
        (0.000)   (0.000)           
Constant 
166.4 *** 2120.2   2135.7   252.2 *** 8.2   1818.3   
(0.000)   (0.214)   (0.195)   (0.000)   (0.788)   (0.255)   
Table 5-9 continued 
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Covariate 
Delta WP3 - 
1960s 
Delta WP3 - 
1970s 
Delta WP3 - 
1980s 
Delta WP3 - 
1990s 
Delta WP3 - 
2000s 
Number of obs 90   180   180   162   180   
F( 17,   774) 3.19   6.16   4.51   4.18   2.68   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.43   0.39   0.32   0.33   0.22   
Adj R-squared 0.30   0.33   0.25   0.25   0.14   
Root MSE 10.13   9.35   9.07   10.27   10.33   
Game day 1 
-1.152 *** -1.341 *** -1.133 *** -1.015 *** -0.516 ** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.022)   
Game day 2 
-1.886 *** -1.079 *** -0.817 *** -1.073 *** -0.775 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
Game day 3 
-0.904 *** -1.132 *** -1.022 *** -1.186 *** -0.913 *** 
(0.008)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 4 
-1.386 *** -0.845 *** -0.707 *** -0.862 *** -1.078 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 5 
-1.321 *** -1.136 *** -1.003 *** -1.232 *** -0.793 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
Game day 6 
-1.166 *** -0.988 *** -0.904 *** -0.953 *** -0.795 *** 
(0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 7 
-1.263 *** -0.944 *** -0.812 *** -0.917 *** -0.830 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 8 
-1.503 *** -1.126 *** -1.062 *** -1.286 *** -0.689 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
Game day 9 
-1.457 *** -0.833 *** -0.694 *** -1.141 *** -0.904 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 10 
-1.181 *** -1.393 *** -0.729 *** -0.990 *** -0.784 *** 
(0.002)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
Game day 11 
-1.290 *** -1.017 *** -1.032 *** -1.351 *** -1.026 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 12 
-1.089 *** -0.897 *** -0.777 *** -1.170 *** -0.721 *** 
(0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
Game day 13 
-1.307 *** -0.775 *** -0.589 *** -1.317 *** -0.810 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 14 
-1.111 *** -0.871 *** -1.039 *** -0.823 *** -0.895 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Game day 15 
-1.357 *** -0.779 *** -0.695 *** -0.910 *** -0.682 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005)   
Game day 16 
-1.462 *** -0.911 *** -0.951 *** -0.987 *** -0.592 *** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.007)   
Game day 17 
-1.242 *** -1.118 *** -0.819 *** -0.905 *** -0.762 *** 
(0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
Constant 
210.950 *** 164.282 *** 141.310 *** 172.846 *** 128.785   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Table 5-11 Regression results – Decade models 
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
 
To address the main research questions stated in the introduction, this dissertation analyzes 
determinants of promotion and relegation in professional soccer leagues. Using survival analysis and 
data that often contains more than 50 seasons per country, I identify factors that have a significant 
effect on promotion and relegation. 
 
In chapter 2 I show—in line with findings presented by other authors for (many) other industries—
that 'liability of newness' and 'liability of smallness'—two theory fragments of organizational 
ecology—can be used to explain the pattern of relegation in sports leagues. Clubs that just entered a 
first tier sports league are more likely to be relegated (i.e., 'liability of newness'). In addition, small 
clubs have a higher risk of relegation than big clubs (i.e., 'liability of smallness'). Controlling for 
'founding conditions,' i.e., conditions in the first season a club played in the first tier league, we show 
that the 'Bosman-ruling'64 has a significant effect. In line with other labor market research, we show 
that small market teams may benefit the most from the opportunity to sign high quality players from 
abroad. Our analysis shows that applying organizational ecology and survival analysis specifically to 
success in soccer yields significant and plausible results that can be used to explain determinants of 
relegation. 
 
In the subsequent chapter 3—in line with more general studies on Olympic success, but contrary to a 
study on location in the National Hockey League (NHL)—I show that soccer is a normal and not an 
inferior good. The higher the wealth of a region, measured in GDP per capita, the more successful a 
soccer team is. Contrary to expectations, I find that the size of the population surrounding a soccer 
club plays no significant role. One reason could be that clubs do not recruit their players from the 
regional talent pool anymore using country-wide and even global scouting departments to find 
young talent. Most interestingly, being geographically close to other first, second or even third tier 
clubs seems to have no significant impact on relegation probabilities. This point, if shown for U.S. 
sports leagues, could support new clubs in becoming members of a professional sports league in the 
U.S. (NHL, NBA, NFL, MLB). In the U.S., new clubs are often rejected because existing members from 
the same city or region expect a negative impact on their own (athletic and financial) success in the 
league.  
 
                                                          
64
  In 1995, the European Court of Justice decided in the so called “Bosman-ruling” that EU football players were given the 
right to transfer without any transfer fee at the end of their contracts. In addition, the restriction on the number of 
players from other EU countries was lifted. 
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In the following chapter 4, I find that—ceteris paribus—the experience of a club in the first division 
as well as it being located in a big city increases the chances of being promoted and decreases the 
chances of being relegated equally. Experience in the second league reduces the chances of 
promotion. Surprisingly, previous promotions and relegations have no significant effect on 
promotion and relegation. Contrary to previous research, I find that another team from the same city 
playing in the first league has a positive impact on the promotion of a second tier team. Regarding 
differences between leagues in Europe, I find that coefficients—while varying slightly from country to 
country—are of similar magnitude and significance levels. Comparing promotion with relegation, I 
show that the regression coefficients for the variables are similar in magnitude and significance while 
pointing in opposite directions. In addition, I propose a forecast model that identifies the promotion 
and relegation probabilities. This forecast model needs to be adjusted by future research to include 
club internal variables such as player salaries, transfer fees and so forth. I could then help club 
managers to save money in seasons with low chances of promotion and risks of relegation and invest 
in seasons with more pronounced chances or risks. 
 
In chapter 5, I analyze the impact of schedules on win percentage of the individual clubs using the 
schedules of all clubs playing in the German 'Bundesliga' since 1965. With these estimation results, I 
develop easy and difficult schedules for clubs. These findings can be used in two ways by the league 
governing body to improve competitive balance. First, they could give the easier schedules to the 
weaker teams. Second, auctioning the right of an easy schedule to the clubs could also create 
revenues for the league governing body. This money could be given to the weaker clubs to invest in 
better players, thus, increasing competitive balance. 
 
As I already mentioned in the individual chapters, there are some shortcomings that could be 
interesting topics for future research. In future research on promotion and relegation, the following 
ideas could be incorporated: 
 
— Some theory fragments of organizational ecology are used in chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
Using other theory fragments such as organizational change or organizational foundings 
could enrich the interpretation of the empirical results. 
— The human capital of players and head coaches as well as the transfers of players and head 
coaches is likely to affect the promotion and relegation probabilities of teams. Therefore, the 
composition as well as changes in the composition of the teams (e.g., player strength 
measured e.g., by grades from sports magazines, average age of teams, cultural factors such 
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as countries of origin of players) should be taken into account when estimating more 
elaborate models. 
— Differences in the institutional arrangements across leagues and changes in these 
arrangements or other changes in the environment of the league over time are likely to 
affect the survival probabilities of new and established teams perhaps in similar, perhaps in 
different ways. In chapter 4, I included interruptions in leagues due to war and I also included 
the “Bosman-ruling” in chapters 2 and 4. However, the impact of other changes (introduction 
of the 3-point-rule, increase in TV revenues and so forth) on promotion and relegation 
should be analyzed in more detail. 
— Using financial data such as total revenues, net transfer revenues or salaries of players and 
coaches, which will only be available in more recent years, could give more information on 
promotion and relegation probabilities—even if this means restricting the analysis to a 
shorter time period. 
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